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ABSTRACT 
 
 
JOHN THOMAS RODDEY HOLDER. A brief glimpse of blue: examining the 
participation and political effects of 21st-century election reform in North Carolina. 
(Under the direction of DR. MARTHA E. KROPF) 
 
 
 This study examines registration, voting and election results in the presidential 
elections from 1992 to 2012. During this period, North Carolina introduced a series of 
election reforms which were designed to increase political participation by making 
registration and voting more widely accessible. These reforms included making One Stop 
early voting and absentee voting by mail universally available, and making it possible to 
register and vote in a single step at an early voting site. This study examines the 
implementation of these reforms by county boards of elections, and the effects which 
they have had on voter participation and on election results. The study finds that election 
reform has coincided with an increase in voter turnout, and produced a short-term 
advantage for the Democratic Party. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Public policy in the United States is largely determined by the outcomes of 
elections. Election outcomes are greatly affected by which potential voters are able and 
willing to participate, and which are not. Therefore, the question of who votes, and who 
does not, has significant implications for public policy, and for American democracy in 
general. An individual’s ability to participate in the voting process may depend on the 
conditions and requirements for doing so, while one’s willingness to participate is 
affected by behavioral and attitudinal factors which may not be addressed simply by 
structural changes making the process of registration and voting less complicated or more 
easily accessible. Numerous federal court decisions have held that the fundamental right 
to vote is guaranteed and protected by the U.S. Constitution, but in the decentralized 
system of American government, the conditions and requirements for exercising that 
right are largely enacted by state legislatures and almost entirely implemented by state 
and local election authorities (Hasen 2005). Thus, individual circumstances and 
institutional factors both play a role in determining whether one participates in voting, or 
does not.   
Much of the contemporary intellectual debate about the issue of voter 
(non)participation centers around whether institutional or behavioral factors are more 
responsible for nonvoting. If structural impediments are the primary reason for 
nonvoting, then removing these impediments will result in greater turnout and a 
participating electorate which is more demographically representative of the population 
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as a whole. If attitudinal factors are primarily responsible, then changing the process will 
not increase participation among those who choose to abstain. As will be discussed 
herein, much of the scholarship on an individual’s decision whether to vote (beginning 
with Downs 1957) frames it in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. It is argued that if the 
individual perceives the benefits of voting to exceed the costs, he will vote; if he 
perceives the costs to exceed the benefits, he will abstain.  
Institutional or structural change which makes the process easier reduces the costs 
of voting, while changing the potential voter’s attitude, perhaps by giving him the 
opportunity to vote for a candidate about whom he is sufficiently enthusiastic, increases 
the benefits. The present research will approach the question primarily from the 
institutional perspective, arguing that a significant positive effect on participation can be 
achieved through legal and procedural reforms which increase opportunities to vote. This 
may include easing requirements for registration, lifting restrictions on absentee voting 
by mail, and increasing the amount of time and the number of locations which an 
individual has available to cast his vote in person. Beginning in 2000, the state of North 
Carolina sequentially implemented each of these reforms; however, in 2013, legislation 
was enacted repealing Same Day voter registration (North Carolina General Statutes 163-
82.6A); curbing the number of days available for early voting (while requiring sites to be 
operated for the same number of hours as in previous elections; North Carolina General 
Statutes 163-227.2), while not affecting eligibility requirements for absentee voting by 
mail (North Carolina General Assembly Session Law 2013-381). This legislation, and its 
possible effects, will be discussed in the concluding chapter of the work. 
3 
 
This research will examine the implementation of these reforms, and their 
political and participation effects in the four most recent presidential elections. The 
reforms to be examined are One Stop absentee voting (also known as in-person early 
voting), which was first made universally available in the presidential election of 2000; 
eligibility of registered voters to cast absentee ballots by mail without providing an 
excuse, initially enacted in 2004; and same day registration, which allows a potential 
voter to register and vote in a single step during the early voting period1, beginning in 
2008. (No new reforms were enacted in 2012.) The present research will examine the 
extent to which each of these reforms, individually and in combination, have affected 
participation and partisan voting patterns in presidential elections in the state. The effects 
(and effectiveness) of the reforms depends largely on the manner in which they are 
implemented by county election authorities, whose resources for doing so are largely 
determined by Boards of County Commissioners. This may lead to disparities between 
counties; for example, while the Board of Elections is responsible for determining the 
number, location, and hours of operation of the county’s One Stop voting sites, the Board 
of Commissioners determines the funding available for the operation of elections, which 
includes the resources necessary to operate the One Stop sites.  
Kimball and Kropf (2006) argue that appropriate levels of funding are necessary 
for proper administration of elections, but that local county governments do not generally 
regard this as a high priority.  This would lead to the conclusion that a lack of necessary 
                                                            
1 Some other states allow registration and voting in a single step during both the early voting period and 
on Election Day, but North Carolina was the first to allow same day registration only during early voting. 
Those who wish to vote on Election Day must still register 25 days in advance. This means that same day 
registrants are by definition early voters, which allows for an examination of the effects of this reform in 
North Carolina in ways which are not possible in most other electoral jurisdictions. Same day registration, 
however, was abolished in North Carolina by legislation enacted in 2013. 
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funds may inhibit the successful implementation of reforms designed to facilitate greater 
access to the polls; as will be discussed later in this work, greater access is perceived by 
both parties to benefit Democratic candidates, and thus Republican-controlled county 
legislative authorities might be particularly reluctant to devote large amounts of resources 
to, for example, the operation of early voting sites over a period of several weeks 
preceding an election. 
The research questions to be examined are as follows: How have these recent 
election reforms been implemented by North Carolina county authorities? To what extent 
have these reforms been carried out differently in different jurisdictions? How have these 
reforms, in their substance and in their implementation, affected voter participation and 
partisan voting patterns in presidential elections? Can these reforms be shown to have 
caused increased voter registration and turnout? And have these results varied across 
counties as a result of any observed differences in implementation? In particular, have the 
results varied according to different levels of support for implementation provided by 
Democratic- and Republican-controlled Boards of County Commissioners?  
With respect to the turnout effect of election reform, of particular interest is 
whether these effects have been observed among members of traditionally 
disenfranchised and nonparticipatory groups, such as the poor, the less well-educated, 
and members of racial minority groups. If the reforms have achieved the latter result, has 
it caused significant change in the demographic composition of the state’s electorate, 
making the pool of voters more closely representative of the population of the state as a 
whole? And have these reforms had an effect on the partisan outcomes of presidential 
elections in the state? For example, to what extent can these reforms be shown to have 
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contributed to Barack Obama’s victory in North Carolina in 2008? Given that Obama 
narrowly failed to repeat his success in the state in his 2012 re-election bid, can these 
reforms be seen to have had a long-term partisan effect, or were they simply practices 
which had a particular impact in a unique set of election circumstances, but have no long-
term appeal or effect? And what might the curtailment of these reforms mean for political 
participation by groups of traditional nonvoters? 
The work will be based on the legal-institutional theory of political participation, 
which explains nonparticipation as primarily the result of procedural barriers, rather than 
the behavioral theory of nonvoting.2 The institutional argument holds that the more 
complicated the process of registration and voting is, the less likely some individuals will 
be to participate in it. Therefore, easing or removing these barriers – such as North 
Carolina’s reforms allowing registration and voting in a single step during early voting, 
expanding the time available for casting one’s vote, and removing the restrictions on 
being able to vote away from one’s polling place on a designated Election Day – should 
increase turnout. If the institutional theory holds true, then the reforms should produce 
this expected result, if they are implemented as intended.  
The behavioral theory, conversely, holds that nonparticipation may result from 
factors such as an individual’s perception of his lack of a stake in the political system, 
low political efficacy, and disillusionment or alienation, which lead to a decision not to 
vote. This theory posits that the necessary conditions for many potential voters to actually 
participate include mobilization by political organizations (Jackson 1996), and the 
existence of what the would-be voters perceive to be a meaningful choice being made 
                                                            
2 The definitions are those used by Piven and Cloward (2000). 
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available to them (Southwell 1986). In the absence of these conditions, procedural voting 
reforms would be expected to have a minimal effect on turnout, and the answer to the 
perceived problem of large-scale nonparticipation lies beyond the political system’s 
ability to solve it simply by making the process of registration and voting easier.  The 
present work will argue, consistent with the legal-institutional theory, that procedural 
reform can, in fact, have a significant effect on political participation, and has indeed 
done so in North Carolina. However, the effectiveness of these reforms in increasing 
turnout may be affected by differential implementation of them. 
Much of the literature on voting and nonvoting is derived from Downs’ (1957) 
conception that a rational individual will, essentially, make an economic decision in 
deciding whether to vote or abstain: Do the costs of voting outweigh the benefits? Both 
the institutional and behavioral theories can be applied here. Those for whom the “costs” 
are high will not vote, nor will those for whom the perceived benefits (to oneself or to 
society) are low. Downs (1957) argues that the costs are highest, and the perceived 
benefits lowest, for low-income citizens who are most likely to find onerous the process 
of obtaining the information and complying with the requirements (time, registration, 
travel to the polls, the act of voting itself), while the costs are lowest and the benefits 
highest (and thus voting is most likely) for higher-income citizens with easier access to 
information, greater skill in navigating the process, and a greater sense that they will 
derive benefit from participation. 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) expand on Downs’ argument by distinguishing 
between a self-interested “instrumental benefit” and the “expressive benefit” of having 
fulfilled one’s sense of civic duty. Again, these perceived benefits are greater for those 
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who believe themselves to have a greater stake in the system, and “[p]eople with political 
resources can more easily bear the cost of voting.” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, p. 
8, emphasis in original) Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) elaborate on the “resource 
model” by arguing that participation requires resources which are addressed by both 
institutional factors (e.g., having the time to vote) and behavioral (e.g., development of 
civic skills). Structural reform may be both  necessary and sufficient to facilitate 
participation by some voters, while it is necessary but not sufficient for others. This 
argument will be explored in greater detail later in this work. The differential effects of 
socioeconomic status, such as income and education, will be incorporated into the model, 
and will be used to examine the behavioralist argument that election reform which 
addresses structural but not attitudinal factors actually increases the stratification of the 
electorate, rather than making it more representative of the population as a whole. 
Reforms to widen access to electoral participation have been advocated as a 
means of increasing traditionally low U.S. voter turnout (Hansen 2001; Fortier 2004; 
Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum and Miller 2007), to reduce the “costs” of voting (time, 
travel to polling place, and administrative concerns) for nonvoters and those who 
participate only occasionally, and to provide for more accurate and secure elections 
(Gronke and Toffey 2008). Another goal is to facilitate participation by members of 
traditionally underrepresented groups, making the voting population more representative 
of the population as a whole (Rosenfield 1994). This would make the results of elections 
a more accurate expression of the views of the entire electorate. Ideally, American 
democracy should be stronger if the reforms accomplish these goals. In addition, to the 
extent that increased participation affects the results of elections and the popular choice 
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of leaders, these reforms will have larger implications for public policy, because elections 
ultimately determine the policies which the elected members of government pursue and 
adopt. These issues therefore pose significant questions to be explored within the fields of 
political science and public policy, and the present research seeks to make an intellectual 
and policy contribution to these fields of inquiry by exploring and assessing both the 
effectiveness and impact of these policies, and their implementation, which is a vital part 
of the policy process. 
This work posits that the eligible voting population can be divided into five 
groups: those who regularly vote without prompting or assistance; those who never vote 
nor express an interest in doing so, regardless of the ease of the process or the candidate 
choices made available to them; nonvoters who would potentially participate only if 
structural barriers pertaining to registration and voting were minimized or completely 
removed; nonvoters who would potentially participate only if they were mobilized, in 
ways including assistance with registration, contact from a campaign representing a 
candidate the otherwise-nonvoter was willing to make the effort to support, and 
assistance in getting to the polls or obtaining an absentee ballot; and nonvoters who 
would potentially participate only in both the presence of mobilization efforts and the 
absence of structural obstacles. 
The latter three groups are the focus of this work, for they, and not the first two, 
are the ones whose behavior may change as a result of the reforms examined herein. 
 [S]omeone who is almost certain to vote, like the person who is 
almost  certain not to vote, is probably relatively unaffected by  
small changes in the benefits, costs, or resources of participation.  
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, p. 10) 
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How, then, do “small changes in the benefits, costs or resources of participation” affect 
those who are not certain either to vote or to abstain? Different reforms may vary in their 
effects on different individuals or groups, particularly if the ways in which the reforms 
are implemented also vary. 
The institutional theory would explain increased turnout if it is observed among 
the third group; the behavioral theory would explain increased turnout if it is observed 
among the fourth; and both theories would contribute to an understanding of increased 
turnout if it is observed among the fifth. Indeed, the necessary combination of 
institutional and behavioral factors which would be necessary to change the political 
behavior of the last group mentioned requires a framework which draws upon both of the 
existing theories, and which might provide a third theoretical perspective specific to the 
unique characteristics of that segment of the populations.  This third perspective will be 
discussed later in this work. 
The present study encompasses the presidential elections of 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008 and 2012, with data from 1992 included for comparison purposes. The work will 
examine the enactment and implementation of each reform in North Carolina. The study 
uses publicly available county-level data from the North Carolina State Board of 
Elections and county Boards of Elections on voter registration, voter turnout, voting 
method,  the partisan composition of county commissions during each election year, the 
number of One Stop voting sites opened in each county in each year, and presidential 
election results3. Multivariate regression will be used to examine the extent to which 
                                                            
3 Voter registration data includes the race and partisanship of registrants and voters. Voting method data 
includes Election Day precinct voting, absentee by mail, or in-person early voting. Provisional, curbside 
and transfer ballots are included in the dataset but are excluded from the analysis because the method by 
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changes in turnout, demographics, and results can be explained by the effects of each 
type of reform, and their implementation. A cross-sectional panel study format will be 
used to assess the impact of these reforms across the elections being examined, with 1996 
as the last election before any of the reforms were adopted.  
The three reforms were introduced sequentially. The 1996 election serves 
effectively as a pre-test, pre-reform baseline. In that election, One Stop early voting was 
offered by some counties but not required statewide, those who wished to vote absentee 
were required to meet certain criteria, and eligibility to vote required registration 30 days 
in advance of Election Day. Each of these conditions changed in subsequent elections. As 
mentioned above, 2000 was the first presidential election with universally available One 
Stop early voting, 2004 the first with no excuse absentee voting by mail (NEAV), and 
2008 the first with same day registration (SDR). This allows for an analysis of the effects 
of each reform in sequence and combination: One Stop in 2000; One Stop + NEAV in 
2004; and One Stop + NEAV + SDR in 2008 and 2012.  
The analysis will thus consider the effects of the first reform in the second 
election examined, the first two reforms in the third election, and all three reforms in the 
fourth and fifth. The major dependent variables for the study of participation effects will 
be the turnout percentage of voting age population, turnout percentage of registered 
voters, and registration percentage of voting age population in each county. Voter 
registration will be distinguished by party to determine whether the effects differ for self-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
which they were cast cannot be determined. The partisan composition of county commissions was 
determined through an analysis of election returns for individual commission races where available. 
Where these data were not available, contemporaneous newspaper accounts to determine the partisan 
affiliation of individual commissioners. Sources for these accounts include The Charlotte Observer, The 
(Raleigh) News & Observer, the Asheville Citizen-Times, the Greensboro News & Record, the Winston-
Salem Journal, and the Greenville Daily Reflector. Election results are categorized by method of voting 
where available. 
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identified Democrats and Republicans. The dependent variable for the study of partisan 
effects will be the Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote in each county in each 
election, with separate consideration of each method of voting (Election Day and 
nonprecinct, which is separated into One Stop and absentee by mail where the data were 
available). Again, changes in these results (for each method) will be used to determine 
the effects of the various reforms. Partisan control of each county commission during 
each election will be incorporated into the models to determine whether this has a 
differential effect on implementation, with a dependent variable representing the 
percentage of the vote which is cast nonprecinct in each election, and an independent 
variable representing the relative availability of One Stop voting in each county. 
Original Contributions of This Work to the Literature 
The anticipated contributions of this work to the literature are as follows. The 
paper will examine whether the observed effects of each of these reforms are long-term; 
transitory; or only applicable under certain circumstances, particularly those defined by 
political context or variations in county-level implementation. This has significance for 
an evaluation of the success of these policy changes. 
As noted above, elections are administered, and election policies implemented, at 
the state and local level. In North Carolina, it is primarily the case that county authorities 
administer and implement decisions made at the state level. While elections officials 
themselves are (at least nominally) nonpartisan, both state and county Boards of Election 
(who determine the choice of those officials) are weighted in favor of the political party 
of the incumbent governor. Kimball, Kropf and Battles (2006) and Kropf, Vercellotti and 
Kimball (2013) argue that, in some cases, the partisanship of election authorities may 
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affect their implementation of requirements such as those related to provisional voting. 
Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2011) find that many local election officials 
believe that reforms such as election day registration and early voting add to the 
administrative burdens of their duties, which may have implications for the manner in 
which those officials implement the reforms. 
North Carolina is an important case to examine because it appears to be an 
exception to the generally observed pattern that early voting depresses turnout. The work 
will explore why this is the case. North Carolina experienced the nation’s largest growth 
in voter turnout between 2004 and 2008, at a time when early voting was rapidly growing 
in popularity and same day registration was being introduced. Therefore, it provides a 
valuable case study of the potential impact of these reforms on participation. 
As will be discussed further in the literature review portion of this work, most 
previous research has indicated that early voting has marginal, mixed or even negative 
effects on turnout4. A good deal of work has found that early voting makes it easier and 
more likely for previous participants to vote again, but that it does little to bring in new 
voters or to increase voting rates among members of groups which are traditionally less 
likely to participate, such as African-Americans5. North Carolina clearly seems to be an 
exception to these findings, as turnout in general and One Stop turnout specifically have 
increased in every presidential elections where One Stop has been available. One Stop is 
now the preferred method of voting for a majority of North Carolinians, and the 
                                                            
4 See, for example, Stein (1998); Hansen (2001); Gans (2004); Fitzgerald (2005); Gronke, Galanes-
Rosenbaum and Miller (2007); Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2009); Leighley and Nagler (2009). 
 
5 See, for example, Berinsky, Burns and Traugott (2001); Neeley and Richardson (2001); Berinsky (2005); 
Fitzgerald (2005); Giammo and Brox (2008); Leighley and Nagler (2009); Rigby and Springer (2010); 
Larocca and Klemanski (2011); Stein, Owens and Leighley (2003). 
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percentage of registered black voter turnout exceeded that for whites in 2008. This 
research will examine why North Carolina appears to be different, or was different in this 
particular case.  
North Carolina is also an important case to examine because it appears that early 
voting and other reforms at least temporarily contributed to a Republican “red” Southern 
state becoming Democratic “blue” on the presidential level in 2008. While the effects of  
general demographic change in the state’s population cannot be understated, this is a 
valuable case in which to examine the particular partisan effects of election reform. The 
result in 2008 may have been affected by differential implementation of election laws, or 
by the fact that the mobilization efforts by the Barack Obama campaign were greater and 
more successful in North Carolina than those of recent previous Democratic presidential 
nominees.  The sequential nature of the introduction of these reforms in North Carolina 
makes it possible to analyze the effects of each reform individually. 
The research on Election Day/same day registration indicates that turnout 
increases as restrictions (advance deadlines or otherwise) decrease, but that this has no 
consistent partisan effects (e.g., Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Again, North 
Carolina’s clear Democratic advantage in SDR in 2008 is an exception, and the present 
research will seek to determine why this is the case. North Carolina’s status as the first 
state to offer same day registration during early voting but not on Election Day will also 
allow the study to make original contributions to the existing body of work in this field. 
This study incorporates the registration and election data for 2012. This will 
facilitate the production of one of the first analyses of that election in North Carolina, as 
well as a comparison of the different results of 2008 and 2012: Did the reforms help 
14 
 
Obama win the first time, but fail to do so the second? And, if so, why was this the case? 
Did these reforms have a long-term systemic effect, or were they, in this case, a short-
term phenomenon produced by the unique political, mobilization and implementation 
circumstances of the 2008 election? 
This is a case study of one particular type of election in one 16-year time period in 
one state. The nature of this study means that its findings cannot necessarily be 
generalized to states other than North Carolina, to primary elections as distinct from 
general elections, or to elections other than those for President (other federal elections, 
state or local elections, or elections nor occurring in the presidential year, when 
participation is highest). However, much of the previous work in this area has similarly 
taken a state-level case study approach6, and this work will contribute to that body of 
literature. 
 The History of Recent Election Reform in North Carolina 
Over the period being examined, the traditionally required practice of registering 
by a deadline in advance of an election, and then visiting one’s assigned neighborhood 
polling place during a given time period on a single Election Day, has been supplemented 
by a variety of options for registration and voting in other venues. In addition to these 
traditional methods, North Carolinians may now vote in person at a wide variety of 
locations during an extended period in advance of Election Day; cast an absentee ballot 
by mail without restriction; and, until 2013, could register and vote in a single act during 
                                                            
6 See, for example, state-level explorations of election reform in Florida, following the controversial 2000 
presidential election (Gronke, Bishin et al. 2005; Gronke and Galanes-Rosenbaum c. 2007); Nevada, which 
has one of the nation’s highest rates of early voting (Dyck and Gimpel 2009; Dyck, Gaines and Shaw 2009); 
and Texas, where in-person early voting originated and remains highly popular (Stein and Garcia-Monet 
1997; Stein 1998; Stein, Owens and Leighley 2003; Haag 2010). 
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the early voting period preceding Election Day, rather than being required to register as 
much as a month before actually casting one’s ballot (although, as previously noted, 
voting on Election Day still requires registration at least 25 days in advance). 
One Stop Early Voting 
 In-person early voting, known in North Carolina as “One Stop” absentee voting, 
originated in Texas in 1963 (Rosenfield 1994), and was available in some areas of North 
Carolina as early as 1973, when voters in certain counties could cast ballots in advance of 
Election Day by visiting their County Board of Elections office and presenting 
documentation of a reason (such as absence, illness, or disability) for being unable to vote 
at the conventional time and place (Zebrowski 2003). This option was made available on 
a statewide basis in 1987, though an excuse for absence from the polls was still required 
(Jones 1992). Removing the excuse requirement was considered as early as 1992 
(Rawlins 1993), but was not achieved until 1999, when the “One Stop in person” 
absentee voting option was made available in general elections of even-numbered years 
for all voters without excuse, effective in 2000 (Session Law 1999-455, NCGS 163-226).  
The county Board of Elections could elect to open additional One Stop voting 
sites at other locations in the county, and a county voter may cast a ballot at any one of 
these locations at any time during the early voting period. For the 2000 general election, a 
total of 58 satellite locations were approved in 31 counties by the State Board of 
Elections, which appropriated a total of $250,000 to assist county boards with their 
operation and maintenance, with no county eligible for more than $15,000 (Johnson and 
Morrill 2000; Sandford 2000). The remaining 69 counties chose not to open satellite 
sites, but to limit One Stop voting to the Board of Elections office, primarily due to 
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budgetary or staffing constraints (Johnson and Morrill 2000). The One Stop voting option 
without excuse was extended to primary elections in 2001 (Session Law 2001-337, 
NCGS 163-226). The One Stop legislation was unsuccessfully challenged in court as a 
violation of the Constitutional requirement that all votes in federal elections be cast on a 
common Election Day (Johnson and Morrill 2000; Wayne 2000). 
The availability of One Stop voting expanded slightly in 2004, grew significantly 
in 2008, and actually declined in 2012. In addition to the consistent availability of One 
Stop voting at the county Board of Elections or an alternate site, in 2004, 35 counties 
operated a total of 99 satellite sites; in 2008, 77 counties operated a total of 269 satellites; 
and in 2012, 71 counties operated a total of 263 satellites. Nineteen counties did not 
operate satellites during any of the elections examined; eight used satellites only in 2008; 
and nine others reduced their number of satellites between 2008 and 20127. In no case 
could it be determined from the available data that a reduction in the availability of 
satellite sites was related to a change in partisan control of the county commission. 
As of 2012, North Carolina was one of 32 states, in addition to the District of 
Columbia, where early voting is available (National Conference of State Legislatures 
2012). Since it was made universally available, One Stop voting has grown substantially 
in popularity in North Carolina, to the extent that it is now the preference of a majority of 
voters, as demonstrated by the following table: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 Analysis by the author of data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections and county 
Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 1.1: Votes cast by method (percentage of votes cast), North Carolina presidential 
elections, 2000-2012. 
  
YEAR             ELECTION DAY            ONE STOP                      MAIL 
2000  2,449,448 (84.5%)          394,158 (13.6%)   53,286 (1.9%) 
2004  2,437.049 (70.3%)            707,636 (20.4%)            322,077 (9.2%) 
2008  1,809,166 (40.3%)           2,411,116 (53.7%)            264,993 (6.1%) 
2012  1,833,545 (40.7%)           2,527,611 (54.6%)            218,303 (4.7%) 
 
Sources: Niolet and Khanna (2004); Johnson (2004); Bartlett and Degraffenreid (2009). Some data 
compiled by the author from information supplied by the North Carolina State Board of Elections and 
individual county Boards of Elections. Percentages may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding. 
 
North Carolina now produces one of the nation’s five highest totals of votes cast 
early (Fortier 2004; Gronke et al. 2009)8. While a 1973 study indicated that North 
Carolina then had the second-lowest percentage of registration of eligible voters in the 
United States (as cited in Bass and DeVries 1995), it exhibited the nation’s highest 
increase in voter turnout from the 2004 to 2008 elections (News & Observer 2008); as 
illustrated above, the bulk of this increase has occurred in One Stop voting, rather than 
increases in traditional Election Day polling place voting or absentee voting by mail.  
Therefore, an examination of the effects of election reforms is appropriately focused 
primarily on One Stop voting.  
 At the time that universal early voting was debated in the General Assembly, it 
was largely supported by Democrats and largely opposed by Republicans; both parties 
apparently believed that it would disproportionately benefit potential Democratic voters. 
This view is not limited to North Carolina (Kimball and Kropf 2006; Kimball, Kropf and 
Battles 2006; Kropf, Vercellotti and Kimball 2013). At the time of its initial 
implementation, however, several journalistic analyses argued that the new procedure had 
no inherent partisan advantage, but would benefit whichever party was able to take 
                                                            
8 The other states in this category are Texas, Tennessee, Florida and Georgia. 
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advantage of it through superior mobilization (Christensen 2000; Morrill 2000; Pilla 
2000). 
No-Excuse Absentee Voting by Mail 
In 2001, the state enacted no excuse absentee voting by mail, no longer requiring 
a citizen to meet one of a specified set of conditions, such as being absent from one’s 
home precinct on Election Day, in order to be eligible to vote by mail in advance of the 
election, rather than at the traditional time and place (Session Law 2001-337, NCGS 163-
226). However, the lifting of these restrictions has not resulted in a substantial increase in 
mail voting as has been observed with One Stop. Absentee by mail has become a distant 
third choice of voting method, well behind One Stop and traditional Election Day polling 
place voting. Fortier (2004) categorizes North Carolina as one of five states with high 
levels of in-person early voting and low levels of absentee voting by mail9. It is worthy of 
note that the use of absentee voting by mail grew substantially in 2004, the first election 
in which an excuse was not required, but has since declined. It appears that the relative 
popularity of this particular method of voting was short-lived. 
Same Day Voter Registration 
In 2007, North Carolina enacted universally available same day voter registration 
(SDR), allowing an eligible citizen to register and vote in a single act at a One Stop 
voting station (Session Law 2007-253, NCGS 163-254); SDR had been available since 
2001 for military personnel and certain other categories of voters. The registration 
deadline remained the same, 25 days before an election, for voters who wish to register 
by mail and vote on Election Day; thus, voters who registered through the One Stop 
                                                            
9 The others are Arkansas, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. 
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procedure were then immediately required to vote at the early voting station, because 
they did not meet the registration deadline in time to vote on Election Day. As mentioned 
above, until 2013, North Carolina permitted same day registration during the early voting 
period, but not on Election Day itself. Thus, some early voters in 2008 and 2012 were not 
registered prior to their participation in that election, while all Election Day voters were 
registered at least 25 days in advance. This distinction allows for an exploration of 
whether same-day registrants, who are by definition new voters and One Stop voters, 
differ demographically or politically from their counterparts who participate at a 
traditional polling place on the traditional day. 
A Brief Political History of North Carolina 
North Carolina is today one of the most politically competitive states in in the 
nation. Like the other former Confederate states, it became overwhelmingly Democratic 
after the end of Reconstruction, the return of many former Confederates to political 
power, and the elimination of the Republican Party as a political force throughout most of 
the region. But while it was part of the Democratic “Solid South,” North Carolina was 
never as monolithically Democratic as other Southern states; pockets of Republican 
strength had existed since the party’s founding prior to the Civil War in the mountainous 
west, where there were little agriculture, few slaves, and little support for secession (Key 
1949). Black North Carolinians’ voting rights and service in elective office survived the 
end of Reconstruction. During the last quarter of the 19th Century, 77 black members 
served in the General Assembly, four in the U.S. House of Representatives, and a number 
were elected to local offices. A Republican-Populist “fusion” coalition, with black 
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support, gained control of the General Assembly in 1894, and a Republican governor was 
elected in 1896 (Thompson 2002). 
Democrats returned to power in the General Assembly in 1898 and regained the 
governorship in 1900, and quickly moved to disenfranchise the black population which 
had provided a significant amount of the Republican and Fusion support. A voter 
registration requirement was enacted, with passage of a literacy test required to register; 
most illiterate whites’ voting power was preserved by a clause exempting from the test 
those whose grandfathers had been eligible to vote in 1867 (Bass and DeVries 1995; 
Luebke 1998; Thompson 2002).  These provisions reduced voting participation from 85% 
of the eligible black population in the 1890’s to a registration rate of only 5% in 1940 
(Thompson 2002). 
 Forty of North Carolina’s 100 counties had literacy tests in place and less than 
50% turnout of eligible voters in the 1964 presidential election; this made them subject to 
the provisions of Section Five of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, which suspended 
the literacy test among other requirements. (The literacy test was permanently abolished 
nationwide when the Voting Rights Act was renewed in 1970.) In these 40 counties, 
black voter registration rose from 32.4% in 1965 to 54% in 1976.  Nonetheless, 
registration rates among North Carolina’s black voters continued to trail those of their 
white counterparts into the 1990’s (Thompson 2002).  
 As stated above, the Republican Party never completely disappeared from North 
Carolina. The state supported Herbert Hoover over Democrat Al Smith in the 1928 
presidential election, and Charlotte and its environs have sent Republicans to the U.S. 
House without interruption since 1952. As was the case elsewhere in the South, 
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Republican strength gradually grew in the 1960’s, leading to presidential victories in the 
state by Richard M. Nixon in both 1968 and 1972 (Lamis 1990; Bass and DeVries 1995; 
Black and Black 2002). However, the national Republican coalition changed during the 
first part of the 20th Century; by the modern era, the party which had been founded to 
oppose slavery and secession, and which enjoyed the overwhelming support of newly-
enfranchised black voters in the decades following the Civil War, saw its support in the 
South grow among whites as it shrank among blacks: 
  When the Republican Party nominated Arizona Senator Barry 
  Goldwater – one of the few northern senators who had opposed the 
  Civil Rights Act – as their presidential candidate in 1964, the party 
  attracted many racist southern whites but permanently alienated 
  African-American voters. (Black and Black 2002)  
 
 On a statewide level, the two-party breakthrough came on the heels of Nixon’s 
landslide re-election in 1972, with the election of James Holshouser and Jesse Helms as 
the first Republicans in the 20th Century to serve as governor and U.S. senator, 
respectively (Bass and DeVries 1995). Since then, both parties have demonstrated 
significant strength. North Carolina elects its statewide officials concurrently with 
presidential elections; since 1968, Republican presidential candidates have carried the 
state ten of 12 times, while Democrats have captured the governorship eight times; on six 
of these occasions, the state simultaneously voted for a Republican president and a 
Democratic governor10. Helms held his Senate seat for five terms (though often by 
narrow margins after heated, expensive campaigns), and was succeeded for one term by 
fellow Republican Elizabeth Dole. 
                                                            
10 North Carolina voted Republican for both president and governor in 1972, 1984, 1988 and 2012; 
Democratic for both offices in 1976 and 2008; and for a Republican president and a Democratic governor 
in 1968, 1980, and without interruption from 1992 through 2004. Data compiled by the author. 
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Meanwhile, the state’s U.S. House delegation remained majority Democratic 
without interruption until 1994, and the other U.S. Senate seat changed partisan hands in 
five consecutive elections beginning in 198011. In the General Assembly, Republicans 
gained control of the House of Representatives for two terms beginning in 1994, and a 
Republican faction joined with Democrats in a short-lived power-sharing arrangement 
(resulting in the election of Democratic and Republican co-Speakers of the House) in 
2003. The Senate remained Democratic from the late 19th Century until 2010, when the 
national tide delivered both houses to the Republicans (Congressional Quarterly 1995; 
Rice and Damico 2003; Barone and Cohen 2007; Brokaw 2010).  The Democratic Party 
has historically dominated voter registration in the state, though this has in no way meant 
a consistent Democratic advantage in election results; rather, it has meant that many 
nominal Democrats have ignored their party registration to support Republican 
candidates such as Nixon, Helms and Ronald Reagan; indeed, Helms owed many of his 
election victories to the support of these “Jessecrats” (Luebke 1998).  
The civil rights movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s led to the legal and political 
empowerment of black citizens nationwide, with particular effect in the Southern states 
where they had been disenfranchised and deprived of other rights. As noted above, black 
voter registration substantially increased in North Carolina following the enactment of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965; as southern whites flocked to their region’s newly-
invigorated Republican Party, newly-enfranchised southern black voters even more 
                                                            
11 Democratic Sen. Robert B. Morgan was defeated by Republican John P. East in 1980. East died in office 
in 1986, and his appointed Republican successor, James T. Broyhill, lost to Democrat Terry Sanford later 
that year. Republican Lauch Faircloth defeated Sanford in 1992 and subsequently lost to Democrat John 
Edwards in 1998. Edwards did not seek re-election in 2004, and was succeeded by Republican Richard 
Burr.  
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enthusiastically joined the Democratic Party, whose leadership had been primarily 
responsible for the enactment of much of the era’s civil rights legislation (Black and 
Black 2002). 
As black political strength grew during the 1980’s and 1990’s, North Carolina 
was the site of a substantial amount of voting rights litigation challenging practices which 
had traditionally discriminated against black voters. The Voting Rights Act Amendments 
of 1982 made it necessary only to demonstrate that an electoral practice had a 
discriminatory effect against traditionally disenfranchised groups, rather than having to 
prove discriminatory intent, in order to challenge it on the grounds that it provided 
minority groups with “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process, and to elect representatives of their choice” (Public Law 97-205). 
Under this Act, in Thornburg v. Gingles (478 U.S. 30 [1986]), the U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously struck down part of the state’s districting plan for the General Assembly, 
holding that it impermissibly diluted the votes of black citizens.  
Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Justice, with “preclearance” authority over 
the state’s Congressional districting plans, interpreted the 1982 Amendments and the 
subsequent Gingles decision as requiring the creation of the maximum possible number 
of “majority-minority” districts, those in which African-Americans constituted a majority 
of the population, with the objective of electing black officials to the General Assembly 
and the U.S. House, among other offices. In the Congressional redistricting following the 
1990 Census (in which North Carolina gained a twelfth House seat), the Department 
refused to preclear a plan creating only one black-majority district, on the grounds that 
the size of the state’s black population made it possible to create two, reflecting black 
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political strength in both urban and rural areas of the state (O’Rourke 1997). A plan was 
subsequently enacted creating two black-majority districts, resulting in the election of the 
state’s first two black U.S. Representatives since 1902 (Barone and Ujifusa 1993). 
However, the districts were challenged by white voters on Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection grounds, and the Congressional redistricting plans were repeatedly litigated 
during the 1990’s12. Differing U.S. Supreme Court decisions in these cases led to the 
state’s conducting its Congressional elections under four different districting plans in the 
six elections beginning in 1992. It should be noted, however, that black Democratic 
Representative Melvin L. Watt, originally elected from the 12th District when it had a 
black majority, retained the seat even after the subsequent redistricting orders reduced its 
black percentage to as low as 36% in 1998 (Christensen and Fleer 1999; Congressional 
Quarterly 2001).  
After Jimmy Carter’s victory in 1976, no other Democratic presidential candidate 
carried North Carolina until Barack Obama in 2008, and neither Carter nor Obama 
succeeded in winning the state again in their re-election bids. Some Democratic losses 
were narrow; Carter lost the state to Reagan by two points in 1980, Obama to Mitt 
Romney by three points in 2012, and Bill Clinton to George H.W. Bush by only seven-
tenths of a point in 1992. The remaining Democratic losses were by more substantial 
margins; in his 1996 re-election campaign, Clinton’s margin in North Carolina slipped 
below his previous total even as he solidly defeated Republican Bob Dole nationally. In 
1984, 1988 and 2000, Walter Mondale, Michael Dukakis and Al Gore lost the state by 
24, 16 and 13 points, respectively; even the Vice Presidential candidacy of North 
                                                            
12 Shaw v. Reno (509 U.S. 630 [1993]);  Hunt v. Cromartie (526 U.S. 541 [1999]). 
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Carolina Senator John Edwards could not bring John Kerry closer than 12 points from 
victory in 2004. (Lamis 1990; Barone and Ujifusa 1993; Politics in America, various 
editions) 
In North Carolina, Republican presidential candidates had an advantage in non-
precinct voting which shifted to the Democrats during the time examined by this study. In 
1996 (in those areas for which data are available) and 2000, Bob Dole and George W. 
Bush defeated Bill Clinton and Al Gore, respectively, by a larger margin among absentee 
voters than among Election Day voters, but in 2004, Bush defeated John F. Kerry by a 
larger margin among Election Day voters than among absentees (North Carolina State 
Board of Elections data; Bonner, Bauerlein and Raynor 2004). The 2008 data show not 
only a Democratic advantage, but the emergence of a significant difference in 
Democratic and Republican preferences of voting methods. As will be discussed below, 
Obama won the One Stop vote in both elections, while McCain and Romney, 
respectively, won the Election Day vote. McCain’s voters were slightly more likely to 
vote on Election Day than One Stop, while more of Obama’s 2008 voters used One Stop 
than voted on Election Day, and in 2012, almost twice as many Obama supporters voted 
One Stop as voted on Election Day. Romney’s Election Day total declined from 
McCain’s, but his One Stop total surpassed McCain’s by a larger margin. (North Carolina 
State Board of Elections data) 
Election Administration in North Carolina 
The governing body of elections in North Carolina is the State Board of Elections, 
an independent agency headed by a five-member body whose members are appointed by 
the Governor for four-year terms. In practice, three members of the Board are members 
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of the Governor’s party and the remaining two are members of the other major party 
(North Carolina General Statutes 163-19 and 163-28). The Executive Director of the 
State Board of Elections is appointed by the board, and is the chief state elections official 
(North Carolina General Statutes 163-26, 163-27, 163-27.1). Each county has a board of 
elections, appointed by the state board, consisting of three members, no more than two of 
whom may be members of the same party; in practice, each county board consists of two 
members of the Governor’s party and one member of the other major party. North 
Carolina’s Governors were Democrats at the time of all five elections examined within 
this work, and thus there is no observable variance in party control of these boards.13  The 
county director of elections is appointed by the Executive Director of the State Board, 
upon the recommendation of the county board. The county director may not be an elected 
official, candidate for office, political party officer, or campaign officer for a candidate  
(North Carolina General Statutes 163-30, 163-35).  Funding for the county board of 
elections in the responsibility of the Board of County Commissioners, which is an 
independently elected partisan body in each county (North Carolina General Statutes 
163-37).  
Under the original 1999 legislation permitting no-excuse early voting and the 
establishment of satellite sites, a county board had to agree unanimously on the location 
of a particular site. Shortly before the 2000 election, this was changed to provide that, in 
the event that a county board could not unanimously agree on a siting plan, the state 
board could determine the county’s plan by majority vote. This was subsequently the 
subject of partisan dispute, for example, with respect to the planned establishment of 
                                                            
13 James B. Hunt, Jr. (1996 and 2000); Michael F. Easley (2004 and 2008); and Beverly Eaves Perdue 
(2012). 
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satellite voting sites on the campuses of historically black Winston-Salem State 
University, in Forsyth County, and North Carolina Central University, in Durham County 
(Rawlins and Bonner 2000; Christensen 2000). As the number of satellite sites has 
increased in subsequent elections, however, it appears that early voting has been 
convenient enough to both Democratic and Republican voters that the location of these 
sites is no longer a matter of frequent political controversy. 
 Having outlined the history of North Carolina politics, the enactment of the 
reforms being examined, and the methods by which elections are administered in the 
state, the present research now turns to a discussion of the argument which it will pursue. 
(The specific research hypotheses to be tested are stated in Chapter Three.) The present 
work will argue that the observed increase in North Carolina’s voter turnout, controlling 
for the state’s substantial population growth, can be primarily attributed to the election 
reforms examined herein. These reforms have increased voter participation in a way 
which has had the effect of benefiting the Democratic Party more than the Republican 
Party, in particular contributing to the victory of Barack Obama in the state in 2008. The 
examination of the partisan effects of these reforms will build on the work of Rosenstone 
and Wolfinger (1978); Calvert and Gilchrist (1993); Brians and Grofman (1999); Knack 
(1999 and 2001); Highton and Wolfinger (2001); Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn (2007); 
and de Oliviera (2009).  
The second major issue to be explored herein is whether Boards of County 
Commissioners which are controlled by Democrats, as opposed to Republicans, will 
devote a greater share of resources to the implementation of election reform, the most 
expensive component of which is the operation of One Stop voting sites. If this is the 
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case, party control of the commission should be a statistically significant variable in 
regression equations examining each of the following, which are various ways in which 
“turnout” and “political effects” will be operationalized in the context of the present 
research: 
1. The percentage of the vote which is cast nonprecinct; 
2. The percentage of voting age population who are registered; 
 3. Turnout of registered voters; 
 4. Turnout of voting age population; 
5. The percentage of registered members of each party who are same day 
registrants (in 2008 and 2012); 
6. The percentage of each candidate’s vote which is cast nonprecinct; 
 7. The Democratic presidential candidate’s percentage of the vote in the county. 
 In each case, greater registration, same day registration, turnout, nonprecinct 
voting, and Democratic vote share, would be expected in Democratic-controlled counties, 
due to a greater share of resources being expended in these areas. The effects, and 
specifically the partisan effects, of each of these reforms have been the subject of 
extensive research, much of which will be discussed later in this work, as has the issue of 
partisan differences in election administration and the implementation of reform (Hasen 
2005). The work also explore whether Democratic-controlled counties have a lower ratio 
of registered voters to One Stop sites. The fewer voters per site, the greater the relative 
commitment to One Stop voting, and the greater reduction in the Downsian “costs” for 
potential voters, which should hypothetically contribute to greater voter turnout. 
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The greater relative benefit to the Democratic Party from these reforms is 
hypothesized to arise from the fact that those potential voters for whom the Downsian 
“costs” of voting are greatest are, demographically, more likely to be Democrats than 
Republicans: persons of lower education, lower income, and disproportionately members 
of racial minority groups. The model will incorporate variables to represent each of these 
characteristics. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the observed effects between 
Democratic- and Republican-controlled counties. The counterargument is that, although 
Republicans initially opposed the enactment of these reforms, in particular One Stop 
voting, once it was in place, Republican elected bodies would make an equal effort to 
make it easier for their own voters to vote, since increasing turnout in Republican areas 
can be expected to benefit Republican candidates in state and federal races, even if it has 
no effect on the outcome of local elections. 
The next chapter of the present research will examine the theories of political 
participation and election administration, with a review of the relevant work of previous 
authors on these subjects. The third chapter will present the research design and a 
detailed description of the data examined, and the methods being used. Subsequent 
chapters will test the various hypotheses previously described, using several different 
dependent variables to measure participation and partisan effects, and how they may vary 
according to implementation. The concluding analysis will explore any observed effects, 
whether these effects are primarily the result of election reform itself, differential 
implementation of reform on the county level, or can primarily be explained by the 
socioeconomic factors which have traditionally been used to explain differences in 
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political participation. It is hoped that this work will contribute to a greater understanding 
of the interaction of election rules and voter participation in the United States.
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 “Early voting is a crock.” – Dr. Ted Arrington.14  
 
This work will draw from a variety of theoretical literature and existing work on 
political participation and election administration. Voting, early voting, voter registration, 
absentee voting, same day registration, election administration, public attitudes toward 
participation, and the interaction of these factors, have all been the subject of extensive 
historical and contemporary research, upon which the present project seeks to build. A 
review of the relevant theories and literature in these various topics follows. 
This study is limited in its scope by focusing entirely on voting as an expression 
of political participation. As Leighley (1995:196) points out, political participation takes 
many forms other than voting (among them, protests and interest group activity), and 
…an overwhelming focus on voter turnout to the exclusion of other forms 
of participation has restricted studies of the consequences of participation 
to looking only at turnout. And the lack of appropriate data on participation 
other than voting makes it nearly impossible to assess the consequences of 
the types of participation that are probably most likely to have a direct 
influence on government officials. 
 
Despite this limited focus, a study of voting procedures and their effects raises important 
issues because, alone among the many forms of participation, voting is the “official” 
method by which citizens express their preferences and decisions, and the method whose 
results are legally binding on the selection of officeholders and the policies which result 
from those choices. 
                                                            
14 Then-Chair, Department of Political Science, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, as quoted in 
The Charlotte Observer, Oct. 14, 2000. 
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 Another caveat which must be mentioned is the historic nature of the 2008 
election, with Barack Obama as the first African-American nominee of a major party, and 
subsequently the first black president. Gronke, Hicks and Toffey (2009) explicitly argue 
that this election is an aberration for that reason, particularly with regard to African-
American early voting in the South, which was aided by the Obama campaign’s highly 
sophisticated mobilization effort. Certainly 2008 represents the confluence of unique 
circumstances: The race featured a candidate with historic appeal to a group which has 
historically been disenfranchised and, even after the legal barriers to voting were lifted, 
has participated at lower levels than the white majority15. That candidate’s campaign 
targeted North Carolina and launched a mobilization effort in the state far more extensive 
than those of recent previous Democratic presidential candidates. At the same time, North 
Carolina introduced same day registration, and most counties substantially increased their 
number of early voting sites from the previous election.  Isolating the individual effects 
of these factors poses a challenge for the researcher. However, the combination of 
Obama’s win in North Carolina in 2008 and loss in 2012 presents the opportunity to 
examine the extent to which the former election truly was aberrational.  
A comparison of the two elections will provide evidence as to the role played by 
election reform in each case, and the long-term vs. short-term effects of each. Were some 
reforms effective only under the circumstances of Obama’s historic first campaign, while 
others have changed voter participation and behavior in a long-term manner? Are some 
types of reforms implemented more or less effectively depending on the circumstances of 
                                                            
15 Verba and Nie (1972) and Tate (1991) find that, when socioeconomic status is controlled for, African-
Americans actually participate at a higher level than do whites. Thus, the disparity mentioned above must 
be attributed to socioeconomic factors.  
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the specific election? For example, did a county’s decision to increase its number of One 
Stop sites in 2008 produce greatly increased turnout only because of the Obama 
candidacy, an increase which might not have occurred under different political 
circumstances? And were the differing outcomes of the two elections in North Carolina 
somehow attributable to differences in their administration? As will be discussed below, 
while the use of early voting in North Carolina has continued to grow (among all groups 
of voters, regardless of race or party), some counties used fewer One Stop sites in 2012 
than in 2008. Did this reduction have an effect on the outcome? The present work will 
consider these possibilities. 
Theories of Political Participation (and Nonparticipation) 
 As mentioned in the  opening chapter of this work, much of the theory of political 
participation is derived from Downs’ (1957) conception of a voter’s calculation of the 
“costs and benefits” of voting. Structural barriers affect those costs, while positive 
attitudinal changes affect the perceived benefits. These two factors have been the primary 
foci of the institutional and behavioral theories of participation. The institutional theory 
argues that nonvoting is due primarily to structural barriers, and thus can be addressed by 
election reforms (such as those discussed in the present work), while behavioralists argue 
that nonparticipation is produced by an individual’s attitudinal orientation toward the 
political system, a remedy for which is beyond the political system’s structural ability to 
provide. Piven and Cloward (2000) characterize this debate as taking place between the 
“legal-institutional” theory and the “political-behavioral” theory, and take their position 
in favor of the former, arguing that the institution of requirements such as voter 
registration was a deliberate attempt to suppress electoral participation, particularly 
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among newly-arrived immigrants and urban voters who historically provided the core of 
the Democratic coalition in much of the country. Thus, removing such procedural barriers 
should increase turnout. This will be the theoretical basis of the proposed work.  
The present work will argue that the more complicated the process of voting, the 
less likely some individuals will be to participate in it. Therefore, easing or removing 
these barriers – such as North Carolina’s reforms allowing registration and voting in a 
single step, expanding the time available for casting one’s vote, and removing the 
restrictions on being able to vote away from one’s polling place on a designated Election 
Day – should increase turnout. Clearly, turnout has increased in North Carolina as these 
reforms have been instituted, and the present work will argue that a causal relationship 
can be established. However, implementation of these reforms has not been uniform 
throughout the state. For example, the state law requiring that all counties allow One Stop 
voting ahead of Election Day leaves it to county discretion whether  to use multiple 
satellite voting sites (and if so, how many), or offer early voting only at the Board of 
Elections office or another single location. The decisions which counties have made in 
this regard do not appear to be strictly a function of their population or number of 
registered voters; some small counties have chosen to use multiple sites, while some 
larger counties use only one. (The dates and hours during which One Stop voting is 
available also vary by county and by individual location; however, those details are 
beyond the scope of the present study.)  
While state law and the State Board of Elections provide general guidelines, 
North Carolina elections are administered in each county according to a budget set by the 
county commission. As one county’s Board of Elections describes it, elections are 
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“county funded and state governed” (Pamlico County 2013). The resources made 
available for the conduct of the election determine, among other things, the availability of 
early voting sites. Thus, counties have had to make different administrative decisions 
about election reform within their individual budget constraints. Have these different 
administrative decisions produced differential effects on participation? 
It is also important to examine, as the work will, whether these reforms have had 
differential effects among different groups of voters – and why.  It appears, for example, 
that in North Carolina, Democrats are more likely than Republicans to use “new” 
methods of participation such as same day registration and early voting, while 
Republicans are more likely to use traditional methods such as Election Day voting 
(which requires advance registration) and absentee voting by mail. While the introduction 
of same day registration coincided with the first Obama election (and victory) in North 
Carolina, an examination of county- and state-provided election returns reveals that the 
relative Democratic advantage in early voting has consistently existed since the practice 
was made universally available in 2000. In order to explain the partisan effects of these 
reforms, it is necessary to explore and explain why there appears to be a correlation 
between one’s choice of candidate and one’s choice of voting method. And does this 
mean that administrative decisions related to the implementation of reform – for example, 
whether and how much to increase the opportunity for early voting – will have greater or 
lesser effects on different populations of voters or potential voters? 
 The behavioralist perspective is represented by the work of Berinsky (2005) and 
Fitzgerald (2005). Berinsky (2005) argues that institutional change is insufficient to 
produce “the engagement of the broader mass public with the political world,” (p. 473), 
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the deficiency of which is the true cause of nonparticipation. He further argues that 
reforms such as those being examined by the present work have the effect of further 
stratifying the electorate and making the voting public even less representative of the 
population as a whole. His reasoning is that these reforms make it easier to participate for 
those who are already engaged and interested in political matters without increasing 
engagement or interest among those who are not – in his terms, “retention” rather than 
“stimulation.” (p. 477) Voter engagement, therefore, requires change which is attitudinal, 
not structural, in nature. 
 Fitzgerald (2005) argues that “voter turnout in U.S. elections may be less about 
convenience and costs than expected.” (p. 842) She argues that the implementation of 
early voting may actually be counterproductive to increasing turnout, because 
mobilization efforts by parties and campaigns may be less effective if they are diffused 
over a period of days or weeks rather than concentrated on a single election day, while 
the implementation of EDR/SDR does tend to increase turnout. Her study finds that early 
voting tends to increase participation among those populations where high levels of it 
already exist, and that both of these reforms have tended to be enacted in states which 
have historically already had high levels of turnout. This would indicate that the 
availability of early voting increases convenience for those who are already inclined to 
vote, but does not adequately reduce costs for nonvoters to the point that they are able or 
willing to participate. She argues that “the more significant costs surrounding electoral 
participation are those related to political knowledge, interest, and involvement” (p. 857) 
rather than those involved in the procedural aspects of registering to vote and then casting 
a ballot.  
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 Verba and Nie (1972) argue that both institutional and attitudinal factors play a 
role in an individual’s political participation, in particular that institutions shape attitudes, 
which determine participatory “outputs.” Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) develop a 
“resource model” of political participation, which includes elements of both institutional 
and behavioral theories. These authors argue that resources – primarily time, money, and 
civic skills – are necessary to participation, and that differential access to these resources 
results in differing levels of participation based on socioeconomic status. This model 
borrows from both institutional and behavior theories in that the resource of time can be 
addressed by structural reforms expanding the time available for voting (such as early 
voting) or reducing the time required for it (same-day registration or no-excuse absentee 
voting by mail), while the development of civic skills is addressed by behavior or 
attitudinal change.  
The conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that structural reform is both 
necessary and sufficient to facilitate participation by existing but infrequent voters, i.e., 
those who may have registered but do not vote regularly, while it is necessary but not 
sufficient to stimulate turnout among the demobilized, those who have declined to 
participate rather than simply found it impossible to do so. For these voters, whose 
abstention lends itself to a behaviorally-based explanation, additional intervention is 
required, primarily contact and mobilization by a party, candidate or campaign (Niven 
2002 and 2004; Masket 2009). This indicates that the types of election reform being 
examined herein may provide a partial solution, but only that, to the problem of voter 
nonparticipation, and that reform may have differential effects on those whose 
nonparticipation is caused by different factors. These reforms can be expected to affect 
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the behavior of those whose nonparticipation is caused by structural factors, but not those 
who abstain due to their behavioral attitudes. 
Election Administration 
 The partisan nature of election administration in state and local jurisdictions has 
been the subject of significant research, especially in the event of well-publicized 
incidents in which partisan officials were seen as administering election matters in a 
manner which advantaged their chosen candidate or party, such as Florida Secretary of 
State Katherine Harris and Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell allegedly acting 
on behalf of the George W. Bush campaigns in 2000 and 2004, respectively, and 
allegations that California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley used HAVA funds for the 
benefit of the state Democratic Party (Hasen 2005; Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn 2006; 
Kimball and Kropf 2006).  
While Kimball and Kropf (2006) find that many jurisdictions entrust the 
administration of elections to a local official chosen in a partisan election, the 
partisanship of election administration in North Carolina is indirect. While the State 
Board of Elections and the County Boards which it appoints are controlled by members 
of the governor’s political party, these authorities hire, at both the state and local levels, 
professional election administrators (the “street-level bureaucrats” in this case) who are 
legally insulated from partisan politics, as stated in the present Chapter One. Alvarez, 
Hall and Llewellyn (2006) find that a large majority of citizens surveyed preferred that 
their local elections be overseen by an elected, nonpartisan board (as opposed to 
appointed, partisan, or a single individual). It would seem that the structure of election 
governance in North Carolina partially complies with public opinion as examined by 
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these authors; at both the state and county level, an appointed board, whose membership 
favors the party which won the previous gubernatorial election, in turn appoints and 
oversees an individual, nonpartisan administrator. 
Kimball, Kropf and Battles (2006) note that “very little research has examined the 
effect of election officials on voter turnout.” (p. 450)  Kimball and Kropf (2006) argue 
that the development of a greater understanding of the behavior of local election officials 
requires further research involving measurable topics, including absentee and early 
voting. This aspect of election administration and implementation has not been the focus 
of significant previous research. The present work will seek to make a contribution in this 
area. This work argues that the greatest potential for partisan influence on election 
administration in North Carolina, and thus the matter of greatest interest to the present 
study, lies in the control of the county elections budget by Boards of County 
Commissioners. These Commissioners are separately chosen in partisan elections; the 
effect of these actors on turnout will be a focus on the present work. The budget-driven 
amount of resources made available for the conduct of an election affects factors such as 
the extent to which the county is able to make early voting available. To put this in 
perspective, in 2012, the operation of each early voting site in Edgecombe County cost 
$10,000 (Rocky Mount Telegram 2012). Kimball and Kropf (2006) argue that “[f]unding 
may be more important than partisanship for proper administration of elections...” (p. 11). 
On occasion, county funds may be supplemented with federal or state funds for 
particular purposes. For example, the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 provided 
grants to states for projects including upgrading voting technology in response to the 
well-publicized difficulties encountered in the 2000 election in Florida. However, in 
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2012, over the objections of elections officials in more than 85 counties (Frank 2012), the 
North Carolina General Assembly declined to appropriate $644,000 in state matching 
funds which would have been necessary to receive an additional $4 million in federal 
HAVA funding. Counties had to increase their own funding in order to maintain the same 
level of services; for example, Johnston County had to do so by $40,000 to preserve its 
desired level of staffing and number of voting sites (Baird 2012).  
Another issue with respect to election administration is the “principal-agent 
problem” involved in the conduct of a large-scale election on a single day, where a great 
deal of authority is invested in largely autonomous but perhaps inadequately trained poll 
workers. Alvarez and Hall (2006) advocate alternatives to traditional Election Day 
polling place voting, such as early voting and voting by mail, as potential solutions to this 
issue. These authors argue that a universal vote-by-mail system, such as that used in 
Oregon, would both increase turnout and improve the accuracy of the vote count. Early 
voting, and voting at centralized centers rather than decentralized precinct-level polling 
places, also alleviates the “principal-agent” problem by requiring fewer poll workers 
(allowing for the selection of those who are more experienced and thus presumably less 
error-prone), and minimizing the probability of mistakes which result from a large 
number of voters attempting to participate at one time. These authors, however, caution 
that consolidation of polling places may reduce overall turnout and increase absentee 
voting.  
Election Administrators and Election Reform 
Changing the manner in which elections are conducted changes the job and 
responsibilities of those who conduct it. Offering a new method or type of voting means 
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that procedures must be developed for its administration, and the new policy must 
actually be implemented. It is necessary to consider the extent to which officials’ 
perceptions and judgments of these reforms affect their administration of them. 
Following HAVA’s requirement that provisional ballots be made available for certain 
(potential) voters, Kimball, Kropf and Battles (2006) find partisan differences between 
Democratic and Republican election officials in their allowance or disallowance of those 
ballots, with each party’s officials more likely to approve provisional votes cast in a 
jurisdiction more favorable to that party and less likely to do so in an area where voters 
are more likely to support the opposite party. Kropf, Vercellotti and Kimball (2013) reach 
a similar conclusion. Provisional voters, however, represent a relatively small share of the 
electorate; these findings cannot be generalized to the admissibility of ballots cast by 
those whose residence and registration are not in question. Burden, Canon, Mayer and 
Moynihan (2011) find that local election officials in Wisconsin generally support 
Election Day Registration as a means of increasing turnout, but that they opposed the 
idea of early voting both because it poses an administrative burden (added time and 
expense) and because it detracts from the civic ritual of collectively voting on a single 
Election Day. Wisconsin, however, is a unique case because of the highly localized 
nature of its election system – the authors report that almost 20% of the local election 
officials in the United States are in Wisconsin – so these findings cannot be generalized 
to states, counties or other jurisdictions where the election authorities can be assumed to 
serve a constituency which may be considerably larger in population. 
The authors cited immediately above examine election administration from the 
point of view of the local official, while the present work seeks to explore how the 
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availability of voting options affects electoral turnout. Election administration may affect 
public confidence in the electoral system, and thus may also affect participation. Alvarez, 
Hall and Llewellyn (2008) argue that voters who exhibit greater levels of trust that their 
ballots will be accurately counted are more likely to vote.  
Characteristics of Voters and Nonvoters 
In comparison to the general population, voters are older, more likely to be 
married, better educated, wealthier and more likely to be white; perceptions that the 
process of registration is difficult, and problems with registration affecting one’s ability 
to vote, are more frequently reported by members of racial minority groups (Rosenstone 
and Wolfinger 1978; Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn 2007; Alvarez and Hall 2009). The 
question thus presents itself whether election reform would therefore be of greater 
proportional benefit to those who are underrepresented in the voting population: younger, 
single, less well educated, poorer and minority citizens. Would election reforms such as 
early voting, liberalized absentee voting by mail, and election day registration, among 
others, make the voting electorate more demographically representative of the population 
as a whole, and if so, what would be the political and partisan effects of this change? This 
work will now review existing research on the demographic, partisan and turnout effects 
of the reforms being examined herein. 
Election Reform: Same Day Registration and Convenience Voting 
“Convenience voting” is defined as any method of voting other than the 
traditional practice of casting a ballot at one’s home precinct on a designated election day 
(Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller and Toffey 2008). Convenience voting may take 
the form of casting an absentee ballot by mail, voting ahead of the designated election 
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day at an elections office, or voting at a satellite center during some period of time ahead 
of the election day, generally known as “in-person early voting.”  
In-person early voting: Rosenfield (1994) differentiates in-person early voting 
from absentee voting, either in person or by mail, on the basis of six characteristics as 
follows: 
Eligibility: Any registered voter may cast an in-person 
early vote, while most states require a voter to state a 
reason before being allowed to vote absentee; 
Application: Early voters do not have to complete an 
application before voting in this manner, whereas 
traditional absentee voters must do so; 
Identifiability of ballot: Ballots cast in early voting are not 
individually identifiable, whereas traditional absentee 
ballots (whether cast in person or by mail) can be traced to 
the individual voter; 
Hours of availability: Traditional in-person absentee 
balloting takes place only during the office hours of local 
election officials, whereas early voting takes place during 
extended hours (more hours during the day, and on 
weekends or other days when the central elections office 
may be closed); 
Location: Traditional in-person absentee balloting takes 
place only at the offices of local election officials, whereas 
early votes may be cast at a number of satellite sites 
throughout the electoral jurisdiction; 
Publicity: Early voting, as defined here, is accompanied by 
publicity to inform voters of its availability, time and 
locations. (paraphrased from Rosenfield 1994, pp. 1-2) 
 
 Thus, the form of early voting examined herein is available to any registered voter 
in the jurisdiction, without excuse or application, may occur at any one of a number of 
sites, occurs during a time not limited to the office hours of the election authorities, 
involves a ballot which cannot be traced to an individual voter after being cast, and is 
publicized by the local authorities. Early voting takes place within a specified time 
period, opening in different states from four to 45 days before the scheduled Election Day 
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and generally closing within a week before it. The average early voting period is 19 days 
(National Conference of State Legislatures 2013). In North Carolina, until 2013, early 
voting (known as “one stop absentee voting”) began on the third Thursday before 
Election Day and ends on the Saturday before it, for a total period of 17 days (North 
Carolina State Board of Elections, “One-stop Absentee Voting”).  Legislation enacted in 
2013 removed the first week from the early voting period, reducing the time available to 
nine days (North Carolina General Assembly Session Law 2013-381). 
Same Day Registration: Research has consistently indicated that a registration 
cutoff date in advance of the election is one of the most significant impediments to voting 
(Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978), and particularly for those who move shortly before 
Election Day (Squire, Wolfinger and Glass 1987; Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan 
2009). Combining the process of registration and voting into a single step reduces the 
“costs” of participation and allows newcomers to join the process at a time close to 
Election Day when interest in the ongoing campaign is highest (McDonald 2008a)16, and 
thus proponents of increased participation see Election Day registration (EDR) and same 
day registration (SDR) as means to accomplish this goal. In North Carolina, this is known 
as “One Stop registration”; it was abolished in 2013 by the same legislation which 
reduced the early voting period by one week (North Carolina General Assembly Session 
Law 2013-381).  
                                                            
16 It should be noted, however, that McDonald (2008a) observes that this does not necessarily increase 
turnout among people who have recently moved and are required to change their voter registration as a 
result. 
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Rather than requiring citizens who wish to vote to register in advance (often as 
much as 30 days before an election), eleven U.S. states17 and the District of Columbia 
have enacted legislation allowing prospective voters to register and vote in a single step 
on, or soon before, Election Day. Of particular interest are the effects of this practice on 
overall electoral participation in the form of voter turnout, and on the demographic and 
partisan representativeness of the participating electorate. Does making voter registration 
easier then make it easier to vote or more likely than one will vote? And does this 
election reform disproportionately affect members of groups who are traditionally less 
likely to participate? A significant amount of literature has examined the history of this 
practice and its effects on voter turnout. 
 Between 1973 and 1976, the states of Maine, Minnesota and Wisconsin each 
adopted the practice of allowing previously unregistered eligible voters to register at the 
polls on Election Day, and then immediately vote. (Brians and Grofman 2001) Idaho, 
New Hampshire and Wyoming adopted the practice following passage of the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), under a provision which allowed states with 
EDR an exemption from its requirement that voter registration materials be made 
available at a variety of public facilities including motor vehicle and public assistance 
agency offices (Alvarez, Ansolabehere and Wilson 2002). Montana adopted EDR at 
central county elections offices, but not at precinct polling places, in 2006. (Dēmos 2007) 
In 2007, North Carolina enacted legislation allowing registration during the state’s One 
                                                            
17 California, Connecticut, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin and 
Wyoming all allow Election Day registration. As mentioned elsewhere in the present work, North Carolina 
was the first state to allow same day registration during the early voting period but not on Election Day 
itself. It was later joined by Ohio. North Carolina repealed SDR in 2013. (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2013a; North Carolina Session Law 2013-381). 
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Stop early voting period but not on Election Day itself (i.e., SDR but not EDR) 
(Comstock-Gay 2007). Iowa adopted SDR in 2008 (Dēmos 2013). 
 Absentee Voting by Mail: In the United States, the first widespread use of voting 
away from one’s home polling place occurred during the Civil War, when soldiers 
fighting away from home (on both sides of the conflict) were given the opportunity to 
mail ballots to their home states in the 1864 presidential election. While most states 
adopted laws providing for absentee voting by civilians in the early 20th Century, its most 
significant expansion in that era came as an attempt to facilitate voting by military 
personnel serving overseas during World War II. Civilian absentee voting expanded 
thereafter, although those who wished to exercise this option were required to provide a 
reason (such as illness for absence from the area) why they were unable to vote on 
Election Day. In 1973, California became the first state to allow any registered voter to 
vote absentee without conditions (Fortier 2004). By 1998, Oregon had expanded the use 
of absentee voting to the point that it eliminated its physical polling places and began to 
conduct its elections entirely by mail, with ballots automatically sent to each registered 
voter (Fortier 2004; Berinsky, Burns and Traugott 2001). As of 2013, absentee voting 
without an excuse is permitted in 27 states and the District of Columbia (National 
Conference of State Legislatures 2013).18 
 This work will now review a selection of the literature pertaining to the 
participation and partisan effects of each of these reforms. Of interest are the 
                                                            
18 Both early voting and no-excuse absentee voting are offered in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, the 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, 
Wisconsin and Wyoming. The states which offer early voting but require an excuse for absentee voting by 
mail are Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. New Jersey is the only state 
with no-excuse absentee voting by mail, but not early voting. The states not mentioned here have 
adopted neither reform. (National Conference of State Legislatures 2013) 
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demographic change which is produced in the electorate by increased availability of 
registration and voting; the effect on voter turnout; and the degree to which these newly-
involved voters’ participation produces changes in the outcome of elections.  
Demographic Effects of Election Reform 
Much of the research in this area has examined the extent to which early voters 
differ politically, attitudinally and demographically from those who vote on the 
traditional Election Day. This issue addresses the question of whether making early 
voting available increases turnout among those who could not, or would not choose to, 
vote otherwise, or whether it simply makes the process of voting more convenient for 
established voters. If it is the latter, then early voting has not succeeded in its intended 
purpose of increasing participation. Previous research has explored this topic at both the 
individual and the aggregate levels.  
A strategy paper authored by Gronke and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005) for a 
conference on the mobilization of progressive voters cites arguments by proponents of 
early voting that those voters who are most likely to benefit from it include people with 
multiple demands on their time, persons with disabilities, those who live a long distance 
from their precinct polling place, and non-English speakers or others who need the 
assistance of a polling worker during the process of voting. Neeley and Richardson 
(2001) quote the Majority Leader of the Tennessee Senate at the time that early voting 
was adopted there to the effect that it was expected to increase opportunities for 
participation by military personnel stationed elsewhere, students attending college away 
from home, workers whose schedules did not make it possible for them to vote on 
Election Day, persons with disabilities, and those with transportation difficulties. In 
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North Carolina, the debate appears to have taken on a more partisan tone, with both 
Democrats and Republicans appearing to believe that Democratic constituencies would 
disproportionately be the beneficiaries of greater opportunities to vote (Sandford 2000; 
Christensen 2000; Wayne and Becker 2000). 
Gronke, Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005) cite research indicating 
that the distance of one’s home from the assigned precinct polling place is negatively 
correlated with probability of voting; the availability of early voting at a satellite site 
closer to home presumably increases that probability. Dyck and Gimpel (2009) find that 
distance to the polling place is positively correlated with a voter’s probability of using 
convenience voting, although Gimpel, Dyck and Shaw (2006) find mixed results for this 
relationship, arguing that convenience voting is most likely to be used by voters with 
both higher levels of education and a longer commute time to work. This interaction 
produces a greater probability of both an interest in politics and time pressures which 
might make traditional Election Day voting less convenient. Gronke (2004) also finds 
that voters with longer commutes are more likely to use early voting. 
Berinsky (2005) examines the work of other authors to argue that the increased 
availability of convenience voting (whether One Stop or mail absentee) retains existing 
voters but does not stimulate voting by previous nonvoters. This tendency exacerbates the 
existing socioeconomic bias in the electorate (in which the poor, less well educated, and 
members of minority groups are not represented in proportion to their share of the 
population) because it makes existing voters more likely to vote without increasing the 
probability that nonvoters will participate. He  argues that those who are more likely to 
vote because of convenience voting are predominantly white and older, better educated, 
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wealthier and more politically active than the electorate as a whole. The work of several 
authors explores the possibility that the 2008 election departed from this trend because 
the Obama campaign’s mobilization efforts increased early voting among African-
Americans and Democrats (Gronke, Hicks and Toffey 2009; Kropf 2012). 
A consideration of the demographic differences between early voters and Election 
Day voters must include the issues of race and ethnicity. Presumably due to the presence 
on the 2008 ballot of Barack Obama as the first African-American presidential nominee 
of a major party, black North Carolinians comprised a disproportionate share of new 
registrants, and the percentage of black turnout exceeded that for white voters for the first 
time (Morrill and Mellnik 2008; “Under the Dome” 2008). Some previous research has 
indicated that African-Americans have been less likely than members of other ethnic 
groups to utilize early voting; while Stein’s (1998) analysis finds no significant racial or 
ethnic differences in its use, Gronke and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005), Gronke, Bishin, 
Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005) and Haag (2010) all find that early voters are 
generally more likely than Election Day voters to be white (or Hispanic) than African-
American. Kenski (2005) reaches the same conclusion with respect to the 2004 election, 
but finds no difference among the groups in 2000. Haag’s (2010) study of Texas elections 
from 2002 to 2008 finds that Hispanic voters were more likely to vote on Election Day, 
while Gronke, Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005) find that Cuban-
Americans in Miami-Dade County, Florida, in 2004 were more likely to early vote while 
black voters were less likely to do so.  The rate of early voting by African-Americans 
increased substantially in 2008, presumably because of the Obama candidacy. Gronke, 
Hicks and Toffey (2009) observe this in particular among Southern black voters, while 
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Haag (2010) reaches the same conclusion about black voters in Texas. The present 
research has access to same day registration data for voters by race, but does not include 
data on actual voting by race beyond the fact that SDR, by definition, includes early 
voting. 
Gronke and Toffey (2008) argue that the expansion of convenience (non-precinct) 
voting opportunities primarily benefits higher income, better educated, older votes who 
are more attuned to politics and campaigns, but the relative differences between early 
voters and Election Day voters vary according to the type of election being held, with 
greater disparities observed in presidential election years. Their comparison of 
participation trends in presidential elections (2004 and 2008) and midterm elections 
(2002 and 2006) indicates inconsistent and even contradictory results between the two; 
for example, a voter’s level of education and extent of paying attention to the campaign is 
positively correlated with early voting in midterm election years but negatively correlated 
with it in presidential election years, while the relationship between income and early 
voting shows the opposite trend. The present study, however, focuses only on presidential 
elections without consideration of differences in voting patterns in midterm elections. 
Larocca and Klemanski (2011) quantify the “costs” of voting primarily in terms 
of the number of trips and the number of tasks involved in completing the process. They 
find a consistent positive effect on turnout resulting from liberalized absentee voting 
requirements and Election Day registration, and a consistent negative effect resulting 
from early voting. They attribute the latter effect to the decreased effectiveness of 
mobilization efforts spread across several days or weeks, rather than focused on a single 
Election Day; they argue that this diffused mobilization is less effective at lowering the 
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“costs” of obtaining the information necessary for many nonvoters to make their 
decisions to vote, and for whom. Furthermore, while early voting increases the window 
of opportunity available for voting, it decreases neither the number of trips nor the 
number of tasks involved; indeed, these authors argue that it may increase the “cost” if 
the early voting site is farther from the voter’s home than the assigned precinct polling 
place.  
Rigby and Springer (2010) argue that reforms of the voting process, rather than of 
the registration process, exacerbate existing inequality in political participation, 
particularly in states where such bias already exists to a significant degree. They argue 
that nonvoting is more likely to be the result of inaccessibility of registration rather than 
of voting itself, and thus that attempts to increase participation should focus on the first 
stage of the two-step process rather than the second. They further argue that EDR, which 
consolidates the process of registering and voting into a single step, reduce inequality to a 
greater degree than reforms such as “Motor Voter,” which widened the opportunity for 
registration and thus reduced the cost of that step of the process, but maintained voting as 
a separate step and did not reduce that cost. Fitzgerald (2005) also argues that registration 
reform, in particular the adoption of EDR, rather than the adoption of convenience 
voting, will have a greater impact on the number of nonvoters who are able to become 
active as voters. 
Gronke, Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005) and Haag (2010) each 
find that first-time voters are less likely to early vote and more likely to vote on Election 
Day. Stein (1998) finds that newly registered voters are less likely to vote at all, even 
given the opportunity to early vote. Greenberg and Carville (2009) find that the 
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individual practice of early voting appears to be “fluid” from one election to the next; 
approximately half of early voters in 2008 were first-time early voters, while the other 
half had early voted in either 2004 or 2006.  
A comparison of early voters and Election Day voters on the characteristic of 
economic class produces inconclusive results. Stein and Garcia-Monet (1997) find that 
early voters are wealthier than Election Day voters, as judged by their county’s median 
home value. However, Stein’s (1998) study of the 1994 election in Texas finds that early 
voters had slightly lower incomes than Election Day voters. Gronke and Galanes-
Rosenbaum (2005) find that early voters are not higher income than their Election Day 
counterparts. In contrast, Gronke, Hicks and Toffey (2009) find that higher income voters 
were more likely than the average voter to use in-person early voting in 2008, but they 
were not more likely to vote absentee. Gronke and Toffey (2008) assert that the income 
difference between the two groups of voters has been increasing over time, as early 
voting options have expanded; these authors find no significant difference in income 
between early voters and Election Day voters in 2000 and 2002, but that early voters had 
higher incomes in 2004 and 2006. 
The demographic characteristic of an individual’s level of education is another 
area in which most research has found differences between early voters and Election Day 
voters.  This is a consistent finding in Gronke’s work with various co-authors. Gronke 
and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005) find that early voters are better educated than the 
average voter. Gronke, Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum (2005) find that early 
voters are more likely to be better informed and better educated, and Gronke, Hicks and 
Toffey (2009) find that better-educated voters were more likely to early vote, either 
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absentee or in-person in 2008. Gronke and Toffey (2008) find no difference in 
educational levels between early and Election Day voters in 2000 and 2002, but that early 
voters were better educated in 2004 and 2006 (another example of these authors’ 
assertion, presented above, that differences between the two groups of voters have 
increased over time as early voting options have expanded).  Gronke and Toffey (2008) 
specifically discover that one’s level of education has a strong positive effect on the 
probability of one’s early voting in states whose laws make early voting more readily 
available. Stein (1998) reports finding no difference in educational levels between the 
two groups, but that early voters were significantly more likely to report an interest in 
politics, while Barreto, Streb, Marks and Guerra (2006) report that absentee voters in 
California are better educated than their Election Day counterparts, though they do not 
significantly differ in their political views. 
Turnout Effects of Election Reform 
Each procedural reform will be examined individually for its impact on turnout in 
the relevant elections. How many voters have chosen to take advantage of each? Which 
political or demographic groups have been most affected by these reforms, in terms of 
their participation? And have these effects differed according to the partisan control of 
the county commission in each jurisdiction? Several authors (Oliver 1996; Hansen 2001; 
Johansen 2006; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum and Miller 2007) argue that election reform 
increases turnout only in conjunction with campaign or party mobilization. This study 
will explore the issue from a different perspective, that of the partisan effect of election 
administration. This could be considered an examination of the “internal” election 
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process, how registration and voting are carried out by the official authorities, rather than 
of “external” factors such as campaign and party mobilization.  
Turnout Effects of Same Day Registration: The study will explore the extent to 
which North Carolina’s implementation of same day registration (SDR) contributed to its 
unparalleled growth in voter turnout in 2008.  The availability of voter registration 
statistics for each county on Election Day 2008 and 2012, and 25 days previous to each 
election (the cutoff date for standard registration), allow for the construction of a variable 
representing net change in registration within the same day registration/early voting 
period. This net change includes new same day registrants and subtracts those who were 
dropped or purged from the rolls within the last month before the election. Presumably, 
any observed net gain is attributable to same day registrants. 
Several authors have examined the effects of EDR and SDR on turnout in 
different elections over time. Calvert and Gilchrist (1993) find that in Minnesota from 
1971 to 1993, 19.4% of voters in presidential elections were Election Day registrants; in 
2006, an estimated 13% of the vote was cast by these voters (Dēmos 2007). Research 
over decades has consistently found a negative relationship between registration closing 
date and turnout (e.g., Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978; Rhine 1995).  
Recent research generally finds a positive relationship between the 
implementation of EDR/SDR and turnout, with an average increase of 3.6 points 
following its adoption (Knack 1999), six points in the midterm elections from 1990 to 
1994 and three points in the presidential elections from 1992 to 1996 (Knack and White 
2000; Knack 2001). McDonald (2008a) finds a seven-point increase in turnout in 2004 
due to EDR; three-quarters of this increase is accounted for by new registrants, and the 
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remainder by existing voters who move close to Election Day. Rhine (1995) predicts that 
the adoption of universal SDR would increase turnout by 14 points, while Alvarez, 
Ansolabehere and Wilson (2002) argue that the existence of universal SDR in the 2000 
election would have increased registration by 5.7 points and actual turnout by 8.1 points. 
In comparison to states which have not adopted these practices, turnout has been 
shown to be higher in EDR/SDR states by margins of 10 points in 1980 and 1992 
(Highton 1997), 12 points in the presidential elections from 1976 to 1988 (Knack 1995), 
15.1 points in 2000 (Alvarez, Ansolabehere and Wilson 2002), and10.5 points in 2006 
(Lierman 2008). It also appears that EDR/SDR can sustain higher levels of turnout even 
in the event of national turnout declines.  
Fenster (1994) finds that the original EDR states increased their presidential 
election turnout from 1972 to 1976, and sustained these levels in the next four elections 
even as turnout in other states declined, with an average turnout increase of 3.04% in 
EDR states and average decline of 1.69% in non-EDR states from 1976 to 1992. In the 
midterm elections from 1976 to 1990, the early adopting EDR states had an average 
turnout increase of 4.1%, while other states saw a decline of 1.1% (Fenster 1994). Knack 
(1999) finds that in the 1996 election, which saw turnout decline from 1992 levels 
throughout the country, states which had newly adopted EDR had only a 5.3% decline, 
while turnout in states that had adopted neither EDR nor NVRA’s registration provisions 
since 1992 declined by 9.6%. However, North Carolina’s unusual status of allowing SDR 
but not EDR from 2008 to 2013 means that comparisons with states which allow both 
should be taken with caution, as these findings may not be entirely generalizable to the 
case being studied.  
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Other authors, however, question the effectiveness of EDR/SDR as a means of 
increasing voter turnout. While King and Wambeam (1995/1996) find that EDR has 
produced an estimated six to nine million new voters, they argue that the earliest states to 
adopt EDR had more competitive party systems, more demographically upscale 
populations, and more permissive voting laws even prior to the implementation of EDR. 
Knack (1995), Rhine (1995) and Fitzgerald (2005) each argue that these states already 
had more active electorates and higher levels of participation at the time the registration 
reforms were adopted.  
King and Wambeam’s (1995/1996) comparison of early-adopting EDR states to 
demographically similar states without EDR finds that, among the EDR states, only in 
Wisconsin did EDR produce a statistically significant increase in turnout. They argue that 
turnout increases in other states cannot reliably be attributed to the implementation of 
EDR. Gans (2004) finds that EDR states actually had sharper declines in turnout from 
1992 to 1996 than did non-EDR states, though larger increases from 1996 to 2000. Gans 
(2004) argues that EDR may be most effective in increasing turnout in elections with 
higher citizen interest. Bennett (1990) and Gans (1990) each find that overall voter 
turnout declined from 1960-1988, with declines observed even in North Dakota (which 
has no voter registration) and the long-standing EDR states of Wisconsin and Minnesota. 
Lloyd (2001) finds that, with respect to the 1980 election, registration closing dates were 
less significant as determinants of voting than the individual’s expectation of voting and 
interest in participation.  
It appears that SDR in North Carolina was a popular practice among first-time 
voters in 2008, but considerably less so in 2012. One advocate of same day registration 
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(Carbo 2008) specifically argues that the introduction of this practice was responsible for 
Obama’s victory in the state that year. As the table below indicates, registration by this 
method dropped for all three categories of voters between the two elections, but 
substantially more so for registered Democrats. Indeed, a preliminary analysis indicates 
that this factor may be more responsible than any other for Obama’s change in fortunes in 
the state between the two elections:  
TABLE 2.1: Net growth of Same Day Registration, 2008 and 201219. 
Year                      Democratic           Republican           Unaffiliated/Other20 
2008              109,918         36,093                              49,689 
2012                51,761         24,637                              12,755   
 
Turnout Effects of Early Voting: Several authors have examined the combined 
turnout effects of both forms of convenience voting, in-person early voting and 
unrestricted absentee voting by mail. Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2009) argue 
that any analysis of voting reform must consider the interaction among the different 
practices, and that early voting has a positive effect on turnout only when combined with 
Election Day or same day registration.  
In the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, more North Carolinians used One 
Stop early voting than voted on Election Day. Rosenfield (1994) presents arguments by 
supporters of early voting that it will increase turnout, especially among members of 
groups which have traditionally been politically underrepresented and those who find it 
difficult to get to their precinct polling place on a specific day. However, results in this 
area have been mixed, and few studies have actually indicated that early voting increases 
                                                            
19 Compiled by the author from data supplied by the North Carolina State Board of Elections and county 
Boards of Elections. . 
 
20 The Libertarian Party had ballot access, and thus voters were able to register under that party label, in 
2008 but not in 2012, when no parties other than Democratic and Republican were recognized by the 
state. 
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turnout. Shortly after the implementation of early voting in Tennessee, Richardson and 
Neeley (1996) found that its availability increased turnout in that state, but that it was not 
the most significant predictor of voter participation.  
Hansen (2001) found that the turnout effects of early voting were mixed and 
marginal. Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum and Miller (2007) find that early voting does not 
increase turnout, while Giammo and Brox (2010) find no increase except when early 
voting was coupled with another election reform, and even in such cases, the increase is 
due to a short-lived novelty effect. Some other recent studies have actually found a 
negative correlation between the existence of early voting and voter turnout, including 
Gans (2004), Fitzgerald (2005), and Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2009). 
Leighley and Nagler (2009) find a positive but small increase in turnout in early voting 
states; these authors observed a smaller increase in states that adopted no-excuse early 
voting than in states requiring an excuse for not voting at one’s precinct on Election Day.   
Stein’s 1998 study of early voting in Texas finds that its availability had a 
significant but marginal effect on turnout, and that new registrants were less likely to vote 
even given the opportunity to early vote. He argues that, given that the costs of voting are 
greater for poorer and less well educated voters, locating early voting sites in familiar 
locations not traditionally used for that purpose (such as shopping malls) may stimulate 
turnout. 
In examining the long-term effect of early voting availability on turnout, Gronke, 
Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller and Toffey (2008) find that in most states, ten to twenty 
percent of voters early vote when it is first made available, and its use generally expands 
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over time. Haag’s (2010) longitudinal studies of Texas elections indicate that early voting 
turnout in that state was high when it was first introduced, but declined over time. 
Turnout Effects of Unrestricted Absentee Voting by Mail: While removing the 
restrictions on absentee voting by mail appears to have had relatively little impact on 
voter turnout in North Carolina, its effects are still worth exploring as part of this study. 
As previously stated herein, Oregon adopted a universal Vote-by-Mail system beginning 
in 1998, which has been the subject of significant research. Southwell (2004) reports a 
general increase in turnout since this reform has been adopted. Richey (2008) finds a 
10% increase in turnout among Oregon’s registered voters as a result of this reform. 
Berinsky, Burns and Traugott (2001) argue that this reform has increased long-term voter 
turnout, but only by making it easier for existing voters to vote. However, Gronke and 
Miller (2007) suggest that the increased turnout observed in these elections was due to a 
novelty effect and was not seen in later elections. 
In general, Karp and Banducci (2000, 2001) also find that increased access to 
voting by mail increases turnout among those who are already predisposed to vote. 
Kousser and Mullin (2007) find that turnout did not increase among voters in small 
California precincts who were assigned to vote by mail rather than at a polling place on 
Election Day. Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum and Miller (2007) argue that vote-by-mail 
systems are the most effective at increasing turnout among the reforms being considered 
by the present work; this study echoes the previously cited authors’ arguments that this 
comes primarily in the form of retention of existing voters rather than the recruitment of 
new voters. 
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Partisanship and Election Reform 
Previous research has found mixed results about the partisanship of early voters in 
comparison to Election Day voters. Kenski (2005) finds a significant Republican 
advantage among early voters in 2000 and a Democratic disadvantage among that group 
in 2004, and Stein (1998) finds that early voters are considerably more ideologically 
conservative than Election Day voters. However, several works find that early voters may 
be stronger partisans than Election Day voters (and thus make their decisions earlier), but 
that this is equally true of both parties’ supporters, and thus there is no particular partisan 
advantage for either Democrats or Republicans in early voting (Stein 1998; Gronke, 
Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum 2005; Gronke and Galanes-Rosenbaum 2005; 
Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller and Toffey 2008; Dyck, Gaines and Shaw 2009). 
The reasons why One Stop voting in North Carolina in 2008 produced a 
significant Democratic advantage will be explored in the present research. As stated 
above, much of the literature examining the effect of convenience voting on partisan 
outcomes has primarily attributed it to the effects of mobilization efforts by candidates, 
campaigns and parties. The question has not been explored whether there may be an 
effect on turnout or partisan outcomes produced by partisan differences in 
implementation by local authorities within the same state. The present research seeks to 
contribute to the literature by examining this previously-unexamined aspect of the issue. 
The present study will also explore the extent to which SDR contributed to 
Obama’s victory in North Carolina in 2008. Many researchers, political actors and 
policymakers have long assumed that mobilization of larger numbers of economically 
disadvantaged, less well-educated, and minority voters would provide a benefit to the 
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Democratic Party (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1978). Indeed, this expectation has largely 
driven Democratic partisan support and Republican partisan opposition to measures 
expanding registration opportunities since a national policy of EDR was unsuccessfully 
proposed by Democratic President Jimmy Carter in 1977 (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 
1978; Calvert and Gilchrist 1993; Brians and Grofman 1999; Knack 1999 and 2001; 
Highton and Wolfinger 2001; De Oliviera 2009). The same partisan division has been 
observed in debates over the implementation of EDR/SDR in several states (De Oliviera 
2009). 
However, previous research on the partisan impact of registration reform has 
produced mixed findings. Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) and Calvert and Gilchrist 
(1993) each find that any such partisan benefit would be minimal, given the relative 
similarity of nonvoters’ political attitudes to those of current participants; in addition, an 
exploration of voters’ and nonvoters’ attitudes on specific issues led Rosenstone and 
Wolfinger (1978) to conclude that the overall effect on the ideology of the electorate 
would be minimal. The relative liberalism or conservatism of nonvoters as compared to 
voters appears to vary according to the issue, providing no clear partisan advantage in 
either direction (Highton and Wolfinger 2001). Calvert and Gilchrist (1993) find that any 
such effect might be in the direction of opposition to incumbents and support for non-
partisan or non-traditional candidates, rather than in the direction of support for a specific 
party. Highton and Wolfinger (2001) find that the partisan benefit of universal 
registration varies by type of election, and Highton (2004) finds that only a minimal 
Democratic gain would have resulted from universal turnout in the Senate elections from 
1994 to 1998. 
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Calvert and Gilchrist’s (1993) case study of Minnesota finds that, in the 1984 
presidential election, Republican Ronald Reagan benefited from EDR in the home state 
of his opponent, Democrat Walter Mondale. Highton and Wolfinger (2001) find that, in 
1992 and 1996, universal registration would have benefited Democrat Bill Clinton and 
disadvantaged Republicans George Bush and Bob Dole, while Knack (1999) finds no 
benefit to the 1996 Clinton candidacy from the adoption of EDR in three states since the 
previous presidential election. Knack (1999) also finds a negative relationship between 
registration reform and Democratic identification in 1996. Brians and Grofman (1999) 
find that states adopting EDR were five points more Democratic than non-adoption states 
prior to its enactment; this margin did not increase as a result of EDR, but EDR was 
positively correlated with political competitiveness. Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn (2007) 
find that, while the pool of potential new registrants is disproportionately composed of 
self-identified Democrats and independents; however, previous research finds that the 
partisan consequences of this expansion would be minimal. 
Several authors have found that early voters tend to be stronger partisans whose 
vote choices are based primarily on party label, rather than on the specific candidate 
characteristics or issues which more strongly influence the choices of Election Day 
voters. These voters make their voting decisions earlier than others and are thus more 
likely to vote early (Stein 1998; Neeley and Richardson 2001; Gronke 2004; Stein, 
Leighley and Owens 2004; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller and Toffey 2008; Haag 
2010). However, Gronke and Toffey (2008) find no difference in the firmness of political 
beliefs between the two groups in the elections of 2000 to 2006, and these authors find a 
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negative correlation between the strength of a voter’s ideology and his probability of 
early voting. 
Stein (1998) finds that early voters in Texas are considerably more conservative 
than Election Day voters. Kenski (2005) finds that Republican voters were significantly 
more likely to early vote in the 2000 election, that Democratic voters were significantly 
less likely to do so in 2004, and that strong partisanship was positively correlated with 
early voting for both parties in 2000. Two studies co-authored by Gronke in 2008 
(Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller and Toffey; Gronke and Toffey) find that early 
voters are more politically aware and more attuned to campaigns than their Election Day 
counterparts, the same conclusion reached by Stein (1998) and Neeley and Richardson 
(2001).  
In the 2000 election, Kenski (2005) also finds that early voters demonstrated 
significantly higher support for Republican candidate George W. Bush than did Election 
Day voters, and that Republicans did a better job than Democrats of mobilizing early 
voters in both 2000 and 2004.  However, other works find no particular partisan 
advantage for either Democrats or Republicans in early voting (Stein 1998; Gronke, 
Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum 2005; Gronke and Galanes-Rosenbaum 2005; 
Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller and Toffey 2008; Dyck, Gaines and Shaw 2009). 
Obama’s 2008 margin of victory in North Carolina is more than accounted for by 
One Stop votes, as seen below. It thus appears that the use of this practice in this election 
significantly benefited the Democratic candidate. In 2004, Democrat John F. Kerry also 
did relatively better with nonprecinct voters than with Election Day voters in North 
Carolina, though in that case it simply means that his margin of defeat by Republican 
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George W. Bush was less among the former group than among the latter (North Carolina 
State Board of Elections data; Bonner, Bauerlein and Raynor 2004). As is shown below, 
Obama’s Election Day and mail votes declined more from 2008 to 2012 than his One 
Stop votes increased. 
TABLE 2.2: North Carolina presidential vote by candidate and method, 2004-2012.21 
     2004                       2008                           2012 
     Kerry           Bush         Obama         McCain        Obama         Romney  
Election Day 1,003,716  1,325,665         950,239 1,109,975 738,784         964,107 
Non-Precinct    522,133     635,901     
One Stop                    1,149,129    902,674     1,353,754      1,153,723 
Mail                                   165,954    174,471   72,375         143,344 
Provisional                         12,815      12,097   13,478   9,221 
 
Gans (2004) argues that early voters make their decision based on differential 
information; those who choose to vote before Election Day give up their access to late-
breaking news that might affect their decisions. The National Commission on Federal 
Election Reform (2001) argues that citizens who cast their votes well in advance of the 
election do so with differential amounts of information, which Fitzgerald (2005) cautions 
may lead to ill-informed choices. Hansen (2001) also cites arguments that early voters 
might make judgments prematurely without having all the information necessary to a 
decision, and some might have voted differently if they had voted later. 
Election Reform and Voter Mobilization 
The effect of early voting on political party and campaign mobilization strategies 
has been the subject of research by several authors. The adoption of this practice provides 
                                                            
21  “Non-Precinct” is the total of One Stop, Absentee by Mail, and other categories of votes 
which could not be reliably broken down by category prior to 2008. Votes for candidates other 
than the Democrat and Republican in each election are excluded. Compiled by the author from 
data supplied by the North Carolina State Board of Elections and county Boards of Elections. 
Some discrepancies exist with the data presented in Table 1.1 which could not be resolved. 
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potential advantages as well as disadvantages to actors in the campaign. Gans (2004) 
argues that focusing on a single day rather than diffusing campaign efforts over a period 
of weeks is a much more effective use of a candidate’s or party’s resources. Gronke, 
Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller and Toffey (2008) cite political consultants who suggest that 
early voting often increases the cost of a campaign by as much as 25%, due to the need to 
start voter mobilization earlier and sustain it for a longer time. 
Early voting may, however, provide both an opportunity and a challenge for 
campaigns to more effectively target both potential early voters and Election Day voters, 
and several recent campaigns have incorporated this into their strategies. Giammo and 
Brox (2010) quote campaign operatives as saying that early voters and Election Day 
voters need to be targeted separately, while Gronke, Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-
Rosenbaum (2005) argue that may early voting allows campaigns to more specifically 
target their supporters, while not repeatedly contacting those who have already voted. A 
necessary condition for this, according to Gronke (2004) and Gronke and Galanes-
Rosenbaum (2005), is the existence of, and access to, voter lists showing which people 
have voted early; with such lists, campaigns may reduce the costs of their mobilization 
efforts, but without this information, as Election Day approaches, campaigns may incur 
unnecessary extra costs and waste their voter appeals on those who have already cast 
their ballots. Fortier (2004) also argues that this information allows campaigns to “lock 
up” their early voting supporters in advance of Election Day, and focus on the remaining 
voters as Election Day approaches. Campaigns in which effective early voting 
mobilization appears to have occurred are the 1992 Clinton-Gore campaign in Texas, 
with a specific targeting effort for Hispanic voters (Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997), and 
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the 2008 Obama-Biden campaign nationally, which specifically targeted early voters 
while the McCain-Palin ticket did not (McDonald 2008b). A disadvantage to an early 
voting mobilization effort, however, according to Gronke, Bishin, Stevens and Galanes-
Rosenbaum (2005) is that voters may be put off and discouraged from participating by a 
longer campaign period and broadcast of attack advertising over a longer amount of time. 
Stein, Owens and Leighley (2003) argue that early voting only increases turnout 
when it is combined with strategically planned campaign mobilization. Lower turnout 
generally among Democratic voters means that Democratic candidates and party 
organizations would be more likely to engage in this type of mobilization as part of their 
electoral strategy. Burden, Canon, Mayer and Moynihan (2009) argue that early voting 
only increases turnout when combined with other practices to increase access to 
participation, such as the ability to register on Election Day or on the same day that one 
wishes to early vote. 
Obama’s 2008 campaign targeted North Carolina, encouraged voter registration, 
and successfully mobilized voters (Christensen 2008; Masket 2009) in a way that the 
campaigns of Clinton, Gore and Kerry did not. In particular, Obama targeted early voters 
(White 2008; Bitzer 2010), and did so more successfully than McCain or the previous 
Democratic candidates. While the same strategy appears to have been used in 2012, the 
Romney campaign mounted a more effective counterattack than had McCain’s. The 
Obama campaigns, in short, took advantage of the election reforms to be examined by 
this proposed research. The first campaign succeeded in winning North Carolina, while 
the second did not. The present research will explore the extent to which differences in 
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implementation of election reform may have contributed to the emergence of the two 
different results. 
The present work will compare registration, patterns of turnout and convenience 
voting (One Stop and absentee by mail) in counties with consistently Democratic and 
consistently Republican-controlled commissions, and in areas where control of the 
commission changed during the period being studied. If partisanship affects election 
administration in these areas, then different patterns should be observed. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the research design chapter which follows.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
OF VARIABLES 
 
 
The previous chapters have introduced the theories upon which the present 
research is based, stated the research questions and the importance of examining North 
Carolina election returns to understand the significance of various types of election 
reform in this case. The study has also examined the work of previous authors in this 
area. This chapter will describe the method by which the present study will be conducted, 
and will explain the models needed to test the various research hypotheses related to the 
participation and partisan effects of election reform, and how differences in county-level 
program implementation may affect the outcome of each reform. In order to examine the 
effects of the election reforms on participation, it is necessary to have data on each 
county’s population, voter registration, voter turnout, and political and demographic 
composition over the period of time before and after the implementation of these reforms. 
The study will examine the implementation and effects of election reform on both 
registration and voting, because both of these steps are necessary to complete the task of 
officially registering one’s preference in an election, and both steps have been the subject 
of reform in North Carolina during the period being studied. In addition, the partisan 
political impact of these reforms will be considered. A variety of dependent variables 
derived from population, registration, turnout, and election data will be used in several 
different Ordinary Least Squares regression equations to explore different aspects of the 
questions being raised, in accordance with the institutional theory that structural barriers 
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to registration and voting are primarily responsible for political nonparticipation. The 
study will include a variety of research hypotheses about the effects of election reform on 
participation. 
Unit of Analysis and Population Examined 
The available data are aggregate in nature, and do not allow for examination of, or 
inferences about, individual behavior, such as a particular person’s attitude about voting 
or opinion of a particular candidate. The unit of analysis is each county in North Carolina 
at the time of a particular election, e.g., Mecklenburg County in 2004 or Buncombe 
County in 2008. Variables denoting subgroups within each county include total voting 
age population; white and nonwhite voting age population; white and black registered 
voters; Democratic, Republican, unaffiliated and total registered voters, and voters for the 
Democratic, Republican and other presidential candidates, by method of voting where 
available, at the time of each election from 1992 to 2012. The complete list of variables 
used in this study is presented in a table later in this chapter. 
Data 
The work uses county-level data from the presidential elections of 1992 through 
2012. Dummy variables representing years, with 1992 as the omitted category, are used 
to denoted each county in each election as a unique case.  The data include total and 
voting age22 population data for each election year, in order to determine participation 
rates for each group in each county. The 2000 data are from the U.S. Census, while the 
                                                            
22 The available data for this study do not break out voting-age population from voting-eligible population. 
It is important to note that not all persons 18 and over who are counted by the Census are eligible to vote. 
Adults who are ineligible to vote in North Carolina include non-citizens, those who are not legal residents 
of the state or who are registered elsewhere, those who have lived in the state for less than 30 days, and 
those who are serving a felony sentence or are on probation or parole. (North Carolina State Board of 
Elections, “Registering to Vote in North Carolina”) 
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data from the remaining years are from Census Bureau estimates. A caveat is that, as will 
be discussed below, voter registration records classify voters by specific race, while the 
available Census data only categorize members of the population as either “white” or 
“nonwhite.” Thus it is not possible to directly calculate “black” voter participation as a 
percentage of “black” voting age population, although it is possible to do so for white 
voters and white VAP. Nonwhite voting age population is, however, included as a 
variable.  
Voter registration and turnout statistics, election results by category of vote, and 
the number of One Stop sites used in each election have been obtained from the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections and county Boards of Elections. Under the provisions 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments, during the period covered 
by this study, 40 North Carolina counties were required to report voter registration data 
by race, in order to establish a lack of discrimination in access to the process. In practice, 
these data are available for all 100 counties. Therefore, voters can be identified by racial 
categories. While the state identifies registered voters by a variety of racial and ethnic 
designators – white, black, American Indian, Hispanic, etc., the two groups of primary 
interest in this study are white and black registrants/voters, given that white citizens are 
the majority of the population, and black citizens have traditionally represented the 
state’s largest minority group and the group most affected by historical discrimination 
and denial of the right to vote. 
For 2008 and 2012, the data include the net change in voter registration within 24 
days of the election. This is a proxy for Same Day Registration; it represents the number 
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of same day registrants minus the number of purges23 which took place during the same 
time period. Given that the cutoff date for registering to vote on Election Day is 25 days 
before the election, any net gain observed between the cutoff date and Election is due to 
same day registration. 
As stated, registration data are available for several different groups of interest, 
including breakdown by party and by race. This allows for an exploration of any 
differential impact which a particular reform may have among a given population in a 
given area. For example, the populations of African-American registrants/voters and 
white registrants/voters in the same county can be examined and compared as distinct 
groups, and the populations of African-Americans in different counties can be examined 
and compared. The populations of registered Democrats in counties with Democratic-
controlled commissions and with Republican-controlled commissions can be examined 
and compared, as can the populations of Democrats and Republicans in the same county. 
An important topic in election reform, and one which is of particular interest to the 
present study, is its effect upon populations who have traditionally been the victims of 
discrimination or underrepresentation in their use of the franchise, as mentioned in 
Chapters One and Two. Many of the authors whose work has been previously mentioned 
in this study have argued that these particular populations are particularly disadvantaged 
by structural barriers to registration and voting, and their work has focused on the extent 
to which election reform does – or does not – make the voting electorate more 
                                                            
23 “In North Carolina, county boards of elections follow a comprehensive list maintenance schedule to 
remove names of individuals who are no longer eligible to be registered due to death, felony conviction, 
removal from the county, or lack of voter contact.” “Lack of voter contact” means that the county board 
of elections is unable to locate or contact by mail someone who has not voted in two consecutive federal 
election cycles. The voter is then removed from the rolls. (North Carolina State Board of Elections, “Voter 
Registration Frequently Asked Questions”) 
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demographically representative of the population as a whole. The data available for this 
study will allow for the examination of that question as it pertains to voters in North 
Carolina, where it is particularly relevant due to the state’s history of discrimination and 
disenfranchisement. If the institutional theory is valid, the introduction of same day 
registration should increase the percentage of the voting age population which is 
registered, while the increased availability of One Stop voting and the removal of the 
excuse requirement for absentee voting by mail should each increase the percentage who 
actually vote. 
The data also facilitate an examination of different partisan groups (registered 
Democrats, Republicans, and unaffiliated voters) in different partisan contexts; for 
example, the work will be able to compare the use of One Stop voting by Democratic 
voters in counties with Democratic or Republican control of their commissions. This will 
allow for a study of whether the effect of each reform is affected by partisan control of 
the authority (county commission) which primarily determines the resources available for 
each county to implement that reform. It will also allow for an exploration of whether the 
advantage predicted (by both sides) that One Stop voting would give the Democratic 
Party has, in fact, emerged.  
The data include the number of votes cast for each candidate in each election, by 
type where available. Legally, One Stop votes are considered to be absentee votes in the 
same category as traditional absentee ballots submitted by mail, though a county may 
choose to report a separate count for these votes on its official election abstract. Thus, the 
data available for this research contains certain limitations. Data on vote by method 
(whether Election Day or absentee) were not available for 1992, although registration, 
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turnout and election return data are available, so the analyses below are able to use 1992 
as a comparison year in several of the regression equations. In the second pre-reform 
baseline year of 1996, when an excuse was still required to vote absentee by mail and 
counties were not required to offer One Stop voting, only 27 of 100 counties reported 
separate absentee voting data. (Again, however, registration, turnout and election return 
data are available.) Thus, the 1996 data contain 73 cases where only the total vote is 
reported, missing observations of vote by type. Conversely, in 2008 and 2012, Election 
Day voting, absentee by mail, and One Stop data were available as separate categories for 
all 100 counties.  
In 2000 and 2004, most counties reported mail absentee and One Stop votes as a 
single “absentee” category. The research can thus draw distinctions between precinct 
voting (at the polling place on Election Day) and non-precinct (Absentee by Mail or One 
Stop), but not specifically distinguish among precinct and One Stop, precinct and 
Absentee by Mail, or One Stop and Absentee by Mail, prior to 2008. Provisional, 
curbside, and other types of votes which do not fall into the above categories are included 
in vote totals, so that  all votes are accounted for, but these are not examined as distinct 
categories because it is not possible to determine the method by which they were cast24.  
The dataset uses “nonprecinct” voting (One Stop plus absentee by mail) as a single 
category for the five latest elections, in order to allow for direct longitudinal comparisons 
across the entire time period examined. For the 2008 and 2012 elections, the data also 
                                                            
24 A provisional vote is cast under certain circumstances when the voter rolls do not contain information 
on a prospective voter or he cannot document his eligibility to vote in the jurisdiction; for example, if the 
person does not appear on the list of registered voters in his precinct. It is subject to further investigation 
and is counted if the person’s eligibility to vote in the jurisdiction is established. Curbside votes are cast by 
persons who are physically unable to enter a polling place, whether at a One Stop site or an established 
Election Day precinct. Some counties report small numbers of other categories of votes whose method of 
casting cannot be determined. 
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include One Stop and mail voting as separate categories, allowing for an examination of 
the separate effects of each method in those two elections. In both cases, Election Day 
votes are reported (subject to the limitations described above). The total votes cast for 
candidates other than the Democratic and Republican nominees (e.g., independent, 
Libertarian, Reform, Green, write-in) by each method, where available, are recorded as a 
single variable. 
The percentage of county residents below the poverty line, and the percentage of 
adults who are high school graduates, will be used to control for the effects of 
socioeconomic status, consistent with the widely observed phenomenon that voting 
participation varies with income and particularly education (see, for example, Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone 1980). These variables are included among the population characteristics 
variables. The socioeconomic data were not available for 1992 or 2004. 
 In order to examine whether there are differences in the implementation of each 
reform depending on budget control, the data also include information on partisan control 
of each County Commission during each election year, where this could be determined 
(there are some missing observations for each year except 2012). The data also include 
the number of One Stop sites used in each county in each year, which is expected to be 
the direct result of budgeting decisions. Counties are not coded for nonprecinct voting in 
1992. For 1996, Guilford and Wake Counties, which reported One Stop votes as a 
separate category, are coded as 1, and all other counties are coded as 0. Beginning in 
2000, the figure is the actual number of sites reported in each county; counties which did 
not operate satellite sites, but only permitted One Stop voting at the Board of Elections 
office or another single location, are coded as 1. The number of the county’s registered 
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voters is then divided by the number of sites to determine the number of potential voters 
per site. A smaller number of voters per site would indicate greater availability or 
convenience of One Stop voting. A larger number of sites would imply more convenient 
access in terms of travel time, and a smaller number of voters per site would imply less 
time spent in the voting process itself, such as waiting in line. Both of these would be 
considered reductions in the “cost” of voting.  
Voter registration and turnout percentages will be calculated as functions of the 
county’s voting age population, and turnout as a function of its registered voters. 
Registration and turnout will also be calculated in terms of change from the previous 
election. These will be used to examine the effects of same day registration and 
nonprecinct/One Stop voting. If registration increases in 2008 and 2012 to a significantly 
greater degree than in previous elections, standardizing for population, it would appear 
that the effect is due to the introduction of same day registration. If turnout increases 
significantly as the availability of nonprecinct voting increases, it would appear that the 
effect is due to greater accessibility of One Stop voting and the removal of restrictions on 
absentee voting by mail. It is also expected that these effects will be greater among 
Democratic voters, and among voters in counties with Democratic-controlled 
commissions. The specific hypotheses associated with these expectations will follow later 
in this chapter. 
Measurement 
The effects of a reform are measured by the change observed in the population of 
interest following its introduction. For example, the effect of the introduction and 
availability of same day registration is represented by the net change in registration 
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among each group of voters within 24 days preceding the elections of 2008 and 2012. 
The partisan effect of One Stop voting is examined by comparing the change in the 
Democratic and Republican candidates’ vote percentages from previous elections. 
Partisan differences in the implementation of election reform are operationalized by a 
variable representing which party controlled the county commission at the time of each 
election. This enables an examination of whether Democratic and Republican-controlled 
commissions differ in their implementation of election reform, measured by the county’s 
resources devoted to One Stop voting sites (which facilitate both early voting and same 
day registration). Commission memberships were determined through a search of various 
annual editions of the North Carolina Directory of State and County Officials; however, 
this source does not list members by party. The party control variable was constructed 
primarily by subsequently examining county- and state-provided election results for 
individual commission races, where available, to determine commissioners’ partisan 
affiliations; where those data were not available, commissioners’ party affiliations were 
determined through a search of relevant newspaper sources.25  
This work follows that of many authors who have examined various types of 
registration requirements and voting procedures (including EDR or SDR) and 
demographic categories as independent variables, while examining state, county, group, 
or individual-level turnout rates as dependent variables. These include Rosenstone and 
Wolfinger (1978); Knack (1995 and 2001); Rhine (1995 and 1996); Highton (1997); 
Leighley and Nagler (1999); Brians and Grofman (1999 and 2001); Knack and White 
                                                            
25 These included various editions of the Asheville Citizen-Times; The Charlotte Observer; the Greensboro 
News & Record; the Greenville Daily Reflector; The (Raleigh) News & Observer; and the Winston-Salem 
Journal. 
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(2000); Lloyd (2001); Alvarez, Ansolabehere and Wilson (2002); Fitzgerald (2005); 
Wolfinger, Highton and Mullin (2005); McDonald (2008); Burden, Canon, Mayer and 
Moynihan (2009); Lee (2010); Rigby and Springer (2010); and Larocca and Klemanski 
(2011).  
These models allow a determination of the effects of specific types of procedural 
changes in registration and voting, which would be consistent with the institutional 
theory that structural barriers are primarily responsible for nonvoting and thus that the 
removal of those barriers would increase participation. The models also allow for an 
examination of the extent to which their impact may vary for different demographic or 
geographic subgroups of voters. This would be consistent with the institutional theory 
that structural barriers have differential effects on different groups, with participation 
largely determined by socioeconomic factors including income and education. 
The work uses a cross-sectional panel time series model, similar to the state-level 
analyses conducted by Knack (1995), Rhine (1995) and Fitzgerald (1995). This is an 
appropriate method, given that the questions of interest involve changes in the behavior 
of a population over time, but the population of each county’s voters in each election is 
not identical (Schutt 2006).  Ordinary Least Squares multivariate regression (“quite 
probably the most often utilized model for pooled data” [Stimson 1985] and “the 
workhorse of political methodology [Beck and Katz 1995])) will be used to examine the 
extent to which changes in turnout and results can be explained by the effects of each 
type of reform across the elections being examined, and by the partisan context of each 
county, with 1992 as the starting point (subject to the previously described limitations on 
the data which were available for this year) and the change from 1992 to 1996 used as a 
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baseline, given that no reforms were adopted between these two elections and a different 
reform was adopted before each of the three following elections. The use of Ordinary 
Least Squares regression is appropriate because the dependent variable in each case is 
continuous and, in most cases, expressed as a percentage, even though it is bounded by 0 
to 100. While the dependent variable is bounded and does not strictly meet the 
assumptions of OLS, for ease of interpretation, OLS is used here. Robust standard errors 
are used to account for the effects of heteroskedasticity produced by variations in the size 
of counties and in their population changes between elections. This addresses a concern 
raised by Beck and Katz (1995) with respect to the use of OLS as a technique for the 
analysis of time-series cross-section data. The Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation is 
also employed. In the absence of these diagnostic and corrective measures, OLS may 
produce inaccurate estimates of standard errors which lead to overconfidence in the 
predictive value of the model (Beck and Katz 1995).  
Each procedural reform (early voting, same day registration, and no excuse 
absentee voting) will be examined, both individually and in combination with the others, 
for its impact on turnout in the relevant elections. How many voters have chosen to take 
advantage of each? Which political or demographic groups have been most affected by 
these reforms, in terms of their participation in voting? How do same day registrants, 
early voters, and absentee-by-mail voters resemble and differ, demographically and 
politically, from their counterparts who register and vote by traditional methods?  And to 
what extent has each given reform succeeded in increasing citizen participation in 
elections, particularly among the traditionally underrepresented or members of those 
groups who are least likely to be engaged in politics? 
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In addition to the effects of each one of these reforms and practices, they must be 
examined in relationship to each other. Do various combinations of reforms, e.g., same 
day registration and early voting, complement each other, or do they produce opposing 
effects? The interactions of these reforms therefore must be examined as well.  
The first concept of interest is the effect of election reform, specifically the availability of 
same day registration and One Stop voting, on registration and turnout. Does making 
registration easier increase registration? Does making it possible to register and vote in 
the same step increase voting? Does making voting easier increase voting? This will be 
measured by dependent variables representing the percentage of voting age population 
who are registered, the percentage of registered voters who turn out to vote, and the 
percentage of voting age population who turn out, as presented in the table below. 
Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses are drawn from the literature. Following each 
hypothesis is the dissertation chapter where the specific hypothesis will be tested. 
 Hypothesis One: Counties with Democratic control of the commission will devote 
greater resources to facilitate nonprecinct voting than other counties, in the form of more 
early voting sites than those with Republican-controlled commissions (during the years in 
which early voting is considered). Hypothesis 1A: This will produce greater use of 
nonprecinct voting in these counties. These hypotheses are explored in Chapter Four. 
 Hypothesis Two: The availability of same day registration will significantly 
increase voter registration. 
 Hypothesis Three: The availability of same day registration, One Stop voting and 
no-excuse absentee voting by mail will significantly increase turnout of registered voters. 
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 Hypothesis Four: The availability of same day registration, One Stop voting and 
no-excuse absentee voting by mail will significantly increase turnout of voting age 
population. The effects of election reform on registration and turnout are explored in 
Chapter Five. 
 Hypothesis Five: The availability of same day registration will increase 
Democratic registration to a significantly greater degree than Republican registration. 
Here, the independent variable is the availability of SDR, and the dependent variable is 
the difference between the percentage in change of Democratic and of Republican 
registrants. 
 Hypothesis Six: Different partisan groups will differentially use the opportunities 
provided by election reform. In particular, Democratic voters will take significantly 
greater advantage of nonprecinct voting (both One Stop and absentee by mail) than 
Republican voters. The independent variables are those representing the availability of 
each form of nonprecinct voting, and the dependent variable is the difference in the  
percentage of the vote for each candidate which is cast by each method (e.g., the 
percentage of the Democratic vote which is cast One Stop minus the percentage of the 
Republican vote which is cast One Stop). Partisan differences in the use of the 
opportunities provided by election reform are explored in Chapter Six. 
Hypothesis Seven:  Same day registration, One Stop voting and no-excuse 
absentee voting by mail will benefit the Democratic candidate to a greater degree than the 
Republican candidate. The independent variables are those representing the availability 
of each election reform, and the dependent variable is the difference in the rate of growth 
in Democratic and Republican vote between each election. The partisan effects of 
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election reform on the outcome of presidential elections in North Carolina are explored in 
Chapter Seven. 
 In each case, the regressions testing election reform effects will include controls 
for party control of the county commission, the county’s number of One Stop sites, and 
the ratio of potential voters to sites (which are used as dependent variables for 
Hypotheses 1 and 1A). While the raw number of sites is largely a function of county 
population and will not necessarily be determinative of registration or turnout 
percentages, it is expected that a smaller ratio of potential voters to sites will make same 
day registration and One Stop voting more convenient (in terms of time spent in the 
registration and voting process), thus lowering the “costs” of participation as they have 
been expressed in the present work. 
 Socioeconomic variables are also relevant here. Given the observed correlations 
between wealth and education and voting, It is expected that poorer populations will be 
less likely to participate, and that better-educated populations will be more likely to do 
so. Given the historically observed disparity between registration and voting rates 
between white and black citizens, it is important to consider racial differences in voting 
as a control. It is expected that the county’s white percentage of VAP will have a positive 
effect on registration and voting. 
 Another variable of interest is the net registration change within 24 days of the 
election as a percentage of total registration. It is expected that a county with a higher 
percentage of new registrants will have a higher percentage of VAP who are registered. 
The net effects of same day registration in 2008 and 2012 are included as an independent 
variable in the equations examining turnout and partisan impact, while the registered 
82 
 
percentage of voting age population is also used as a dependent variable in the equations 
examining the effects of election reform on registration.  
With respect to the turnout percentage of registered voters and of voting age 
population, the percentage of vote cast nonprecinct (One Stop or absentee by mail) is also 
of interest. It is expected that a higher frequency of nonprecinct voting will positively 
affect turnout both of registered voters and of the VAP as a whole. Thus, the percentage 
of vote cast nonprecinct is used as an independent variable predicting the effects on 
turnout and election results in all years for which the voting method data are available; 
the percentages cast One Stop and absentee by mail are used as separate independent 
variables in the equations examining turnout and results in 2008 and 2012. 
 Same day registration and One Stop voting are also expected to have a partisan 
effect which will benefit the Democratic Party. The Democratic (potential) voting 
coalition contains a larger proportion of people (less-well-educated, poorer) who are less 
likely to vote or whose participation is conditioned on circumstances. The Republican 
coalition contains a larger proportion of voters whose personal characteristics (race, 
wealth and education) make them more likely to vote regardless of circumstances or 
procedural change. Therefore, it is expected that any change in procedure will have a 
greater effect on the more volatile Democratic electorate. This will be explored using the 
Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote in each election as a dependent variable in 
equations measuring the effect of each respective election refornm. 
 These variables will be analyzed by a series of regression equations with 
dependent variables including the percentage of the county’s vote which is cast 
nonprecinct; registration percentage of voting age population; turnout percentage of 
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registered voters and of voting age population; the percentage of each party’s candidate’s 
vote which is cast nonprecinct (with specific attention to One Stop and mail voting in 
2008 and 2012); and the Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote in each election. 
Each of these will be explored in turn in the chapters to follow. Below is a table listing 
the contents of the dataset used and the number of counties for which each datum is 
available in each election. Following the table is a discussion of the concepts and 
regression equations for which each variable is relevant and applicable. 
TABLE 3.1: List of variables and number of counties (out of 100) for which data are 
available in each year, 1992-2012. 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Total 
County name 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Year 1996 N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 
Year 2000 N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A 100 
Year 2004 N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A 100 
Year 2008 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A 100 
Year 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 
Democratic control of Commission 
(1=yes) 
0 0 72 82 81 100 335 
Total voting age population 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
White VAP 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Nonwhite VAP 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
White percentage of VAP 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Total change in VAP since previous 
election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Change in white VAP since previous 
election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Change in nonwhite VAP since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Registered Democrats 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Registered Republicans 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Registered unaffiliated/other  100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
White registered voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Black registered voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Total registered voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Democratic pct. of registered voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Republican pct. of registered voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Unaffiliated/other pct. of reg. voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
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TABLE 3.1 CONTINUED 
White pct. of registered voters 
1992 
100 
1996 
100 
2000 
100 
2004 
100 
2008 
100 
2012 
100 
Total 
600 
Black pct. of registered voters 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Pct. of VAP which is registered 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Net D registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Net R registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Net U/O registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Net W registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Net B registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Net total registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Net D registration change during SDR 
period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Net R registration change during SDR 
period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Net U/O registration change during 
SDR period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Net W registration change during 
SDR period 
N/A  N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Net B registration change during SDR 
period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Net total registration change during 
SDR period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Pct. D registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Pct. R registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Pct. U/O registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Pct. W registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Pct. B registration change since 
previous election26 
0 99 99 99 100 100 497 
Pct. total registration change since 
previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Pct. D registration change during 
SDR period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
                                                            
26 Graham County had one black registered voter in the early portion of the period covered by this study. 
Those cases have been excluded from this portion of the analysis because any “percentage change” in this 
number would obviously represent an unreliable outlier. 
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TABLE 3.1 CONTINUED 
Pct. R registration change during  
SDR period 
1992 
N/A 
1996 
N/A 
2000 
N/A 
2004 
N/A 
2008 
100 
2012 
100 
Total 
200 
Pct. U/O registration change during 
SDR period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Pct. W registration change during 
SDR period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Pct. B registration change during 
SDR period 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 200 
Pct. total reg. change during SDR 
Difference in percentage points 
between Democratic and Republican 
change in registration during SDR 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
100 
100 
100 
100 
200 
200 
 
Democratic total vote 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Republican total vote 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Other total vote 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Total vote cast for President 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Turnout percentage of registered 
voters 
100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Turnout percentage of voting age 
population 
100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Number of One Stop sites27  0 2 99 100 100 100 401 
Change in number of One Stop sites N/A 2 99 99 100 100 400 
Democratic Election Day vote 0 27 100 9928 9529 100 421 
Democratic nonprecinct vote 0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Republican Election Day vote 0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Republican nonprecinct vote 0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Other Election Day vote 0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Other nonprecinct vote 0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Total vote cast on Election Day 0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Total vote cast nonprecinct 0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Democratic % of total vote 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Republican % of total vote 100 100 100 100 100 100 600 
Percentage of residents below poverty 
line 
0 0 100 0 81 100 281 
                                                            
27 Only Guilford and Wake Counties reported these data for 1996. The number of One Stop sites in 
Columbus County in 2000 could not be determined from the available information. This affects both the 
raw number of counties included for that year and the number included in the “change” variable for 2004. 
 
28 Lee County did not report vote by method in 2004. This affects the number of observations for the 
following eight variables. 
 
29 Bertie, Chatham, Duplin and Northampton did not report vote by method in 2008. Lee did not 
differentiate in its reporting between One Stop and absentee by mail. This affects the number of  
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TABLE 3.1 CONTINUED 
Percentage of those 25 and older who 
are high school graduates 
1992 
0 
1996 
0 
2000 
100 
2004 
0 
2008 
81 
2012 
100 
Total 
281 
Ratio of reg. voters to One Stop sites 0 2 99 100 100 100 401 
Percentage of vote cast on Election 
Day 
0 27 100 100 96 100 423 
Percentage of vote cast nonprecinct 0 27 100 100 96 100 423 
Democratic percentage of Election 
Day vote 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Republican percentage of Election 
Day vote 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Democratic percentage of nonprecinct 
vote 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Republican percentage of nonprecinct 
vote 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast 
on Election Day 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Percentage of Republican vote cast  
on Election Day 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast 
nonprecinct 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Percentage of Republican vote cast 
nonprecinct 
0 27 100 99 95 100 421 
Democratic votes cast Absentee by 
Mail 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Democratic votes cast One Stop N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Republican votes cast Absentee by 
Mail 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Republican votes cast One Stop N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Other votes cast Absentee by Mail N/A N/A N/A N/A 93 100 193 
Other votes cast One Stop N/A N/A N/A N/A 93 100 193 
Total votes cast One Stop N/A N/A N/A N/A 93 100 193 
Percentage of total vote cast One Stop N/A N/A N/A N/A 93 100 193 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast 
One Stop 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Percentage of Republican vote cast 
One Stop 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast 
by mail 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Percentage of Republican vote cast by 
mail 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Democratic percentage of One Stop 
vote 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
Republican percentage of One Stop 
vote 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 100 195 
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TABLE 3.1 CONTINUED 
Pct. change in turnout of registered 
voters since previous election 
1992 
0 
1996 
100 
2000 
100 
2004 
100 
2008 
100 
2012 
100 
Total 
500 
Percentage change in turnout of VAP 
since previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Percentage change in registration of 
VAP 
0 100 100 100 100 100  500 
Change in Democratic percentage of 
vote since previous election 
0 100 100 100 100 100 500 
Change in percentage of Democratic 
vote cast One Stop 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  95 95 
Change in percentage of Republican 
vote cast One Stop 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 95 95 
 Each county’s voting age population, number of registered voters by race and 
party, turnout in the presidential election, and the number of votes cast for each candidate 
are available for all 100 counties in all six elections. These data are used to construct 
other variables. The effect of same day registration, which was only available in 2008 and 
2012, is represented by the net change in registration within 24 days of the election (the 
period between the 25-day registration cutoff for eligibility to participate on Election 
Day, and Election Day itself). As discussed elsewhere in this work, “net change” is 
defined as the number of same day registrants minus the number of purges from the voter 
rolls during the same period. 
The number of votes cast on Election Day and the number cast nonprecinct are 
not available for 1992, and are available for only 27 counties in 1996. These data are 
available (with a small number of exceptions30) for all counties beginning in 2000. These 
data are used to construct dependent variables representing the percentage of votes cast, 
and cast for each candidate, on Election Day and nonprecinct for the four most recent 
studies. The 2000 and 2004 data, however, do not allow for the exploration of mail voting 
                                                            
30 Separate data were not reported by Lee County in 2004, nor by Bertie, Chatham, Duplin and 
Northampton in 2008. 
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and One Stop voting as separate categories. Only in 2008 and 2012 are Absentee by Mail 
and One Stop voting consistently reported as separate categories31, and only for those 
elections are the percentages of votes cast by each method used as dependent variables.  
The concept of ease of early voting will be defined in terms of its availability. 
This will be operationalized as the number of One Stop sites in a county in each election, 
standardized for the population of voter registration through the construction of a variable 
representing “voters per site,” or the ratio of registered potential voters to the number of 
sites. This variable will be used in the analyses of the partisan implementation of election 
reform (Chapter Four), the effects of election reform on registration and turnout (Chapter 
Five), partisan differences in the use of election reform (Chapter Six), and the partisan 
effect of election reform (Chapter Seven). One Stop voting was not universally available 
in the state until 2000, so the data for this is not available for 1992 and is only available 
in 1996 for the two counties which reported it as a separate category (Guilford and 
Wake). Beginning in 2000, each county’s number of One Stop sites is consistently 
reported.  
 Where available, a variable representing the incumbent party in control of each 
county commission at the time of each election is used, in the form of a dummy variable 
with Democratic control coded as 1 and other coded as 032. This allows for the 
exploration in Chapter Four of partisan differences in the implementation of election 
reform – whether party control of a commission has a significant effect on issues such as 
                                                            
31 Lee County continued to report One Stop and Absentee by Mail as a single category in 2008, so it is 
excluded from the separate analysis of those categories in that year and in the examination of change 
between 2008 and 2012, as are the four counties mentioned in Footnote 30 which did not report  vote by 
method in 2008. 
 
32 The only case in which non-Democratic control does not mean Republican control is the case of the 
Jackson County Commission in 2012, with two Democrats, two Republicans, and one independent. 
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the availability of One Stop voting. The use of nonprecinct voting, another primary 
subject of Chapter Four, will be explored through the use of variables representing the 
percentage of vote cast in each year on Election Day and by nonprecinct means (One 
Stop or absentee by mail). The primary dependent variable of interest in this case is the 
percentage of vote cast nonprecinct. These data are available for the total vote cast and 
for the vote cast for the Democratic and the Republican candidates. This will allow for an 
exploration of partisan differences in voting method, the primary focus of Chapter Six. 
As previously stated, votes by method are not available for 1992, and are only available 
for 27 counties for 1996. One Stop and absentee by mail votes are not reported separately 
for 2000 and 2004, so the only longitudinal comparison available for all four of the most 
recent elections studied is “nonprecinct” rather than a specific examination of One Stop 
and mail voting practices. One Stop and absentee by mail are reported as separate 
categories by 95 counties in 2008 and all 100 counties in 2012, which allows for a 
comparison of patterns of voting method by partisans of different candidates in these two 
elections. 
 Registration and turnout are the primary focus of Chapter Five. Voter registration 
data, voting age population data, and the total number of votes cast in each presidential 
election are available for all six elections. These are used to construct dependent variables 
representing the percentage of voting age population who are registered, the percentage 
of turnout of registered voters, and the percentage of turnout of voting age population, in 
each election. It is also possible to measure the change in each of these percentages from 
one election to the next, to determine whether the implementation of a particular election 
reform in a particular year (universally available One Stop voting in 2000, universally 
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available absentee voting by mail in 2004, and same day registration in 2008) causes a 
significantly greater change in registration and/or turnout than are observed in other 
elections.  
 Chapter Seven examines the partisan effects of election reform, with the 
Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote in each election as the primary dependent 
variable. Also considered are the Democratic candidate’s percentage of vote by each 
method (Election Day, nonprecinct, and One Stop/mail where available). This chapter 
also explores the change in Democratic vote share between each of the elections, so that 
the partisan effect of the introduction of a specific reform in a specific election can be 
examined.  
 Variables representing socioeconomic characteristics of the population are used as 
controls where available. The percentage of the county’s voting age population which is 
white is available throughout the period examined. The percentage of persons over 25 
who are high school graduates, and the percentage of the county’s population under the 
federally defined poverty line, are available for 81 counties in 1996, 2000, 2008 and 
2012. Given the widely observed disparities in voting rates according to race, wealth and 
education, it is important to control for these characteristics in order to determine the 
extent to which variations in political participation, voting method or candidate 
preference may be the results of changes in election procedures rather than simply 
examples of the existing socioeconomic differences in the population. These data are 
used to construct independent variables for each equation in which the data are available.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE EFFECT OF PARTISANSHIP ON THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF ELECTION REFORM 
 
 
 The previous chapter outlined the data collection and construction of models 
allowing for an examination of whether, consistent with institutional theory, reducing the 
costs of voting will increase voter registration and voter turnout, and whether such an 
increase would have partisan effects. How does this reduction in costs affect the behavior 
of the electorate, and the outcome of their choices? While the implementation of these 
laws over time in the state of North Carolina may have reduced the costs of voting, each 
county in the state had a certain amount of discretion in implementing the regulations, as 
well as a certain level of constraint imposed by budgetary limitations. This chapter will 
examine whether partisan considerations affected that discretion.  Kimball, Kropf and 
Battles (2006) argue that partisan election authorities may administer laws and 
procedures in ways which benefit their party and its voters. The present research will 
explore the extent to which this may also be true of partisan elected officials’ funding 
decisions which affect the administration of the election. 
The previous chapter outlined a potential variable for measuring partisan 
differences in the implementation of election reform on the local level, in the form of 
partisan control of the county commission. The present chapter implements the various 
tests of the hypotheses outlined. The effects of election reform can be isolated by 
controlling for a number of county-level variables which are theoretically related to the 
dependent variables of voter registration, voter turnout and partisan turnout. These 
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include poverty level, education level, and race of the county’s population. This chapter 
advances the test of partisan test of implementation, as outlined in the previous chapter, 
by controlling for the partisan control of the county commission, the body which 
determines the election budget in each county.  
The analysis begins with a series of bivariate tests using the Democratic 
commission control variable, constructed as a dummy variable (Democratic control =1, 
other=0)33. The years 1992 and 1996 were not included in this portion of the analysis, 
and a total of 65 observations are missing for the years 2000, 2004 and 2008. This yields 
an N of 335 observations in most cases. First, an examination of the relationship between 
party control and election year shows no significant correlation for any of the four years 
examined. It is thus expected that the partisan effects of implementation will not 
significantly vary by year, and that any observed changes in registration, turnout or 
voting behavior can be attributed to the effects of the reforms themselves: 
TABLE 4.1: Bivariate correlations of Democratic control of county commission with 
election year, 2000-2012.34 
            Sig.  N 
Year 2000 (1=yes, 0=no)       .011 .844 335 
Year 2004 (1=yes, 0=no)      -.022 .690 335 
Year 2008 (1=yes, 0=no)      .041 .450 335 
Year 2012 (1=yes, 0=no)      -.028 .611 335 
The next section of the analysis presents its findings related to bivariate 
correlations with commission control and certain population characteristics of the county, 
including racial composition, and education and poverty levels where available. These 
                                                            
33 As mentioned in Footnote 32, the only available case in which “Other” does not mean Republican 
control is Jackson County in 2012. 
34 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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characteristics will be used throughout the analysis to control for the effects of 
socioeconomic factors and isolate the identified effects of election reform. 
TABLE 4.2: Bivariate correlations of Democratic control of county commission with 
population characteristics (2000, 2008, 2012).35 
           Sig.  N 
White percentage of voting age population    -.616 .000** 335 
Percentage of county population under poverty line    .405 .000** 244 
Percentage of persons 25+ who are high school graduates  -.112    .083     243 
Percentage of voting age population which is registered    .089  .103 335 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01.  
 
There is a strong, significant, negative correlation between the white percentage 
of voting age population and Democratic control of the commission. There is a moderate, 
significant, positive correlation between party control and the percentage of the county’s 
population which is under the poverty line, with poorer counties more likely to be 
Democratic. There is no significant correlation between registered percentage of voting 
age population, or the education variable, with party control of the commission. 
 The next table indicates the extent to which party control of the county 
commission may influence the county voters’ use of same day registration in the 2008 
and 2012 elections. The “net change” variable represents the difference between the 
number of registered voters in each group on Election Day, and the number who were 
registered 25 days before the election, which is the cutoff date for voting on Election 
Day. The “net change” represents the number of people who registered within 24 days of 
the election, who are by definition same day registrants, minus the number of voter 
                                                            
35 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Education and poverty data were not available 
for 1992, 1996 or 2004, and some observations were missing for 2000 and 2008. 
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purges during the same period. This measures the net effect of Same Day Registration on 
the county’s registration totals. 
TABLE 4.3: Bivariate correlations of Democratic control of county commission with 
county voters’ use of Same Day Registration in 2008 and 2012.36 
           Sig.      N 
Percentage of Democrats who are same day registrants  .184 .013* 181  
Percentage of Republicans who are same day registrants  .233 .002** 181 
Percentage of unaffiliated/other who are same day registrants .055 .459 181 
Percentage of white voters who are same day registrants      .116 .119 181 
Percentage of black voters who are same day registrants                 -.030 .684 181 
Same day registration as percentage of total registration  .193 .009** 181 
* Sig p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 
The positive and significant correlation between Democratic commission control 
and same day registrants as a percentage of total registration indicates that SDR is more 
common in counties with Democratic-controlled commissions. Given that SDR takes 
place at a One Stop voting site, and the evidence (presented in Table 4.4, below) that 
Democratic-controlled commissions devote greater resources to making One Stop voting 
easier, it stands to reason that SDR should be easier in these counties as well. This is true 
for the subgroups comprising registered voters of both parties, but it is interesting to note 
that Republicans in Democratic-controlled counties appear to take greater advantage of 
SDR than Democrats do, given that the correlation observed between commission control 
and the percentage of Republicans who are same day registrants is stronger and more 
significant than that observed for the percentage of Democrats using SDR. There was no 
significant correlation observed between partisan commission control and use of SDR by 
either racial group, or by unaffiliated voters. 
                                                            
36 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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 The next section of the analysis observes the correlation between commission 
control and voters’ choice of voting method, whether Election Day or nonprecinct (which 
includes both One Stop voting and absentee voting by mail). This section also analyzes 
the variables measuring the availability of One Stop voting, in order to address the central 
question of whether party control of a commission indirectly affects the availability and 
use of nontraditional voting methods by its citizens. 
TABLE 4.4: Bivariate correlations among Democratic control of county commission, 
voting method and voter turnout, 2000-2012.37 
           Sig.  N 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast on Election Day   -.058 .287 333 
Percentage of Republican vote cast on Election Day   -.012 .822 333 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast nonprecinct    .060 .276 333 
Percentage of Republican vote cast nonprecinct    .018 .740 333 
Percentage of total vote cast on Election Day   -.057 .301 332 
Percentage of total vote cast nonprecinct     .071    .201 332 
Potential voters per One Stop site     -.197 .000** 334 
Turnout percentage of county’s registered voters   -.109 .047* 335 
Turnout percentage of county’s voting age population  -.020 .714 335 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
There does not appear to be a significant correlation between party control of a 
county commission and partisan choice of voting method. There is a weak, significant, 
negative correlation between Democratic commission control and the turnout percentage 
of the county’s registered voters, but no significant correlation between party control and 
turnout percentage of overall voting age population. This indicates that Democratic-
controlled counties may have a smaller proportion of registered voters who actually vote, 
notwithstanding the greater relative availability of One Stop voting. This finding would 
be consistent with the findings of Gans (2004) and other authors previously cited herein, 
that making early voting easier does not actually lead to its greater use. 
                                                            
37 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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There is a weak, significant, negative correlation between Democratic 
commission control and potential voters per One Stop site. The fewer the number of 
potential voters per site, the more readily available – and thus easier – One Stop voting 
may be, since the number of other voters waiting to use the polls affects the time required 
to wait in line and complete the process of voting. This would represent a greater 
potential reduction in the Downsian “costs” of voting, which would seem to indicate that 
Democratic-controlled counties are slightly more willing than their Republican 
counterparts to reduce the structural barriers which the institutional theory of 
participation argues are primarily responsible for nonvoting. However, the analysis seems 
to indicate that this does not directly translate into greater usage of One Stop voting, 
given the lack of significant correlation between commission control and the percentages 
of votes which were respectively cast on Election Day and nonprecinct. 
  The next section of this chapter will be a multivariate analysis to examine the 
extent to which party control of the county commission may affect the percentage of the 
county’s presidential vote which is cast nonprecinct. An additional analysis will be 
conducted with specific respect to the use of One Stop voting in 2008 and 2012 (as 
previously noted, separate data for One Stop and mail voting could not be consistently 
obtained for previous elections). The independent variables used will be party control of 
the commission, white percentage of voting age population, high school graduation 
percentage, percentage of population below the federally defined poverty level, potential 
voters per One Stop site (a variable which, as noted, represents the relative availability of 
One Stop voting), and the net registration change produced by Same Day Registration (as 
previously noted, this statistic represents the change in registration within 24 days of the 
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election, calculated as same day registrants minus purges during the same period). As 
noted in the previous chapter, Ordinary Least Squares regression, the technique used in 
this analysis, assumes homoskedasticity in error variation; the models have thus been 
checked for the presence of heteroskedasticity, and robust standard errors are used 
throughout to correct for this issue.  
The first multivariate analysis uses election year dummies as independent 
variables to compare nonprecinct voting in the baseline year of 1996 to its use in 
subsequent years: 
TABLE 4.5: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast 
nonprecinct as the dependent variable and year dummies as independent variables, 2000-
2012. (n=425) 38 
 B  Robust SE t           Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)                    .0359037    .0050498       7.11      0.000           .              
Year 2000                    .1078283    .0080399     13.41      0.000**       .2024959 
Year 2004                    .2343539   .0130003     18.03      0.000**       .4385715 
Year 2008                    .5469842   .0115261     47.46      0.000**     1.02363 
Year 2012                    .5445213    .0103971     52.37      0.000**     1.022583 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .8316. 
Adjusted R-squared .8300. 
Root MSE .09324. 
 
 This model shows that nonprecinct voting has increased in each year since 
universal One Stop voting was introduced in 2000, and all years show significantly 
greater nonprecinct voting than the baseline year of 1996. Each election year variable is 
significant with a positive coefficient, and the greatest observed increase occurs between 
2004 and 2008, consistent with previously reported findings. The next model will 
incorporate variables to control for socioeconomic factors, Democratic control of the 
                                                            
38 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. Nonprecinct data for 1992 were not available, and the year 1996 was 
excluded from the equation due to collinearity. 
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county commission, and the relative availability of One Stop voting, and the introduction 
of same day registration. This includes the years 2000, 2008 and 2012. Education and 
poverty data were not available for 1992, 1996 or 2004, and in addition, there are some 
missing observations for 2008. 
TABLE 4.6: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast 
nonprecinct as the dependent variable and election and socioeconomic factors as 
independent variables (2000, 2008, 2012). (n=242) 39 
   
     B      Robust SE   t           Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)               -1.323984 .1798999      -7.36      0.000        .  
Democratic commission         -.0571666 .0240204      -2.38      0.018*       -.1318347 
White percentage of VAP       -.0003713 .0008054        -.046    0.645       -.0287416 
Poverty rate          .0178211 .0029113        6.12     0.000**       .4078776  
High school graduation rate     .0206513 .0015321      13.48     0.000**       .6024721  
Voters per One Stop site         -3.30e-06  4.52e-07       -7.29     0.000**     -.3401597 
* Sig. p < .05, ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .5580. 
Adjusted R-squared .5487. 
Root MSE .14578 
In this model, the education, poverty and voters per site variables have the 
greatest significance and influence, followed by party control of the county commission. 
The county’s high school graduation rate appears to have a highly influential positive 
effect on its use of nonprecinct voting. The significance of party control of the county 
commission differs from the findings of the bivariate analysis. This would seem to 
indicate that another independent variable in the multivariate equation is removing the 
error variance found in the bivariate model, thus allowing the party control variable to 
become significant at the multivariate level. 
                                                            
39 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Education and poverty data were not available 
for 1992, 1996 or 2004. 
99 
 
The racial composition of the voting age population is not significant.  It would 
appear that socioeconomic factors play a greater role in determining the use of 
nonprecinct voting than does election reform; indeed, if education ranks as the most 
influential factor, this may support Berinsky’s (2005) argument that the availability of 
nonprecinct voting does indeed contribute to the further stratification of the electorate, by 
making voting more convenient for existing voters while not drawing in new voters.  
The next table specifically examines the percentage of vote cast One Stop in the 
elections of 2008 and 2012: 
TABLE 4.7: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast One Stop 
in 2008 and 2012 as the dependent variable. (n=168) 40 
           B  Robust SE   t  Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)    .1945899 .1384278 1.41 0.162          . 
Democratic commission   .0160292  .0172412 0.93 0.354        .0832767 
White percentage of VAP -.0017231 .0005488        -3.14 0.002**     -.3066977 
Poverty rate    .0001115  .0021009 0.05 0.958        .0057006 
High school graduation rate  .0060106  .0014634 4.11 0.000**      .3406404 
Voters per One Stop site     -8.90e-07  8.29e-07        -1.07 0.285       -.0871696 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .1767. 
Adjusted R-squared .151. 
Root MSE .089035. 
 
In this model, education and white percentage of voting age population emerge as 
the only significant variables, with education both most significant and most influential. 
Party control of the commission, poverty rate, and the ratio of potential voters to One 
Stop sites are not significant here. Thus, it does not appear that election reform factors 
significantly affected the use of One Stop voting in the two elections for which the data 
could be obtained.  
                                                            
40 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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 The following tables examine the individual elections for which the relevant data 
are available, beginning in 2000. This will allow for an examination of the effect of each 
specific reform in the year in which it was introduced. A model incorporating all of the 
year variables as well as the socioeconomic and election reform variables in a single 
equation could not be produced due to collinearity issues resulting from missing 
observations in various categories. 
TABLE 4.8: Multivariate regression equation using percentage of vote cast nonprecinct 
in 2000 as the dependent variable. (n=71) 41  
              
 B   Robust SE         t     Sig.             Beta 
 (Constant)        -.1620084    .1109279       -1.46    0.149            . 
Democratic commission    .0149415         .017127          0.87     0.386           .1289398 
White percentage of VAP  .0009101         .000587          1.55     0.126           .2458739 
Poverty rate     .0016829   .0024619        0.68     0.497           .1157064 
High school graduation rate  .0018644         .0014331        1.30     0.198           .1961998 
Voters per One Stop site  -3.87e-07      2.59e-07       -1.50    0.139          -.2249219 
Registered percentage VAP   .0957817   .0816515        1.17     0.245           .1409158 
R-squared .1473. 
Adjusted R-squared .0674. 
Root MSE .05621. 
 
 None of the variables emerge as significant in this equation. For the purposes of 
evaluating the impact on political participation of the introduction of universally 
available One Stop voting, it appears that in this election, this policy change did not 
produce wide enough use to have a significant impact. Nor did county commission 
control or the socioeconomic composition of the potential electorate significantly affect 
the use of nonprecinct voting in this election. 
                                                            
41 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Missing observations are due to lack of data on 
party control of county commissions for 28 counties, and on the number of One Stop sites in Columbus 
County. 
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 The next equation examines the 2004 election. 
TABLE 4.9: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast 
nonprecinct in 2004 as the dependent variable. (n=81)42 
   B              Robust SE          t          Sig.           Beta 
(Constant)                   .3027807         .2034349       1.49    0.141            .             
Democratic commission            .0054592         .0490487       0.11    0.912            .0221063 
White percentage of VAP          .0007104        .0013059        0.54   0.588            .0943465 
Voters per One Stop site            -2.01e-06         6.05e-07      -3.33    0.001          -.3828874 
Registered percentage VAP      -.030059          .164245        -0.18    0.855          -.0195735 
R-squared .1527 
Adjusted R-squared .108. 
Root MSE .1173302. 
 
In 2004, for the percentage of total vote cast nonprecinct, only the voters per site 
variable is significant, with a negative coefficient indicating that the greater availability 
of One Stop voting does increase the percentage of vote cast nonprecinct. However, this 
was also the year in which restrictions on absentee voting by mail were removed. Given 
the lack of separate data to distinguish between mail voting and One Stop, it is impossible 
to determine the specific effect on participation in this election which was produced by 
making mail voting universally available.  The next tables examine the effects of the use 
of One Stop and mail voting in 2008. 
TABLE 4.10: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast One 
Stop in 2008 as the dependent variable. (n=68) 43 
 
  
                                                            
42 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. U.S. Census data on socioeconomic characteristics were unavailable for 
this year. Missing observations are due to lack of data on party control of county commissions for 18 
counties, and Beaufort County did not report Election Day and absentee voting separately in this election. 
 
43 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Missing observations are due to lack of data on 
party control of county commissions for 19 counties, education and poverty data for 19 counties, and 
separate Election Day and nonprecinct voting results for five counties (with some overlap among the 
three categories). 
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TABLE 4.10 CONTINUED  B  Robust SE  t Sig.        Beta  
(Constant)     .2590398         .2348617        1.10    0.274           . 
Democratic commission   -.0153128         .032703        -0.47    0.641          -.0849986 
White percentage of VAP -.0024908         .0008625      -2.89    0.005**      -.4574847 
Poverty rate               -.0011194         .0039665      -0.28    0.779          -.0619323 
High school graduation rate   .0043515         .0025259       1.72     0.090           .2758214 
Voters per One Stop site  -2.06e-06         1.53e-06       -1.35    0.183          -.1865624 
Registered percentage VAP   .2193114         .1696163        1.29    0.201           .1825563 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .2355. 
Adjusted R-squared .160. 
Root MSE .0831216. 
 
With respect to One Stop voting in 2008, only the white percentage of voting age 
population is significant, indicating (contrary to expectations) that election reform played 
no role in increasing nonprecinct voting. However, it should be noted that 32 counties are 
excluded from this analysis due to missing observations of partisan commission control 
or socioeconomic variables. 
TABLE 4.11: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast absentee 
by mail in 2008 as the dependent variable. (n=68) 44 
  B   Robust SE          t     Sig.             Beta 
 (Constant)        -.0444529     .0461962       -0.96    0.340            . 
Democratic commission   -.0021822         .0104129       -0.21    0.835          -.0336574 
White percentage of VAP  .0001981   .0003192        0.62    0.537           .1011014 
Poverty rate    -.0006221    .001318         -0.47    0.639          -.0956341 
High school graduation rate  .0008687         .000546          1.59    0.117            .152992 
Voters per One Stop site           9.57e-07     6.83e-07         1.40    0.166           .2403213 
Registered percentage VAP     .004886          .0420087         0.12    0.908           .011301 
 
R-squared .1923. 
Adjusted R-squared .1128. 
Root MSE .03075. 
  
                                                            
44 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Missing observations are the same as those 
described in Footnote 13, above. 
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 No variables emerge as significant in this equation. This is likely an artifact of the 
decreasing percentage of North Carolina votes which are cast by mail, and the emergence 
in 2008 of One Stop voting as the most popular form of casting one’s ballot in the state. 
TABLE 4.12: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast One 
Stop in 2012 as the dependent variable. (n=100) 45 
 
  B                    Robust SE        t        Sig.              Beta 
(Constant)    -.0252916         .2037673      -0.12    0.901                         
White   -.0013337         .000707        -1.89    0.062            -.2333461 
Turnout % VAP     .2566108         .1552361       1.65     0.102             .1601809 
Voters per site   -1.88e-07          1.02e-06      -0.18     0.854           -.0192156 
High school graduation rate  .0059624         .0023351       2.55     0.012*          .312685 
Democratic commission  .0241251         .0221078       1.09     0.278            .1204946 
Poverty rate     .0013954         .002664         0.52     0.602            .0658238 
* Sig. p < .05.                        
R-squared .1970. 
Adjusted R-squared .145. 
Standard error of the estimate .0930023. 
 
 In this equation, only the high school graduation rate emerges as significant, with 
a positive coefficient indicating higher use of One Stop voting in counties with higher 
average education levels. The other partisan, election and socioeconomic factors do not 
appear to significantly affect the use of One Stop voting in this election. 
TABLE 4.13: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of vote cast by mail 
in 2012 as the dependent variable. (n=100) 46 
 
      B   Robust SE   t  Sig.        Beta  
(Constant)     .0394324         .2030122        0.19     0.846          .                         
Democratic commission          .0258659         .0225827        1.15     0.255          .1291889 
White percentage of VAP      -.0014635         .0007297       -2.01     0.048         -.2560708 
Poverty rate                  .0007173         .0030635        0.23     0.815          .0338348 
                                                            
45 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
46 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 4.13 CONTINUED    B   Robust SE   t Sig.        Beta  
High school graduation rate    .0060861          .0027047        2.25    0.027          .3191693 
Voters per One Stop site         -2.94e-07          1.03e-06       -0.28    0.777         -.0299666 
Registered percentage VAP    .1111911         .1439094         0.77    0.442          .0837211 
R-squared .1712. 
Adjusted R-squared .118. 
Root MSE .01766. 
 As was the case with mail voting in 2008, no variables emerge as significant in 
this equation, again most likely due to the declining frequency of mail balloting in North 
Carolina. As previously stated, absentee voting by mail reached its highest percentage in 
2004, the first election in which restrictions on its use were lifted. The available data do 
not permit this study to conduct an analysis of its specific effects on participation in that 
year, and thus no conclusion can be drawn; however, it appears that mail balloting has 
significantly influenced participation in the subsequent elections. 
 This chapter has sought to explore the possibility of partisan implementation of 
election reform within counties. Partisanship has been defined by party control of the 
county commission, which determines the budget under which the nonpartisan county 
Board of Elections operates, including the extent to which the county is able to offer One 
Stop voting (and thus also same day registration). While Democratic commissions appear 
to be more willing to devote resources to facilitate One Stop voting, it does not seem that 
this consistently translates into increased participation. Thus Hypothesis One is 
supported. It does not appear, however, that partisan control of the commission 
significantly affects the use of nonprecinct voting in general or One Stop voting in 
particular. The tendency for Democratic-controlled counties to have relatively greater 
access to One Stop voting does not appear to substantively effect its use. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 1A is not supported. The effects of same day registration and One Stop voting 
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on registration, turnout of registered voters and voting age population, and the partisan 
effects of any observed changes produced by these reforms, will be the subjects of the 
coming chapters, as will the continued consideration of the question of whether structural 
barriers (in according with the institutional theory) or socioeconomic factors (race, 
education and poverty) are more responsible for nonvoting (in accordance with the 
behavioral theory). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: PARTICIPATION EFFECTS OF ELECTION REFORM 
 
 
 The previous chapter discussed issues pertaining to the implementation of the 
various types of election reform, focusing on partisan differences in implementation and 
their possible effects on reform. This chapter will begin an examination of the effects of 
these reforms, beginning with the issues of voter registration and turnout. The work will 
consider registration of voting age population, turnout of VAP, and turnout of registered 
voters. If the reforms have had their intended effects, the rates of each of these should 
significantly increase in comparison to previous elections, and the institutional theory of 
participation would argue that this increase was due to the removal of structural barriers. 
The hypotheses stated previously are that the availability of same day registration will 
significantly increase voter registration; the availability of SDR and One Stop voting will 
significantly increase turnout of both registered voters and the voting age population as a 
whole; and that each of these effects will be greater in counties with Democratic-
controlled commissions. 
 First, the analysis will present a bivariate correlation of the relevant registration 
and turnout variables with each other. Registration percentage of voting age population, 
turnout percentage of registered voters, and turnout percentage of voting age population 
are correlated for each year. Then, the three registration and turnout factors are correlated 
with each other for the entire six-election span. This is to examine the extent to which 
registration and turnout patterns may have changed over the time examined by this study, 
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which provides the background for a preliminary analysis of the effects of election 
reform on those forms of participation. 
TABLE 5.1: Bivariate correlations among registration and turnout factors, 1992-2012.47 
 
(1) Registered percentage of voting age population 
(2) Turnout percentage of registered voters 
(3) Turnout percentage of voting age population 
    
                       (1)   Sig.        (2)    Sig.        (3)     Sig. 
Year 1992 (n=100)                                     -.346  .000**  .293  .000**  -.084  .040*  
Year 1996 (n=100)                                     -.264  .000** -.368  .000**  -.422  .000**     
Year 2000 (n=100)                                      .069  .093     -.430  .000**  -.253   .000**  
Year 2004 (n=100)                                      .109  .007** -.058  .158       .035   .396       
Year 2008 (n=100)                                      .211  .000**  .369  .000**    .418   .000** 
Year 2012 (n=100)                                      .221  .000**  .194  .000**    .305   .000** 
Registered percentage of voting age population (n=600)  .011 .795        .731   .000** 
Turnout percentage of voting age population (n=600)                             .668   .000**          
* Sig. p < .05, ** sig. p < .01. 
 The registration percentage of voting age population has increased steadily and 
consistently over the period examined, with significant and negative correlations for the 
first two years, no significant correlation in 2000, and significant and increasingly 
positive correlations for the latter three years. This may be an indication that election 
reform has affected registration, which will be explored further in a multivariate analysis 
below. The largest observed change in the registered percentage of VAP occurred 
between 2004 and 2008, indicating that the introduction of same day registration in the 
latter year may have had a significant, positive effect on this statistic, with a lesser 
(though still positive) effect in 2012. Turnout of both registered voters and voting age 
population has been inconsistent throughout the period examined, perhaps due to 
differences in the relative competitiveness of the various elections in different years, with 
                                                            
47 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections.  
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elections perceived as more competitive in North Carolina producing higher turnout. In 
1992, there was a positive correlation with turnout percentage of registered voters, but a 
negative correlation with turnout percentage of voting age population; both were 
significant. Both correlations were negative and significant in 1996 and 2000; both were 
insignificant in 2004; and both were positive and significant in 2008 and 2012, with a 
stronger correlation in 2008. It appears that the introduction of universally available One 
Stop voting began the reversal of a decline among the VAP in general, but not among 
those who were already registered. 
 The next section of the analysis examines the relationship among registration, 
turnout and the socioeconomic variables which will be used as key socioeconomic 
variables throughout the study. In order to isolate the effects of election reform on 
political participation, it is necessary to control for the effects of external factors, such as 
a county’s population characteristics, and thus to explore those effects in the preliminary 
analysis. 
TABLE 5.2: Bivariate correlations among county population characteristics, registration, 
and turnout, 1992-2012.48 
 
(1) Registered percentage of voting age population 
(2) Turnout percentage of registered voters 
(3) Turnout percentage of voting age population 
 
                                                 (1)   Sig.         (2)   Sig.        (3)  Sig.        N 
White percentage of voting age population .367 .000**   -.192 .000**  .160 .000**    600 
High school graduation rate                         .341 .000**    .400 .000**  .530 .000**    281 
Poverty level                                                .032 .594       -.013 .827      .010 .861        281 
                                                            
48 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections,  
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. For both high school graduation rate and poverty 
level, data were unavailable for 1992, 1996 and 2004, and 19 observations were missing for 2008. 
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 Voter registration is the first step in the voting process. If one does not register, by 
definition one does not vote. One would therefore expect a positive relationship between 
the percentage of those who are registered and the percentage of those who actually vote. 
As is seen in Table 5.2, two of the three important socioeconomic characteristics are 
significantly and positively correlated with registration and turnout: white percentage of 
VAP and high school graduation rate, with no significant correlation observed for 
poverty level and participation rates.  
 Registration and turnout are significantly correlated only with white percentage of 
voting age population, and with the education variable, but (surprisingly) not with the 
poverty level. The correlations for the education variable are consistently positive (as 
expected), with the strength increasing from registration percentage of VAP, to turnout 
percentage of registered voters, to turnout percentage of VAP. White percentage of VAP 
is positively correlated with both registration and turnout of VAP, but negatively 
correlated with turnout percentage of registered voters, an apparent inconsistency. 
The next section of the analysis examines registration characteristics and turnout, 
in order to explore the differential participation rates among different racial and political 
groups within North Carolina. If different groups register and vote at different rates, it is 
likely that they will be differentially affected by the reforms being examined. 
TABLE 5.3: Bivariate correlations among registration characteristics and registration 
percentage of voting age population, 1992-2012. (n = 600 for percentages of registered 
voters belonging to each group; n = 500 for registration change percentage in four years, 
for which 1992 is excluded.)49 
 
Registered percentage of voting age population    Sig. 
Percentage of registered voters who are Democrats                           -.299  .000** 
                                                            
49 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 5.3 CONTINUED       Sig. 
Percentage of registered voters who are Republicans                          .108  .008** 
Percentage of registered voters who are unaffiliated/other                  .493  .000** 
Percentage of registered voters who are white                                     .024  .557 
Percentage of registered voters who are black                                    -.159  .000** 
Democratic registration change percentage in four years                    .058  .199 
Republican registration change percentage in four years                   -.376  .000**   
Unaffiliated/other registration change percentage in four years         -.398  .000**     
White registration change percentage in four years        -.048  .286            
Black registration change percentage in four years              .011  .807                  
Total registration change percentage in four years                              .090  .045* 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01.    
These correlations appear to indicate that registration percentages are highest in 
counties with greater concentrations of unaffiliated voters or those registered with other 
parties, with a lower but still positive and significant correlation with the percentage who 
are registered Republicans, and a negative, significant correlation with the percentage 
who are Democrats. There is no significant correlation with the percentage of registered 
voters who are white, and a negative, significant correlation with the percentage who are 
black. This indicates lower levels of registration in more Democratic counties and 
(obviously with some overlap) in counties with higher proportions of nonwhite 
populations. Again, differential rates of participation among these groups may produce 
differential effects of election reform, which will be explored in the multivariate analyses 
to follow. 
There are negative and significant correlations between the percentage of VAP 
who are registered and the percentage change in registration among total population, 
Republicans, and unaffiliated voters since the previous presidential election, which would 
actually indicate a decreasing trend in registration from one election to the next, even 
during the time when reforms were implemented to make registration more widely 
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available and more closely tied to the process of voting. This will be explored in the 
multivariate analyses. There are no significant correlations for the racial groups. 
TABLE 5.4: Bivariate correlations among registration characteristics and turnout 
percentage of registered voters, 1992-2012. (n = 600 for percentages of registered voters 
belonging to each group; n = 500 for registration change percentage in four years, for 
which 1992 is excluded.)50  
                     Sig.        
Percentage of registered voters who are Democrats                          -.175  .000**  
Percentage of registered voters who are Republicans                          .149   .000** 
Percentage of registered voters who are unaffiliated/other                  .163   .000** 
Percentage of registered voters who are white                                     .110   .082* 
Percentage of registered voters who are black                                    -.082   .045* 
Democratic registration change percentage in four years                   -.204 .000** 
Republican registration change percentage in four years                    -.457 .000** 
Unaffiliated/other registration change percentage in four years         -.416   .000**  
White registration change percentage in four years                            -.246 .000**     
Black registration change percentage in four years                             -.113 .012*     
Total registration change percentage in four years                              -.337 .000** 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01.    
 The correlation with turnout percentage of registered voters and the percentage of 
voters belonging to each group is weak and significant: positive for Republicans, 
unaffiliated and white voters, and negative for Democrats and black voters. Once 
registered, members of the first three groups are more likely to actually turn out than are 
members of the last two. This may portend that registration and voting reforms will affect 
these groups differently. There is a significant negative correlation for each group with 
the turnout percentage of registered voters and percentage of registration change since the 
previous presidential election; this indicates that, over the course of the five elections for 
which the data are available (1996-2012), the larger proportion of voting age population 
who were registered, the smaller the proportion of registered voters who actually turned 
                                                            
50 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
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out. This would seem to be a preliminary indication that the process of voting, rather than 
the process of registration, produces a greater obstacle to participation. 
TABLE 5.5: Bivariate correlations among registration characteristics and turnout 
percentage of voting age population, 1992-2012. (n = 600 for turnout percentage; n=500 
for percentage change from previous election, for which 1992 is excluded.)51 
Sig. 
Percentage of registered voters who are Democrats             -.345    .000** 
Percentage of registered voters who are Republicans                        .178    .000** 
Percentage of registered voters who are unaffiliated/other                .492    .000** 
Percentage of registered voters who are white                                   .082    .007**               
Percentage of registered voters who are black                                  -.163    .000** 
Democratic registration change percentage in four years                 -.092    .034* 
Republican registration change percentage in four years                  -.551   .000** 
Unaffiliated/other registration change percentage in four years       -.534    .000** 
White registration change percentage in four years                          -.194    .000** 
Black registration change percentage in four years                          -.069     .126 
Total registration change percentage in four years                           -.280    .000** 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 The correlations between the percentage of registered voters who belong to each 
group and turnout percentage of VAP are equally or more significant than was observed 
for those groups with turnout percentage of registered voters. The sign is in the same 
direction and, with the exception of white voters, the correlation is stronger in each case 
than was observed with registered voters. This reinforces the observation stated above, 
that voting rather than registration appears to pose the greater obstacle to participation 
over the course of the five elections examined. This will be explored further in the 
multivariate regression analyses to follow within the present work. 
The next section of the analysis examines the specific effects of same day 
registration in 2008 and 2012 on registration and turnout. 
                                                            
51 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 5.6: Bivariate correlations among same day registration (2008-2012) and 
registration percentage of voting age population. (n=200)52 
            Sig.  
Same day registration as percentage of total registration  -.110 .120 
Percentage of Democrats who are same day registrants  -.130    .064 
Percentage of Republicans who are same day registrants             -.242    .001** 
Percentage of unaffiliated/other who are same day registrants -.151    .003** 
Percentage of white voters who are same day registrants   -.159    .025* 
Percentage of black voters who are same day registrants  -.116 .100 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 
The net percentage change produced by same day registration does not have a 
significant correlation with registered percentage of VAP for any of the groups examined, 
while the percentages of Republicans, unaffiliated and white voters who are same day 
registrants have negative and significant correlations with it, which would seem to be a 
preliminary indication indicate that for these groups, SDR had its greatest effects in 
counties with lower pre-existing registration rates. 
TABLE 5.7: Bivariate correlations among same day registration (2008-2012) and turnout 
percentage of registered voters. (n=200)  
Turnout percentage of registered voters             Sig. 
Same day registration as percentage of total registration   .220    .001** 
Percentage of Democrats who are same day registrants  .217    .002** 
Percentage of Republicans who are same day registrants  .088    .212 
Percentage of unaffiliated/other who are same day registrants .241    .001** 
Percentage of white voters who are same day registrants   .187    .008** 
% of black voters who are same day registrants   .035    .623  
 
The opposite effect from that observed in the previous table is seen for turnout of 
most groups of registered voters (since same day registrants are, by definition, registered 
voters who turn out). A significant and positive correlation is seen with turnout of those 
registered with the percentages of Democrats, unaffiliated, and white voters who used 
                                                            
52 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
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SDR, as well as the total percentage of voters who are same day registrants. No 
significant correlation is observed for Republican or black voters. 
TABLE 5.8: Bivariate correlations among same day registration (2008-2012) and turnout 
percentage of voting age population. (n=200)53 
                      Sig. 
Same day registration as percentage of total registration            .069    .329 
Percentage of Democrats who are same day registrants            .043    .546 
Percentage of Republicans who are same day registrants               -.128     .071 
Percentage of unaffiliated/other who are same day registrants         .046    .517 
Percentage of white voters who are same day registrants                -.001    .994 
Percentage of black voters who are same day registrants                -.072    .311  
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 
 No significant correlations were observed here. This, combined with the data 
observed in Table 5.7 above, would seem to indicate that SDR significantly increased 
turnout among those who wished to register, but that its availability did not affect overall 
turnout; it appears that those who did not vote were not, in fact, more likely to do so 
because of the removal of a registration barrier. This reinforces the observations made 
above that registration does not appear to be the most significant barrier to voting; 
nonparticipation must have another, more influential explanation. This will be explored 
by the multivariate analyses to follow. 
The next section of the analysis examines the relationship among registration, 
turnout, and voting method: 
TABLE 5.9: Bivariate correlations among registration percentage of voting age 
population and voting method, 1996-2012.54 
                                                                                    Sig.  N 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast on Election Day                     -.321   .000**     423  
                                                            
53 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
54 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 5.9 CONTINUED       Sig.   N 
Percentage of Republican vote cast on Election Day           -.315   .000** 423 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast nonprecinct            .324   .000** 423  
Percentage of Republican vote cast nonprecinct            .315   .000** 423  
Percentage of vote cast on Election Day            -.270   .000** 423 
Percentage of vote cast nonprecinct              .280   .000** 423  
Voters per One Stop site              -.157   .002**     401 
** Sig. p < .01.  
 
 Here are observed moderate and significant correlations for almost every factor 
involving choice of voting method. For Democratic and Republican voters, the 
registration percentage of voting age population varies according to the percentage of the 
vote cast by each method: it is negatively correlated with Election Day voting and 
positively correlated to an almost identical degree with nonprecinct voting. The ratio of 
potential voters to One Stop sites is also weakly and significantly correlated in the 
expected (negative) direction, giving a preliminary indication that the relative availability 
of One Stop voting (a prerequisite to the use of same day registration in 2008 and 2012) 
contributes to higher levels of voter registration.  
TABLE 5.10: Bivariate correlations among turnout percentage of registered voters and 
voting method, 1996-2012.55 
          Sig. N 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast on Election Day           -.653   .000**     423 
Percentage of Republican vote cast on Election Day           -.635   .000** 423  
Percentage of Democratic vote cast nonprecinct            .652   .000** 423  
Percentage of Republican vote cast nonprecinct            .619   .000** 423  
Percentage of vote cast on Election Day            -.653   .000** 423  
Percentage of vote cast nonprecinct              .655   .000** 423 
Voters per One Stop site              -.230   .000** 401  
** Sig. p < .01. 
 
 
                                                            
55 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 5.11: Bivariate correlations among turnout of voting age population and voting 
method, 1996-2012. 56 
Sig. N 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast on Election Day          -.686    .000** 423 
Percentage of Republican vote cast on Election Day          -.662    .000** 423 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast nonprecinct           .687    .000** 423 
Percentage of Republican vote cast nonprecinct           .656    .000** 423 
Percentage of vote cast on Election Day           -.666    .000** 423 
Percentage of vote cast nonprecinct             .672    .000** 423 
Voters per One Stop site             -.256    .000** 401 
** Sig. p < .01. 
The correlations observed for registration of voting age population are even 
stronger with respect to the turnout of both registered voters and the voting age 
population as a whole. Strong and significant correlations are seen with respect to turnout 
and choice of voting method: positive for percentage of vote cast nonprecinct, negative 
for percentage of vote cast on Election Day. Again, the ratio of potential voters to One 
Stop sites is negatively correlated with turnout. It appears, therefore, that the availability 
of nonprecinct voting has had a significant positive effect on voter registration and an 
even greater effect on voter turnout, and that this effect increases with greater relative 
availability of it. This will be explored in greater detail by multivariate analysis. 
The next section of the analysis will utilize multivariate regression to examine the 
impact of each reform on registration and turnout, beginning with the percentage of 
voting age population which is registered. Ordinary Least Squares regression is used, with 
robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity, and the Durbin-Watson technique 
used to test for autocorrelation. The first equation uses year dummy variables to explore 
variation over time, with 1992 as the baseline: 
                                                            
56 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 5.12: Multivariate regression equation comparing change in registered 
percentage of voting age population over time, 1996-2012. (n=600; 1992 is the omitted 
variable.)57 
 
B       Robust SE t     Sig.       Beta 
(Constant)       .7520645        .0101459      74.13    0.000          . 
Year 1996                               .0187242          .0138453        1.35    0.135           .0687059 
Year 2000                               .0942356          .0137796        6.84    0.000**      .3457856 
Year 2004                               .1034214          .0134338        7.70   0.000**      .3794917 
Year 2008                               .1266118          .0125986      10.05    0.000**      .4645861 
Year 2012                               .1288304          .0126526      10.18    0.000**      .4727269 
R-squared .2497 
Adjusted R-squared .243.  
Root MSE .088. 
** Sig. p < .01. 
This regression equation indicates that registration has steadily increased since the 
baseline year of 1992, with significant increases in every year except 1996, and the 
greatest increases coming in 2008 and 2012, coincident with the availability of same day 
registration. Thus, it would appear that SDR has had an additive effect to the existing 
trend of increased registration over the time studied.  
The next regression equation introduces variables representing Democratic control 
of the county commission, socioeconomic variables, the relative availability of One Stop 
voting, and the effect of same day registration in 2008 and 2012, using registered 
percentage of voting age population for the entire six-election period as the dependent 
variable: 
TABLE 5.13: Multivariate regression equation using registered percentage of Voting Age 
Population as the dependent variable, 2008-2012. (n=172)58 
 
B  Robust SE   t  Sig.         Beta 
(Constant)    .0789764  .1630645  .048 0.629          .    
                                                            
57 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and County Boards of Elections. 
58 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 5.13 CONTINUED  B  Robust SE   t  Sig.           Beta 
Democratic commission  .0355377  .0133624        2.66 0.009**        .2334841 
White percentage of VAP  .0006123  .0006572   .093 0.353          .1380954 
Poverty rate    .0050698  .0020138 2.52 0.013*          .3270115 
High school graduation rate  .0082495  .0013854 5.95 0.000**        .6062053 
Voters per One Stop site  -6.02e-07   4.64e-07       -1.30 0.195           -.0745323 
SDR percentage of registrants-.4975105  .4866234       -1.02 0.308          -.0842432 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .2955. 
Adjusted R-squared .2699. 
Root MSE .06515. 
 
Education emerges as the most significant and influential variable here, followed 
by party control of the county commission and poverty rate, all with positive coefficients. 
The racial composition of the county and the election reform factors do not emerge as 
significant. This would seem to indicate that the county’s existing characteristics are 
more influential predictors of its rate of registration among voting age population than are 
election reforms designed to make it easier for its citizens to register and to vote. 
 The next section of the analysis examines the effect of same day registration on 
the size of the electorate, using as the dependent variable the percentage of registered 
voters who used SDR and the same demographic factors as in the previous equation as 
independent variables: 
TABLE 5.14: Multivariate regression equation using percentage of registered voters who 
are same day registrants as the dependent variable, 2008-2012. (n=172)59 
B  Robust SE   t Sig.         Beta 
(Constant)                         0.0689841 0.0175589 3.93 0.000          . 
Democratic commission        -0.0005012 0.0020318      -0.25 0.805       -0.0194 
White percentage of VAP      -0.0005517 0.0000706      -7.81 0.000**     -0.7348 
Poverty rate             -0.0009601 0.0002383      -4.03 0.000**     -0.3657 
High school graduation rate    0.0000797 0.0001666 0.48 0.633        0.03457 
Voters per One Stop site  1.74E-07 9.37E-08 1.86 0.065        0.12716 
** Sig. p < .01. 
                                                            
59 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 5.14 CONTINUED 
R-squared .3585. 
Adjusted R-squared .3392. 
Root MSE .1039. 
 
In this equation, the white percentage of voting age population and the poverty 
rate are the only significant variables, with a negative coefficient in both cases. This 
would indicate that SDR was more widely used in (perhaps paradoxically) counties with 
higher proportions of  minority populations, and wealthier counties. The relative 
availability of One Stop voting, which is synonymous with the availability of SDR, is not 
significant here. This again indicates that the county’s existing characteristics, rather than 
election reform factors, are more influential in determining the use of Same Day 
Registration. 
The next section of the analysis examines turnout percentage of registered voters 
over time, using year dummies: 
TABLE 5-15: Multivariate regression equation comparing turnout percentage of 
registered voters over time, 1992-2012. (n=600; 1992 is the omitted category)60 
 
B  Robust SE   t Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)               .6766    .0048819     138.56 .000         .  
Year 1996              -.1017  .0071826      -14.16    .000**        -.5477453  
Year 2000              -.1122  .0073368      -15.29    .000**        -.6042972 
Year 2004              -.0542  .0073791        -7.35    .000**        -.2919154 
Year 2008               .0114   .0064247         1.77    .077         .0613992 
Year 2012              -.0151  .006622          -2.28    .023*        -.081327 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .4844. 
Adjusted R-squared .48. 
Root MSE .04994. 
 
                                                            
60 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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 All years except 2008 are significant here, with negative coefficients. The 
substantially higher t values and Beta values in the earlier equations indicate a relatively 
lower turnout in comparison to the later elections. This appears to indicate significant 
decline in turnout among registered voters from the previous election in all years except 
2008, where the coefficient is positive but not statistically significant. In comparison to 
the steady increase in turnout percentage among voting age population, it would seem that 
with the exception of 2008, there has been a proportionately smaller share of the 
registered population actually voting in each election. This might indicate that the 
introduction of SDR in 2008 temporarily arrested this decline, since same day registrants 
are by definition voters; but the gap returned in 2012, as same day registration decreased. 
This would also indicate that, in general, overcoming the registration hurdle may not be 
sufficient for many registrants to overcome the voting hurdle as well.  
The next section of the analysis introduces variables related to county commission 
control, socioeconomic factors, and factors related to nonprecinct voting and same day 
registration. 
TABLE 5.16: Multivariate regression equation using turnout percentage of registered 
voters as the dependent variable (2000, 2008, 2012), with socioeconomic and election 
reform factors as independent variables. (n=243)61 
 
B    Robust SE         t          Sig.            Beta 
(Constant)     .7220874        .0612795       11.78    0.000             . 
Democratic commission   -.0110225        .007628          -1.44   0.150           -.0784607 
White percentage of VAP      -.0002693        .0002758        -0.98    0.330           -.064353 
Poverty rate    -.0043239       .0008509        -5.08    0.000**       -.3054595 
High school graduation rate   -.001185         .0006998        -1.69     0.092           -.1067037 
Voters per One Stop site        -3.47e-07         2.10e-07        -1.65     0.100           -.1104077 
                                                            
61 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections,   
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 1992, 1996 and 2004 observations are omitted 
from the analysis due to the lack of data on the education and poverty variables. 
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TABLE 5-16 CONTINUED   B  Robust SE  t Sig.           Beta  
Nonprecinct percent of vote   .2547899        .0216755        11.75    0.000**         .7864404 
 ** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .5471. 
Adjusted R-squared .5355. 
Root MSE .4791. 
 
 Here it appears that election reform has had an impact. The percentage of vote 
cast nonprecinct is significant and the most influential variable, followed by the county’s 
poverty rate. The ratio of potential voters to One Stop sites, the education and racial 
variables, and party control of the county commission do not emerge as significant 
variables. It thus appears that nonprecinct voting is an extremely strong predictor of 
turnout among registered voters. 
 The next section of the analysis will examine turnout of voting age population, 
over time and using the socioeconomic and political factors previously examined. 
TABLE 5.17: Multivariate regression equation comparing turnout percentage of voting 
age population over time, 1992-2012. (n=600, with 1992 as the omitted category)62 
                   
B       Robust SE         t      Sig.            Beta 
(Constant)                .5089               .0076909      66.17    0.000             . 
Year 1996               -.0648              .0101185        6.40     0.000**        -2827221 
Year 2000               -.0328              .0097201       -3.37    0.001**        -.1431062 
Year 2004                     .0225              .0099493        2.26     0.024*           .0981674 
Year 2008                     .0955              .0096591        9.89     0.000**         .416666 
Year 2012                   .0742              .0099286        7.47     0.000**         .3237342 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .4321. 
Adjusted R-squared .4273. 
Root MSE .0647. 
As was seen with registration rates, turnout has also increased steadily over the 
period examined by this study, with negative coefficients in 1996 and 2000 and positive 
                                                            
62 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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coefficients thereafter. The greatest increase occurred in 2008, the year of Obama’s first 
election and the first year in which One Stop voting surpassed Election Day voting. with 
a smaller but still significant increase in 2012. 
TABLE 5.18: Multivariate regression equation using turnout percentage of voting age 
population as the dependent variable (2000, 2008, 2012), with socioeconomic and 
election reform factors as independent variables. (n=243)63 
 
  B        Robust SE    t  Sig.             Beta  
(Constant)      .2203366         .0750171        2.94     0.004             .    
Democratic commission    .0066782        .0092556        0.72     0.471             .0414474 
White percentage of VAP .0003337         .0003488        0.96     0.340             .069522 
Poverty rate    -.0008856        .0011355       -0.78    0.436            -.0545509 
High school graduation rate  .0030392        .0008386        3.62     0.000**         .2386185 
Voters per One Stop site          -4.60e-07        2.10e-07       -2.19     0.030*         -.1277589 
Nonprecinct percent of vote    .2009321        .0227036         8.85    0.000**         .5407555 
R-squared .5393. 
Adjusted R-squared .5275. 
Root MSE .05542. 
 
 The following equation examines turnout percentage of VAP in 2008 and 2012, 
with an added variable representing the effect of Same Day Registration in those years: 
TABLE 5.19: Multivariate regression equation using turnout percentage of voting age 
population as the dependent variable (2008-2012), with socioeconomic and election 
reform factors including Same Day Registration as independent variables. (n=172)64 
 
                                                    B               Robust SE            t         Sig.   Beta  
(Constant)      .2645182      .1237205            2.14   0.034             .         
Democratic commission     .0181904      .0110418            1.65   0.101             .1436776 
White percentage of VAP   .0000569      .0005149            0.11   0.912             .015466 
Poverty rate    -.001005        .0015781          -0.64   0.525            -.0779907 
High school graduation rate     .0032391     .0012175            2.66   0.009**          .286682 
Voters per One Stop site           7.84e-07      4.14e-07           -1.89   0.060           -.1170232 
Nonprecinct percent of vote    .1371659     .0509696            2.69   0.008**         .1942645 
                                                            
63 Analysis conducted  by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 1992, 1996 and 2004 are excluded due to the lack 
of data on education and poverty for those years. 
64 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 5.19 CONTINUED      B  Robust SE    t  Sig.          Beta  
SDR percentage of registrants  .0554756     .4710709            0.12   0.906            .0113189 
R-squared .1950. 
Adjusted R-squared .1604. 
Root MSE .05812. 
     
 The high school graduation rate and percentage of vote cast nonprecinct are 
significant in both equations, though their influence decreases substantially in the second. 
The ratio of potential voters to One Stop sites is significant in the first equation, but not in 
the second. The percentage of voters who used SDR in the second equation is not a 
significant variable, and its introduction into the model substantially lowers the R-
squared value explaining the amount of variance in the dependent variable. This would 
indicate that SDR did not, in fact, substantially affect turnout among VAP. 
In comparing the results of the equations examining turnout of registered voters 
and of voting age population, the percentage of the vote cast nonprecinct is the most 
influential variable in both cases, though more so with registered voters than with turnout 
of VAP as a whole. The socioeconomic variables also influence the equations, with the 
high school graduation rate significant in predicting turnout among VAP and the poverty 
level significant in predicting turnout among registered voters (but not vice versa). Party 
control of the county commission and the racial composition of the county are 
consistently insignificant. 
In comparing the bivariate and multivariate models predicting registration and 
turnout, white percentage of voting age population was significant in the bivariate models 
but in none of the multivariate models, indicating that the bivariate significance may be a 
spurious relationship. Education was a significant predictor of registration and of turnout 
for both registered voters and voting age population in the bivariate model; in the 
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multivariate models, it influenced registration and turnout of VAP, but not turnout of 
registered voters. This would indicate that education does influence both registration and 
turnout; however, once one is registered, education does not predict likelihood of turnout. 
The county’s poverty rate was not significant in the bivariate models or in the 
multivariate models related to turnout of voting age population, but was significant in the 
multivariate models related to turnout of registered voters. This indicates that the addition 
of another independent variable in the multivariate model corrected for the error variance 
observed with poverty in the bivariate model. The significance of poverty in the 
registered voter turnout model indicates the opposite effect of education: poverty does not 
influence registration, but, once one is registered, poverty does predict likelihood of 
turnout. Democratic control of the county commission appears to positively affect overall 
registration rates, but not the use of SDR, and not turnout of either registered voters or 
VAP in general. 
 The next sections of the analysis will examine registration and turnout in the 
individual election years, in order to determine the effect which each reform may have 
had in the year in which it was introduced. 
TABLE 5.20: Multivariate regression equations examining registration percentage of 
voting age population in individual election years, 1992-2012. 65 
   
Year 1992 (n=100)  B  Robust SE   t Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)   0.6138849      0.0475399      12.91  .000         . 
White percentage of VAP 0.1783881      0.0606185 2.94  .004**      0.28422 
** Sig. p < .01      
R-squared .0808.      
Adjusted R-squared .071.      
Root MSE .09785. 
                                                            
65 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and, where applicable, the U.S. Census Bureau. Data not included in individual 
equations were not available for those years.  
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TABLE 5.20 CONTINUED 
Year 1996 (n=100)  B           Robust SE  t Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)   0.6377751 0.0408094    15.63 .000       . 
White percentage of VAP 0.0017227 0.0005235      3.29 .001**       .29855 
** Sig. p < .01      
R-squared .0891.      
Adjusted R-squared .080.      
Root MSE .09105. 
 
Year 2000 (n=71)   B  Robust SE    t Sig.         Beta 
(Constant)       .1849816      .217661           0.85     0.399          .                    
White percentage of VAP        .0016431    .0010877         1.51     0.136          .30172 
Democratic commission         -.0105063    .0247483         0.42     0.673         -.0616262 
Poverty rate                  .0080075         .0039289         2.04     0.046*        .3742065 
High school graduation rate    .0054891   .0018868         2.91     0.005**      .3926287 
Voters per One Stop site   -2.62e-07      3.15e-07        -0.83    0.408         -.1035647 
Nonprecinct percent of vote    .1926194         .1733678         1.11     0.271          .1309252 
* Sig. p. < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared  0.2078. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1335. 
Root MSE   .07971. 
 
Year 2004 (n=81)       B     Robust SE          t       Sig.                     Beta 
(Constant)      .7196664          .0753052         9.56    0.000            . 
White percentage of VAP       .0015508          .0007239         2.14    0.035*         .3162735 
Democratic commission          .0396466          .0219518         1.81   0.075           .2465469 
Voters per One Stop site         -9.78e-08    3.13e-07        -0.31    0.755           -0285684 
Nonprecinct percent of vote   -.0140829          .075999        -0.19     0.853          -.0216271 
* Sig. p < .05. 
R-squared     =  0.0638. 
Adjusted R-squared .0145. 
Root MSE      =  .08031. 
 
Year 2008 (n=68)   B              Robust SE     t  Sig.    Beta 
(Constant)      .056529          .259417           0.22   0.828             .                                   
Democratic commission           .0521064       .0200776          2.60   0.012*           .3474668 
White percentage of VAP        .0016255       .0010565          1.54   0.129             .3586528  
Poverty rate                  .00455           .0032895           1.38   0.172            .3024095 
High school graduation rate     .006579         .0023371          2.82   0.007**         .500972 
SDR percent of registrants     -1.050663        .6809972          -1.54   0.128           -1670901 
One Stop percent of vote        .1426554        .0929552            1.53   0.130            .171377 
Mail percent of vote                .1423599        .1480302           0.96    0.340           .0615492 
Voters per One Stop site          3.66e-07        7.22e-07            0.51    0.614           .0397642 
R-squared .3943. 
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TABLE 5.20 CONTINUED 
Adjusted R-squared .3122. 
Root MSE .06262. 
 
Year 2012 (n=100)   B          Robust SE       t    Sig.  Beta 
(Constant)                -.1312276   .2181361    -0.60   0.549                        . 
Democratic commission          .0288899   .0167377     1.73   0.088           .1916373 
White percentage of VAP       .0000932   .0007123      0.13   0.896           .0216663 
Poverty rate     .0076959   .0026207      2.94   0.004**       .4821431 
High school graduation rate    .0097185   .0021085      4.61   0.000**       .6768907 
SDR percent of registrants    -1.0262        .855912       -1.20   0.234          -.1475287 
One Stop percent of vote         .0964558   .0606433      1.59   0.115           .1281044 
Mail percent of vote                .8372363   .2764007       3.03   0.003**       .2077792 
Voters per One Stop site          -4.76e-07   6.07e-07      -0.78   0.435          -.0644858 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .3913. 
Adjusted R-squared .2942. 
Root MSE .06363. 
 
 The white percentage of voting age population, the only datum available for all 
six elections examined, is significant with a positive coefficient in 1992, 1996, and 2004, 
but not in other years. It thus appears that the historically observed disparity between 
white and nonwhite rates of registration among VAP has recently diminished to a point of 
statistical insignificance. It does not appear, however, that registration reform is 
responsible for this change, as the percentage of registrants who used SDR was not a 
significant variable in predicting registration percentage of VAP in either 2008 or 2012. 
Democratic control of the county commission was significant, with a positive coefficient, 
in 2008, but not significant in other years.  This may be an artifact of the Obama 
campaign’s targeted voter registration efforts in more heavily Democratic areas. 
 The high school graduation rate is significant, with a positive coefficient, and the 
most influential variable in every year in which it appears, reflecting the historically 
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observed positive relationship between education and likelihood of political participation. 
It thus appears that the various election reforms examined herein have not narrowed the 
disparity in participation for the less well-educated. The poverty rate is significant, with a 
positive coefficient, in 2000 and 2012 (two of the three years for which the data were 
available). This leads to the unexpected conclusion that registration percentages were 
higher in those years in counties with higher levels of poverty.  
 The election reform variables were generally not significant. The ratio of voters 
per site, which might have been expected to affect registration rates in 2008 and 2012, 
does not achieve significance in any year. The percentage of vote cast nonprecinct in 
2000 and 2004, the percentage cast One Stop in 2008 and 2012, and the percentage cast 
by mail in 2008 do not achieve significance. The percentage of vote cast by mail was 
significant with a positive coefficient in 2012, indicating that (since mail voters and same 
day registrants are mutually exclusive) registration levels were higher in counties with 
greater use of mail voting and lower use of One Stop and thus SDR. The percentage of 
registrants who used Same Day Registration does not achieve significance in either 2008 
or 2012. If the use of Same Day Registration does not significantly increase the 
registration percentage of voting age population, then Hypothesis Two is not supported. 
 The next sections of the analysis will examine turnout of registered voters and 
turnout of voting age population in the individual election years. 
TABLE 5.21: Multivariate regression equations examining turnout percentage of 
registered voters in individual election years, 1992-2012.66 
 
Year 1992 (n=100)  B  Robust SE   t  Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)   0.5554446  0.0230546    24.09  .000          . 
                                                            
66 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and, where applicable, the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 5.21 CONTINUED  B  Robust SE   t   Sig.        Beta  
White percentage of VAP 0.1563699  0.0277383 5.64  .000**       0.51812 
** Sig. p < .01.      
R-squared .2685      
Adjusted R-squared .261.      
Root MSE .04198.  
 
Year 1996 (n=100)  B  Robust SE   t Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)   0.4911895 0.0253781     19.35 .000         . 
White percentage of VAP  0.0010832 0.0003127 3.46 .001**       .33829 
** Sig. p < .01.      
R-squared .1144      
Adjusted R-squared .105.      
Root MSE .04982. 
 
Year 2000 (n=71)   B Robust SE   t Sig.         Beta 
(Constant)     .6236632        .0960906    6.49    0.000                      .   
White percentage of VAP     .0002649        .0004883    0.54    0.589           .0726024 
Democratic commission         -.0077552        .0149738        -0.52   0.606          -.0678912 
Poverty rate   -.0081068        .0019362        -4.19   0.000**      -.5654191 
High school graduation rate    .0011065         .0009575         1.16    0.252           .1181226 
Voters per One Stop site          -6.26e-07       1.94e-07         -3.22    0.002**      -.3686031 
Nonprecinct percent of vote   -.1828038        .1061943         1.72    0.090          -.1854445 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared 0.4127. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3577. 
Root MSE .04599. 
       
Year 2004 (n=81)   B       Robust SE        t        Sig.        Beta  
(Constant)       .5025964        .035656           14.10   0.000                        
White percentage of VAP     .0014374        .0003801          3.78    0.000**      .4454178 
Democratic commission         -.0027201        .013651           -0.20   0.843         -.0257003 
Voters per One Stop site  -2.27e-07     2.12e-07            -1.07     0.289       -.1006325 
Nonprecinct percent of vote      .0730603   .0400745     1.82   0.072                   .1704715 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared 0.2673. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2287. 
Root MSE .04676. 
 
Year 2008 (n=68)      B             Robust SE     t         Sig.         Beta 
 (Constant)                  .8342104   .1108391     7.53   0.000                         
White percentage of VAP        -.0009754   .0004726    -2.06   0.043*               -.3944511 
Democratic commission           -.023437     .011405     -2.05   0.044*                -.2864416 
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TABLE 5.21 CONTINUED    B          Robust SE     t      Sig.         Beta  
High school graduation rate      -.0007402  .0016939    -0.44   0.664                  -.1033065 
Poverty rate                 -.0047375   .0017665    -2.68   0.009**              -.5770832 
Voters per site       -9.56e-07   6.20e-07    -1.54   0.129                  -.1903309 
One Stop percent of vote    .0253669   .0580879     0.44    0.664                   .0558525 
Mail percent of vote     -.1379701   .1056868    -1.31    0.197                  -.109328 
Registered percentage VAP      .0983041   .1246642     0.79    0.434                   .1801702 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 
Year 2012 (n=100)     B             Robust SE     t      Sig.         Beta 
(Constant)        .9739998   .0888098    10.97   0.000                   .          
White percentage of VAP       -.0004886   .0003512    -1.39    0.167                  -.1922719 
Democratic commission          -.0018185  .0102841     -0.18   0.860                   -.020426 
High school graduation rate    -.0033882   .0016362    -2.07    0.041*                -.3995916 
Poverty rate                             -.0054881   .0013492    -4.07    0.000**              -.5822002 
Voters per site      -3.49e-07   4.62e-07    -0.76    0.452                  -.0799744 
One Stop percent of vote         .0916366     .04386        2.09    0.039*                 .2060816 
Mail percent of vote              .1334602   .1839946      0.73    0.470                   .0560842 
Registered percentage VAP    .0569931   .0898645       0.63   0.528                   .0965066 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared   0.1652. 
Adjusted R-squared .0918. 
Root MSE  .04263. 
 
 The white percentage of the county’s VAP is significant with a positive 
coefficient in most of the earlier years, and actually significant with a negative coefficient 
in 2008. This would seem to indicate that, as previously observed, the registration gap 
between white and nonwhite voters has closed over time, so has the gap between the rates 
of white and nonwhite registrants who actually vote. The poverty rate was significant, 
with a negative coefficient, and the most influential variable in each year for which it was 
available, indicating lower rates of turnout among registered voters in counties with 
higher levels of poverty. The county’s high school graduation rate was significant only in 
2012, where it had an unexpectedly negative coefficient. The ratio of potential voters to 
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One Stop sites was significant only in 2000, the first year in which universal One Stop 
voting was offered. The use of  nonprecinct voting in general was not significant in 2000 
or 2004. For the two elections in which nonprecinct voting could be broken down by 
type, the percentage of mail voting was not significant, and the percentage of One Stop 
voting was significant, with a positive coefficient, only in 2012. Party control of the 
county commission was significant only in 2008, with a negative coefficient for 
Democratic control. It thus appears that election reform has had no consistent effect on 
the turnout of registered voters. Hypothesis Three is therefore generally not supported. 
 The next section of the analysis will examine turnout of voting age population in 
the individual elections being considered. 
TABLE 5.22: Multivariate regression equations examining turnout percentage of voting 
age population in individual election years, 1992-2012.67 
 
Year 1992 (n=100)  B             Robust SE t Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)   0.3234356 0.031162       10.38  .000         . 
White percentage of VAP      0.2393706 0.0394824 6.06  .000**      0.50356 
** Sig. p < .01.      
R-squared .2536      
Adjusted R-squared .246.      
Root MSE .06678.      
      
Year 1996 (n=100)     B   Robust SE t Sig.       Beta 
(Constant)   0.3086404 0.0276709    11.15 .000       . 
White percentage of VAP 0.0017529 0.0003481      5.04 .000**     0.43855 
** Sig. p < .01.      
R-squared .1923      
Adjusted R-squared .184.      
Root MSE .05939.      
 
Year 2000 (n=71)     B  Robust SE t Sig. Beta  
(Constant)        .181469           .095551         1.90    0.062         . 
White percentage of VAP  .0009814         .0005539       1.77    0.081         .2905635 
Democratic commission         -.0141785         .0136391      -1.04   0.302        -.1340881 
                                                            
67 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and, where applicable, the U.S. Census bureau. 
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TABLE 5.22 CONTINUED     B  Robust SE  t Sig.     Beta  
Poverty rate                             -.0027284        .0017617      -1.55   0.126        -.2055749 
High school graduation rate     .0038641        .0008659       4.46    0.000**     .4456341 
Voters per One Stop site          -6.32e-07        1.75e-07      -3.61    0.001**    -.4021597 
Nonprecinct percent of vote    -.0318285       .1067365      -0.30    0.767        -.0348806 
R-squared  .4815. 
Adjusted R-squared .4329. 
Root MSE  .04. 
 
Year 2004 (n=81)    B  Robust SE t Sig.     Beta 
(Constant)      .3402783        .0492739       6.91    0.000                         
White percentage of VAP       .0022362        .0004733       4.72    0.000**     .6187363 
Democratic commission          .0236981        .015671         1.51    0.135        .1999367 
Voters per One Stop site         -2.31e-07         2.24e-07     -1.03    0.305        -.0915146 
Nonprecinct percent of vote    .0523322        .0471562      1.11     0.271         .1090336 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared     =  0.3075. 
Adjusted R-squared .2710.  
Root MSE      =  .05091. 
 
Year 2008 (n=68)   B  Robust SE t       Sig.    Beta 
(Constant)                               .1652691         .1886871      0.88    0.385         .                   
White percentage of VAP      .0003519          .000801       0.44    0.662          .0925633 
Democratic commission         .0178129         .0183079      0.97    0.335         .1416117 
Poverty rate              -.0004923  .0023085     -0.21   0.832         -.0390117 
High school graduation rate   .0045876         .001989        2.31    0.025*       .4164675 
Voters per One Stop site        -4.87e-07         7.74e-07     -0.63    0.531        -.0630686 
One Stop percent of vote        .129262           .0798081     1.62    0.111         .1851303 
Mail percent of vote              -.0184159         .1318994    -0.14    0.889-        .0094922 
SDR percent of registrants    -.8338791         .679558      -1.23    0.225-        .1581002 
* Sig. p <  .05. 
R-squared     =  0.2911 
Adjusted R-squared .1950. 
Root MSE      =  .05682. 
 
Year 2012 (n=100)  B            Robust SE      t        Sig. Beta  
(Constant)   .    .1776717        .177552       1.00   0.320        . 
White percentage of VAP      -.0002362        .0006057    -0.39   0.697       -.0662103 
Democratic commission          .0191116        .0143119     1.34   0.185        .1529185 
Poverty rate      .0008163        .0022954     0.36   0.723        .0616891 
High school graduation rate    .0038789        .0019368     2.00   0.048*      .3258749 
Voters per site    -6.45e-07        5.06e-07    -1.28   0.205      -.1053477 
One Stop percent of vote          .1278335        .0606076    2.11   0.038*      .2047901 
Mail percent of vote                 .6756699        .219661       3.08   0.003**   .2022634 
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TABLE 5.22 CONTINUED  B  Robust SE      t        Sig.         Beta   
SDR % of registrants              -.0802892        .9034707    -0.09  0.929     -.0139229 
R-squared .2015. 
Adjusted R-squared .1407. 
Root MSE .05821. 
 
The white percentage of the county’s voting age population is significant with a 
positive coefficient in most earlier elections, but not in more recent ones, indicating a 
closing of the gap in voting rates among white and nonwhite VAP. The education 
variable remains significant with a positive coefficient in each election where it is 
included, indicating the previously noted relationship between education and voting, 
while the poverty variable is not significant in any equation. As was true of turnout of 
registered voters, the ratio of potential voters to One Stop sites was significant (with the 
expected negative coefficient) only in 2000, the first year in which One Stop voting was 
universally available. The percentage of vote cast nonprecinct is not significant until 
2012, when both One Stop and mail are significant with positive coefficients, indicating 
that the availability of both options contributes to turnout of VAP. The percentage of 
registrants who used SDR is insignificant in both 2008 and 2012.  Democratic control of 
the county commission is not significant in any equation. 
 In comparing the findings for turnout of registered voters and of voting age 
population, it appears that the racial gap has narrowed among both groups. The poverty 
variable is significant in predicting turnout of registered voters but not of voting age 
population, while the education variable is significant with respect to turnout of voting 
age population but, with one exception, not significant with respect to turnout of 
registered voters. Party control of the commission was significant on only one occasion, 
and its sign was in the unexpected direction. One Stop voting was significant for both 
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groups in 2012, while mail voting was significant for turnout of VAP in that year. 
Otherwise, with the exception of the ratio of potential voters to One Stop sites in 2000, 
the availability of nonprecinct voting does not appear to significantly affect turnout.  
The hypotheses previously stated with respect to the effect of same day registration on 
registration and turnout were that the availability of SDR would significantly increase 
voter registration, increase turnout of both registered voters and the voting age population 
as a whole. The hypotheses previously stated with respect to the effects of greater 
availability of nonprecinct voting through One Stop and absentee voting were also that 
these practices would significantly increase voter turnout. This does not appear to have 
been the case. Hypotheses Three and Four are therefore not supported. 
 This chapter has examined the effects of election reform on voter registration and 
turnout in general. The partisan effects of these reforms, and the extent to which different 
partisan groups are differentially affected by them, will be addressed by the remainder of 
the present work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: PARTISAN DIFFERENCES IN CHOICE OF VOTING METHOD 
 
 
 The preceding chapters have examined the differences in partisan implementation 
of election reform, and the effects which election reform has had on participation in the 
form of registration and turnout. The following chapter will examine the partisan effects 
of these reforms – whether the changes in the voting electorate produced by the increased 
availability of registration and nonprecinct voting have actually affected the results of 
presidential elections in North Carolina. The present chapter will examine whether 
Democratic and Republican voters differ in their choices of voting methods: Is one group 
more likely than the other to take advantage of nonprecinct voting in general, One Stop 
voting, or of unrestricted absentee voting by mail? This chapter will examine nonprecinct 
voting in general for the entire span of the five elections examined, and One Stop and 
mail voting for the elections of 2008-2012, for which distinct data could be obtained on 
the use of these methods. The socioeconomic variables which have been previously used 
in this analysis will continue to be utilized here. The first analysis in this chapter is a set 
of bivariate correlations using the percentage of each candidate’s vote which is cast by 
each method as a variable. 
TABLE 6.1: Bivariate correlation between voting method and population characteristics 
in nonprecinct voting, 1996-2012. 68 
 
(1) Percentage of Democratic vote cast nonprecinct 
(2) Percentage of Republican vote cast nonprecinct 
                     (1)     Sig.      N         (2) Sig.   N 
                                                            
68 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
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TABLE 6.1 CONTINUED 
Year 1996          -.390  .000**   2769    -.395   .000**   27 
Year 2000                 -.581  .000** 100      -.562    .000**  100  
Year 2004                      -.240  .000**   9970     -.186  .000**   99 
Year 2008                                    .550  .000**   9571      .466   .000**   95  
Year 2012                                          .496  .000**  100       .510    .000**  100 
Democratic commission                  .060  .276      33372     .018   .740      333    
High school graduation rate              .504  .000**  28073     .538   .000**  280 
Poverty rate                                         .261  .000**  280        197    .000**  280 
Voters per One Stop site                    -.350  .000**  39974    -.324  .000**  399 
White percentage of voting age population        -.015  .754     425       .031    .529       425  
Registered percentage of voting age population  .324  .000** 425     .315    .000**   425  
Turnout percentage of registered voters               .652  .000** 425     .619    .000**   425 
Turnout percentage of voting age population      .687  .000**  425      .656     .000**   425   
Democratic percentage of vote                            .137   .005** 425     .075    .124       425 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 
 Over the five elections for which the data are available, the share of both parties’ 
votes which is cast nonprecinct increases over time, with significant correlations 
throughout. The stronger negative correlation in both cases between the year 2000 (the 
first year of universal One Stop voting) and the percentage of the vote cast nonprecinct, 
than is observed for the preceding year 1996, is likely due to the considerably larger 
sample size of 100 counties in the latter year as opposed to only 27 in the former. As has 
been previously discussed in this work, only 27 counties reported votes by method 
                                                            
69 The remaining 73 counties did not report vote by method prior to 2000. 
 
70 Lee County did not report Election Day and nonprecinct voting separately in 2004. 
 
71 Chatham, Duplin, Lee, and Northampton Counties did not report Election Day and nonprecinct voting 
separately in 2008. 
 
72 Data on partisan control of the county commission are not available for 1992 or 1996, and there are 
missing observations for 2000, 2004 and 2008. 
 
73 Education and poverty data are not available for 1992, 1996 or 2004, nor for certain counties in 2008. 
 
74 The number of One Stop sites in Columbus County in 2000 could not be determined from the available 
data. 
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(Election Day or absentee) in 1996, whereas all 100 generally did so (with exceptions as 
noted) beginning in 2000. The negative correlation becomes weaker in both cases in 
2004, and positive, moderate significant correlations are observed for both parties in 2008 
and 2012, with a stronger correlation for the Democratic nonprecinct vote share in 2008 
and for the Republican in 2012. Party control of the county commission does not produce 
a significant difference in the use of nonprecinct voting in general over the five elections 
examined, though differences will be observed in the separate examination (below) of 
One Stop and mail voting in 2008 and 2012.  
 The county’s high school graduation rate is positively, moderately and 
significantly correlated with nonprecinct voting for both parties, while the poverty rate 
has a weak, positive significant correlation in both cases. This leads to the seemingly 
disparate conclusions that nonprecinct voting is more common in both better-educated 
and poorer counties (though these conclusions are subject to the limitations imposed by 
the lack of data for 1996 and 2004). The effect of education is slightly greater for the 
nonprecinct share of the Republican vote, while the effect of poverty is slightly greater in 
the Democratic case. 
As expected, the ratio of potential voters to One Stop site, a proxy for the relative 
availability of One Stop voting, has a moderate, significant and negative correlation with 
the use of nonprecinct voting, indicating that it is more likely to be used where it is more 
readily available. The white percentage of the county’s voting age population is not 
significantly correlated with either party’s nonprecinct vote share. The registration and 
turnout statistics are all positively and significantly correlated with nonprecinct voting in 
both cases, indicating that the availability of nonprecinct voting has a positive effect on 
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registration and an even stronger positive effect on turnout of both registered voters and 
the voting age population in general. The effect is slightly stronger in all cases for the 
nonprecinct share of Democratic vote than for the Republican. The percentage of the 
Democratic vote cast nonprecinct is significantly and positively correlated with the 
Democratic candidate’s share of the vote, while there is no significant correlation with 
Republican use of nonprecinct voting and Democratic vote share. This would indicate 
that nonprecinct voters have become a larger share of the Democratic voting coalition, 
while no such effect has been observed for Republicans. 
The next section of the analysis specifically examines the use of One Stop voting 
in 2008 and 2012. 
TABLE 6.2: Bivariate correlations with percentage of vote for each candidate cast One 
Stop, 2008-2012.75 
 
(1) Percentage of Democratic vote cast One Stop 
(2) Percentage of Republican vote cast One Stop 
                        Sig.      N                    Sig.      N 
Democratic commission                    .242   .001** 177       .056    .459     177 
High school graduation rate                                 .178   .018*  177        .243    .001** 177 
Poverty rate                                                          .057   .450    177        -.066   .382     177  
Voters per One Stop site                                      .017   .812    196       -.023    .309     196   
White percentage of voting age population        -.288  .000** 196         .014   .841     196  
Registered percentage of voting age population  .199  .005** 196      .155    .031*   196   
Turnout percentage of registered voters              .181  .000**  196        .104    .147     196   
Turnout percentage of voting age population      .281  .000** 196         .192    .007** 196 
SDR percentage of Democratic registrants          .359  .000** 196         .058    .416     196   
SDR percentage of Republican registrants           .332 .000** 196         .141    .049*   196 
Democratic percentage of vote                             .438 .000** 196         .095    .186     196  
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 
                                                            
75 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
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 Democratic control of the county commission is significantly and positively 
correlated with the percentage of the Democratic vote which is cast One Stop, but not 
with the Republican percentage. Given the previously observed correlation between 
Democratic commission control and a relatively lower ratio of voters to One Stop sites, it 
appears that Democratic-controlled counties are more likely to see an increase in the 
percentage of Democratic vote cast One Stop due to the greater relative availability of 
this voting option in those counties, while Republican use of One Stop does not vary with 
partisan commission control. The high school graduation rate is significantly and 
positively correlated with the use of One Stop voting for both parties’ candidates, 
indicating (as was seen above with regard to the use of nonprecinct voting in general) that 
counties with higher education levels also have higher levels of One Stop voting. The 
white percentage of the county’s voting age population was negatively and significantly 
correlated with the One Stop share of the Democratic vote, while no significant 
correlation was observed on the Republican side. This would appear to indicate that One 
Stop voting for Democrats is more widely used in counties with higher percentages of 
minority population, while the use of One Stop voting for Republicans does not vary 
according to this characteristics. While the poverty rate and ratio of voters to One Stop 
site were significant in the five-election study of nonprecinct voting in general, neither 
reaches significance here.  
 While the general use of nonprecinct voting was significantly and positively 
correlated with all of the registration and turnout variables used in the previous equation, 
and those correlations continue to be significant (but weaker) for all categories on the 
Democratic side with respect to One Stop voting, there was no significant correlation 
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between the turnout percentage of registered voters and the One Stop share of vote for the 
Republican candidate.  There were, however, weak, significant and positive correlations 
between both registration and turnout of voting age population and One Stop share for the 
Republican.  
 The Democratic candidate’s share of the vote was significantly, positively 
correlated with the use of One Stop voting, and the correlation was stronger than that 
which was observed in the five-election study of general nonprecinct voting. Again, there 
was no significant correlation observed between the Democratic vote share and the 
proportion of Republican vote cast One Stop. This seems to indicate the particular 
importance of One Stop voting to the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012.  
 A significant positive correlation between One Stop voting and Same Day 
Registration is to be expected, because same day registrants are, by definition, One Stop 
voters. However, the partisan effects are of interest here. The Democratic percentage of 
the vote which was cast One Stop was moderately, significantly and positively correlated 
with the percentages of both Democrats and Republicans who used Same Day 
Registration. There was a weak, significant, positive correlation between the percentage 
of Republican vote cast One Stop and the percentage of Republicans who were same day 
registrants, and no significant correlation with the percentage of Democrats who used 
SDR. This indicates heavier Democratic use of One Stop voting in the presence of greater 
same day registration by either partisan group, but less effect of SDR on Republican use 
of One Stop voting, which would appear to lead to the conclusion that a greater share of 
Democratic voters in 2008 and 2012 were same day registrants than was true of their 
Republican counterparts.  
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TABLE 6.3: Bivariate correlations with percentage of vote for each candidate cast 
Absentee by Mail, 2008-2012.76 
 
(1) Percentage of Democratic vote cast by mail 
(2) Percentage of Republican vote cast by mail 
            Sig.     N       Sig.       N  
Democratic commission                                       -.080  .289   177        -.311   .000**  177 
High school graduation rate                                  .218 .004** 177         .068   .372      177 
Poverty rate                                                          -.225 .003** 177        -.084  .264      177  
Voters per One Stop site                                       .017   .812    196       -.023   .747      196 
White percentage of voting age population          .202  .005** 196         .099   .167     196  
Registered percentage of voting age population  .202   .005** 196         .045   .532     196    
Turnout percentage of registered voters              -.041 . 566     196         .116   .104     196 
Turnout percentage of voting age population       .136  .058     196         .112   .119     196        
Democratic percentage of vote                            -.051  .476     196        -.052  .472      196  
SDR percentage of Democratic registrants           .057  .425     196         .178   .013*   196 
SDR percentage of Republican registrants          -.123  .085     196         .067   .351     196 
 
 Several differences emerge here between partisan use of One Stop and of mail 
voting. Democratic commission control was significant for Democratic, but not 
Republican, use of One Stop voting; the opposite is true for mail voting, with a 
significant and negative correlation between Democratic control and Republican use of 
mail voting. Unlike One Stop voting, there is no partisan consideration involved in the 
availability of absentee voting by mail (such as the decisions related to the number and 
location of sites). Given the lack of a correlation on the Republican side with frequency 
of One Stop voting in these counties, the conclusion to be drawn is that Republican voters 
in Democratic counties are more likely to vote on the traditional Election Day. This is the 
only significant correlation observed with respect to the Republican use of mail voting, 
while the Democratic rate of mail voting is significantly affected by a number of factors, 
                                                            
76 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
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many of which were also significant with respect to the use of One Stop voting by these 
partisans. The high school graduation rate is positively correlated with Democratic mail 
voting, as it was with One Stop voting and with nonprecinct voting in general. The 
poverty rate is significantly and negatively correlated with Democratic mail voting, while 
it was not significantly correlated with Democratic use of One Stop voting, and was 
positively and significantly correlated with Democratic use of nonprecinct voting over 
the five-election period. The county’s white percentage of voting age population is 
significantly and positively correlated with Democratic use of mail voting, while it was 
significantly and negatively correlated with Democratic use of One Stop voting and not 
significantly correlated with Democratic nonprecinct voting overall. This would indicate 
that Democratic partisans are more likely to use mail voting, and less likely to use One 
Stop, in counties with greater proportions of white voters. The registered percentage of 
voting age population is significantly and positively correlated with Democratic use of 
mail voting, as it was with Democratic use of One Stop voting and nonprecinct voting in 
general, while Democratic use of mail voting was not significantly correlated with 
turnout or with the overall Democratic percentage of the vote. Partisan control of the 
county commission, and the ratio of potential voters to One Stop sites, were not 
significantly correlated with the Democratic use of voting by mail. 
 Mail voters are, by definition, not same day registrants. Any correlation observed 
between mail voting and SDR would presumably be negative. However, there is a weak, 
significant, positive correlation between the percentage of Democrats using SDR and the 
percentage of Republicans voting by mail. This indicates a greater disparity in choice of 
voting methods between the two groups in counties with greater Democratic use of SDR. 
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 The next section of the analysis will use multivariate regression to explore the 
differences in Democratic and Republican choices of voting method. 
TABLE 6.4: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast nonprecinct as the dependent variable with year dummies, 2000-2012. (n=425, with 
1992 as the omitted category)77 
B              Robust SE   t  Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)                          .035537 .0043303         8.21     0.000           . 
Year 2000   .109698 .0075099       14.61     0.000**       .190588 
Year 2004                          .259180 .011845         21.88     0.000**       .4487283 
Year 2008                         .609252  .0110368       59.42     0.000**       1.054821  
Year 2012                          .583774 .0043303       52.89     0.000**       1.014242 
** Sig. p < .01.       
R-squared .8651 
Adjusted R-squared .864. 
Root MSE .09021. 
 
TABLE 6.5: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast nonprecinct as the dependent variable with year dummies, 2000-2012. (n=425, with 
1992 as the omitted category)78 
 
                   B   Robust SE   t   Sig.        Beta 
(Constant)   .039704 .006845            5.80    0.000          . 
Year 2000   .104306 .0093814        11.12    0.000**      .2140423 
Year 2004    .243978 .0131889        18.50    0.000**      .4989128 
Year 2008   .4886185 .0137835        35.45    0.000**      .99918  
Year 2012                          .5040033 .0118677        42.47    0.000**    1.034243 
** Sig. p < .01.  
R-squared .7805. 
Adjusted R-squared .778. 
Root MSE .097425.     
 
 Here, as with the bivariate correlations, is observed substantial growth in the 
portion of vote cast nonprecinct for both parties’ candidates over the period observed. 
(The year 1996 was omitted from the equation due to collinearity.) Democratic 
                                                            
77 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
 
78 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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nonprecinct voting peaked in 2008, while Republican nonprecinct voting continued to 
increase through 2012. Each year’s growth is statistically significant.  
TABLE 6.6: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast nonprecinct (2000, 2008, 2012) as the dependent variable with socioeconomic and 
election reform factors as independent variables. (n=279)79 
       
(Constant)     -1.319373     .178483     -7.39   0.000           .              
Democratic commission         -.0599842         .0234235       -2.56    0.011*        -.1258487 
White percentage of VAP       -.0011461        .0007841       -1.46     0.145         -.0807176 
Poverty rate                              .0159323        .0029599         5.38    0.000**       .3317417 
High school graduation rate     .0129741        .0020548         6.31    0.000**       .3443424 
Voters per One Stop site     -2.23e-06        5.45e-07        -4.10    0.000**     -.2093831 
Turnout percentage of VAP     1.265718        .1569356         8.07    0.000**       .4278683 
R-squared .6562 
Adjusted R-squared .647 
Root MSE .1256017 
 
 With the exception of the white percentage of the county’s voting age population, 
all of the socioeconomic and election reform variables are significant here. Turnout 
percentage of voting age population is the strongest factor, indicating that greater turnout 
is associated with greater use of nonprecinct voting. (The same conclusion was reached 
by the equations in Chapter 5, when nonprecinct voting was a significant variable in 
determining turnout rates of both registered voters and voting age population in general.) 
The education and poverty variables are both significant with positive coefficients, 
indicating (as was found earlier) a seemingly paradoxical finding that Democratic 
nonprecinct voting is more likely in counties with both higher education levels and higher 
poverty levels. The ratio of potential voters to One Stop sites was also significant, 
indicating that the relatively greater availability of One Stop voting does in fact 
contribute to the percentage of Democratic vote cast nonprecinct. However, the 
                                                            
79 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. In an equation using registration percentage of VAP instead of turnout 
percentage, registration percentage was not significant. 
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Democratic commission variable has a negative coefficient which indicates that One Stop 
voting is less likely in these counties.  
TABLE 6.7: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast nonprecinct (2000, 2008, 2012) as the dependent variable with socioeconomic and 
election reform factors as independent variables. (n=279)80 
    
       B   Robust SE   t   Sig.  Beta  
(Constant)          -1.30765        .1564843      -8.36     0.000                         
Democratic commission   -.0469985        .0207326       -2.27     0.024*        -.1178305 
White percentage of VAP         .0006277        .0006902        0.91     0.364           .0528271 
Poverty rate         .0138785       .0026467         5.24     0.000**       .3453223 
High school graduation rate      .0132289        .0016372        8.08     0.000**       .4195638 
Voters per One Stop site           -1.86e-06         4.57e-07       -4.06    0.000**      -.2082766 
Turnout percentage of VAP       .8703353        .1299502        6.70    0.000**       .3515778 
R-squared .6170. 
Adjusted R-squared .6072. 
Root MSE .1251. 
 
 The same variables emerge as significant, and as insignificant, in both equations, 
although the education variable is more influential for Republican voters while turnout 
was more influential for Democrats. This equation also presents the seeming paradox of 
greater levels of nonprecinct voting in both better-educated and poorer counties. The ratio 
of potential voters to One Stop sites had almost identically influential effects on 
Democratic and Republican voters, indicating that there is almost no partisan difference 
in voting patterns which results from the relatively greater availability of One Stop 
voting, and party control of the commission produces similar effects for both groups as 
well, indicating that nonprecinct voting for both parties was less widely used in 
Democratic-controlled counties. 
                                                            
80 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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 The next section of the analysis will focus specifically on the elections of 2008 
and 2012, where the data allow for One Stop voting and absentee voting by mail to be 
differentiated. 
TABLE 6.8: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast One Stop (2008-2012) as the dependent variable. (n=177)81 
 
      B  Robust SE   t  Sig.  Beta 
(Constant)     .3143101         .146107          2.15     0.033                         
Democratic commission          .0023243       .0169829          0.14     0.891          .011923 
White percentage of VAP      -.0024445       .0005674         -4.31     0.000**     -.4295912 
Poverty rate     -.0011509       .0020995         -0.55    0.584         -.0581077 
High school graduation rate    .0039313        .0015352         2.56     0.011*        .2199852 
Voters per site                         -2.13e-07         8.07e-07        -0.26    0.792         -.0206141 
Turnout percentage of VAP    .3090712         .1130953        2.73     0.007**       .200582 
R-squared 0.2370. 
Adjusted R-squared .2086. 
Root MSE .08695.           
   
 In this equation, socioeconomic factors are more influential than election reform 
factors. The white percentage of the county’s voting age population is most significant 
and most influential with a negative coefficient, adding further evidence that Democratic 
use of One Stop voting has been most common in counties with larger proportions of 
minority populations. As previously observed, the high school graduation rate and 
turnout rate of voting age population are both significant with positive coefficients, 
indicating that counties with higher education levels see greater use of One Stop voting 
among Democratic voters, and that rates of turnout and nonprecinct voting are positively 
associated with each other. The poverty rate and the ratio of potential voters to One Stop 
sites did not significantly influence the proportion of Democratic vote cast One Stop 
(surprisingly, in the latter case). 
                                                            
81 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 6.9: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast One Stop (2008-2012) as the dependent variable. (n=177)82 
 
     B    Robust SE   t  Sig.          Beta  
(Constant)     -.0154655    .1516974       -0.10     0.919             .            
Democratic commission          .006257           .0191516        0.33     0.744           .0315834 
White percentage of VAP       .0000771         .0005679         0.14     0.892          .0133382 
Poverty rate                             .0010581         .0022569         0.47     0.640          .0525703 
High school graduation rate   .0050724          .0016556         3.06     0.003**      .2793044 
Voters per site   -1.09e-06      9.18e-07     -1.19    0.237         -.1038188 
Turnout percentage of VAP   .1427444    .1252802          1.14    0.256          .0911587 
R-squared .0915. 
Adjusted R-squared .0576. 
Root MSE .09642. 
 
 Here it is observed that Republican voters’ use of One Stop is much less 
responsive to election reform and socioeconomic factors than is true of their Democratic 
counterparts. Only the high school graduation rate was a significant variable in this 
equation, indicating a higher proportion of One Stop voting by Republicans in counties 
with higher education levels, which was also true of Democrats. However, racial and 
turnout factors were not significant for Republican voters as was the case for Democrats. 
Poverty and the relative availability of One Stop sites failed to achieve significance in 
this equation as well. The substantially lower R-squared observed in the Republican 
equation as opposed to the Democratic one also provides evidence that Republicans’ use 
of One Stop voting is far less susceptible than Democrats’ to variation caused by the 
factors being examined. 
 The next section of the analysis explores possible differences in the use of 
absentee voting by mail by Democratic and Republican voters in the elections of 2008 
and 2012. 
                                                            
82 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 6.10: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast absentee by mail (2008-2012) as the dependent variable. (n=177)83 
 
     B  Robust SE   t Sig.       Beta  
 (Constant)     -.0343987       .0296664       -1.16     0.248           .            
Democratic commission           .0022278        .0073576        0.30     0.762          .0360638 
White percentage of VAP        .0001339        .0002048        0.65     0.514           .074277 
Poverty rate                             -.0006694        .0007874       -0.85    0.396         -.1066684 
High school graduation rate     .0005234        .0004128        1.27     0.207          .0924294 
Voters per site                           1.47e-07         3.19e-07        0.46     0.647          .0447508 
Turnout percentage of VAP      .0398233       .0275277        1.45     0.150          .0815607 
R-squared .0959. 
Adjusted R-squared .0564. 
Root MSE .03009. 
 
 It has been established that absentee voting by mail now comprises a substantially 
smaller proportion of nonprecinct voting in North Carolina than does One Stop voting. 
Here, Democratic use of mail voting is not significantly affected by any of the election 
reform or socioeconomic factors which have been included in the analyses presented 
herein. No variables emerge as significant, and the R-squared explains a very small 
proportion of the variance. 
TABLE 6.11: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast absentee by mail (2008-2012) as the dependent variable. (n=177)84 
 
    B  Robust SE  t Sig.  Beta  
(Constant)       .0299544         .0322359        0.93     0.354                         
Democratic commission         -.0096045         .003991         -2.41    0.017*          -.222557 
White percentage of VAP      -.0000367         .000161         -0.23     0.820          -.0291743 
Poverty rate                            -.0008782         .0003469        -2.53    0.012*        -.2002945 
High school graduation rate    .0001441         .0003709         0.39     0.698           .0364229 
Voters per site                          2.93e-07         1.64e-07          1.79     0.076          .1280216 
                                                            
83 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
84 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 6.11 CONTINUED   B   Robust SE   t  Sig.         Beta 
Turnout percentage of VAP   .0497856          .0268341         1.86     0.065          .1459538 
R-squared .2289. 
Adjusted R-squared .1951. 
Root MSE .01941. 
 
 In this equation as well, most of the election reform and socioeconomic variables 
which have been considered in the analysis do not achieve significance here. However, 
Democratic control of the commission and the county’s poverty rate are both significant 
with negative coefficients, indicating that Republican use of mail voting occurs in lower 
rates in Democratic-controlled and poorer counties. 
 The next section of the analysis will examine differences in Democratic and 
Republican voting methods in individual elections, beginning in 2000. 
TABLE 6.12: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast nonprecinct in 2000 as the dependent variable. (n=71)85 
 
  B         Robust SE         t           Sig.           Beta 
(Constant)      -.1151839        .127253        -0.91     0.369           . 
Democratic commission      .0228854        .0173342       1.32      0.191          .1989129 
White percentage of VAP    .0012966        .0006978       1.86      0.068          .3528032 
Turnout percentage of VAP   .0941106         .1890869       0.50      0.620          .0864936 
Poverty rate      .0032923         .0026566      1.24       0.220          .2279832 
High school graduation rate   .000961          .0016293       0.59       0.557          .1018611 
Voters per site    -3.02e-07         2.66e-07      -1.14      0.261        -.1767076 
R-squared 0.1372. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0563. 
Root MSE .05614. 
 
 No variables emerge as significant in this equation, as was seen previously in the 
equation examining overall nonprecinct voting in this election year. 
                                                            
85 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Missing observations are due to a lack of data on 
party control of 27 county commissions, and on the number of One Stop sites in Columbus County. 
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TABLE 6.13: Multivariate regression analysis using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast nonprecinct in 2000 as the dependent variable. (n=71)86 
 
B     Robust SE         t        Sig.                     Beta 
(Constant)      -.2504524      .1104636       -2.27    0.027                        . 
Democratic commission      .01863    .0174386        1.07    0.289             .1600104 
White percentage of VAP    .0012319     .0005372        2.29    0.025*           .3312343 
Turnout percentage of VAP   -.0592008       .1903607       -0.31    0.757            -.0537655 
Poverty rate       .0017196       .0022859         0.75    0.455             .1176697 
High school graduation rate    .0040895       .0016148         2.53    0.014*           .4283329 
Voters per site     3.02e-07        2.78e-07        -1.09     0.281           -.1746587 
* Sig. p < .05. 
R-squared .1978. 
Adjusted R-squared .1226. 
Root MSE .05478. 
 The high school graduation rate and white percentage of the county’s voting age 
population emerge as significant predictors of the proportion of Republican vote cast 
nonprecinct, both with positive coefficients. It would seem, therefore, that in this election 
year, nonprecinct voting was more commonly used among Republicans, and in counties 
with higher levels of education and white population. 
 The next section of the analysis examines voting patterns in the election of 2004, 
for which year data on education and poverty were not available. 
TABLE 6.14: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast nonprecinct in 2004 as the dependent variable. (n=81)87 
   
  B       Robust SE      t          Sig.                   Beta 
(Constant)      -.0085309     .1474058      -0.06       0.954             . 
Democratic commission     .034084       .0424478       0.80        0.425            .1580225 
                                                            
86 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Missing observations are identical to those 
specified in Footnote 85, above. 
 
87 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. Missing observations are due to a lack of data on party control of 18 
county commissions, and separate Election Day and nonprecinct voting totals were not reported by Lee 
County. 
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TABLE 6.14 CONTINUED   B           Robust SE       t  Sig.         Beta   
White percentage of VAP       .001248       .0012757       0.98        0.331            .1897566 
Turnout percentage of VAP     .413778       .1911322        2.16       0.034*           .2273826 
Voters per One Stop site     -8.34e-07     5.38e-07       -1.55       0.125           -.1816856 
* Sig. p < .05. 
R-squared  .1633  
Adjusted R-squared . 1192 
Root MSE  .10183 
 
TABLE 6.15: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast nonprecinct in 2004 as the dependent variable.88 
 
B     Robust SE       t           Sig.                       Beta 
(Constant)         .1157781   .1455332      0.80      0.429                         
Democratic commission        .0205577   .0425366      0.48      0.630                .0891163  
White percentage of VAP          -.0007285   .001421      -0.51      0.610              -.1035769 
Turnout percentage of VAP        .4450253   .2049719     2.17      0.033*              .2286596 
Voters per One Stop site       -5.61e-07    5.83e-07    -0.96      0.339              -.114208   
* Sig. p < .05. 
R-squared  .0809. 
Adjusted R-squared  .0325. 
Root MSE  .11415. 
 In 2004, turnout percentage of voting age population emerges as the only 
significant variable in either equation, with positive coefficients indicating that the 
percentage of both Democratic and Republican vote which is cast nonprecinct increases 
as turnout increases. Chronologically, this is the first time that a significant effect for 
nonprecinct voting is observed. This is also the first election in which absentee voting by 
mail was unrestricted; however, the lack of discrete data on mail voting as distinct from 
One Stop do not allow for conclusions as to the specific effect which mail voting, as 
                                                            
88 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. The data are subject to the same limitations and omissions described in 
Footnote 87, above. 
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opposed to increased use of One stop  may have had on the percentages of vote cast 
nonprecinct in this case.  
 The next section of the analysis will examine the election of 2008, the first 
election in which separate data are available for One Stop voting and voting by mail. 
TABLE 6.16: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast One Stop in 2008 as the dependent variable. (n=68)89 
 
       B             Robust SE      t         Sig.      Beta 
(Constant)        .3526103 .2261854     1.56     0.124  . 
Democratic commission      -.019028 .0290589    -0.65     0.515            -.1173477 
White percentage of VAP     -.002376 .0007309    -3.25     0.002**        -.4848474 
High school graduation rate      .0041329 .0021591     1.91     0.060         .291053 
Poverty rate       -.000052 .0036693    -0.01     0.989            -.0031967 
Voters per One Stop site     -1.53e-06 1.30e-06     -1.17     0.245             -.153464 
Turnout percentage of VAP      .2677801 .1578213     1.70     0.095       .2077282 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .02698 
Adjusted R-squared .1980 
Root MSE .07311. 
 
TABLE 6.17: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast One Stop in 2008 as the dependent variable. (n=68)90 
 
           B           Robust SE        t       Sig.     Beta 
(Constant)          .2223134     .2539142     0.88    0.385            .               
Democratic commission      -.0163033     .0330326    -0.49   0.623           -.0870121 
White percentage of VAP    -.0007629     .0008812    -0.87   0.390           -.1347321 
High school graduation rate        .0033997     .0025423     1.34    0.186           .2071942 
Poverty rate                 -.0008178     .0043081    -0.19    0.850           .0435011 
Voters per One Stop site            -2.34e-06      1.72e-06    -1.36    0.178           -.2033356 
                                                            
89 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Missing observations are due to missing data for 
party control of 13 county commissions, 19 counties for which education and poverty data were 
unavailable, and five counties which did not separately report Election Day and nonprecinct voting (with 
some overlap among the three groups). 
 
90 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. The data are subject to the same limitations and 
omissions described in Footnote 89, above. 
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TABLE 6.17 CONTINUED      B   Robust SE    t        Sig.      Beta  
Turnout percentage of VAP       .1676253      .2017508    0.83    0.409             .1125325 
R-squared .0911. 
Adjusted R-squared .0017. 
Root MSE .0946. 
 
 No variables emerge as significant for Republican use of One Stop voting in this 
election, while only white percentage of voting age population emerges as significant for 
Democratic use of it, with a negative coefficient indicating that counties with higher 
percentages of white population saw lower rates of One Stop voting among Democrats, 
but not Republicans.  
TABLE 6.18: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast absentee by mail in 2008 as the dependent variable. (n=68)91 
          
B         Robust SE          t          Sig.           Beta 
(Constant)     -.0768809        .0467665      -1.64     0.105          . 
Democratic commission      .0108938        .0169054       0.64      0.522          .1264668 
White percentage of VAP    .0001379        .0003153       0.44      0.663          .052972 
High school graduation rate     .0014286        .0007203        1.98      0.052         .1893766 
Poverty rate                -.0010062       .0016598       -0.61      0.547        -.1164241 
Voters per site                            1.07e-06        9.79e-07        1.09      0.278         .2026451 
Turnout percentage of VAP     -.0315137       .0486551       -0.65     0.520        -.0460186 
R-squared  .1372 
Adjusted R-squared .0523 
Root MSE  .04222 
 
TABLE 6.19: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast absentee by mail in 2008 as the dependent variable. (n=68)92 
 
 B  Robust SE          t        Sig.             Beta 
(Constant)      -.03553    .0440361        -0.81    0.423          .  
                                                            
91 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. The data are subject to the same limitations and 
omissions described in Footnote 89, above. 
 
92 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. The data are subject to the same limitations and 
omissions described in Footnote 89, above. 
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TABLE 6.19 CONTINUED    B   Robust SE         t  Sig.        Beta 
Democratic commission           -.0130804    .0060562        -2.16    0.035*      -.2883347 
White percentage of VAP     .0002134       .0002029         1.05    0.297          .1556692 
High school graduation rate       .0010406       .0005576        1.87    0.067           .2619298 
Poverty rate        .0002105      .0005812         0.36    0.718          .0462459 
Voters per site         6.09e-07        2.76e-07         2.21    0.031*        .2186164 
Turnout percentage of VAP     -.0210322       .0437394       -0.48    0.632         -.058317 
R-squared .3285. 
Adjusted R-squared .2625. 
Root MSE . 01962. 
  
 No variables were significant in the equation examining Democratic voters’ use 
of voting by mail, while for the equation examining Republicans, Democratic control of 
the county commission was significant with a negative coefficient, indicating lower 
levels of mail voting for the Republican candidate in these counties. The voters per site 
variable was significant with a positive coefficient, indicating that greater proportions of 
Republican votes are cast by mail in counties where One Stop voting is relatively less 
convenient. It may be that Republican voters, but not Democrats, were significantly 
influenced to vote by mail instead of One Stop in this election if the latter option was less 
accessible. This could be interpreted as a greater preference for mail voting by 
Republicans than by Democrats. 
 The next set of equations will examine the use of One Stop voting and voting by 
mail by different partisans in 2012. 
TABLE 6.20: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast One Stop in 2012 as the dependent variable. (n=100)93 
 
 B            Robust SE        t          Sig.             Beta 
(Constant)       .0385511         .2186728       0.18     0.860           . 
Democratic commission    .0155447         .023001         0.68     0.501           .0741898 
                                                            
93 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 6.20 CONTINUED    B  Robust SE       t  Sig.        Beta 
White percentage of VAP   -.0022243         .0007649     -2.91     0.005**      -.3718787 
High school graduation rate    .0066445         .0024658       2.69     0.008**       .332974 
Poverty rate    .0015482         .0027447       0.56     0.574           .069788 
Voters per site      3.38e-07          9.72e-07       0.35     0.729           .0329204 
Turnout percentage of VAP     .2429347        .1436692        1.69     0.094           .1449073 
R-squared 0.2523  
Adjusted R-squared 0.2041 
Root MSE .09391 
TABLE 6.21: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast One Stop in 2012 as the dependent variable.94 
      B  Robust SE  t Sig.         Beta 
  
(Constant)    -.1206349        .2275481       -0.53     0.597           . 
Democratic commission    .0259443        .0229347         1.13     0.261           .12741 
White percentage of VAP   .0004942        .0007079         0.70     0.487           .0850256 
High school graduation rate  .0055341        .0025086         2.21     0.030*         .2853614 
Poverty rate    .0007829        .0028816         0.27     0.786           .03631 
Voters per site   -5.31e-07          1.12e-06       -0.48     0.635          -.0532555 
Turnout percentage of VAP   .1901508         .1676633         1.13     0.260           .1167073 
R-squared     =  0.1145  
Adjusted R-squared .0574 
Root MSE      =  .09933 
 
 In 2012, the high school graduation rate variable is significant and positive for 
both Democratic and Republican voters, indicating that counties with higher levels of 
education have higher levels of One Stop voting, regardless of candidate preference. As 
was also true in 2008, the white percentage of the county’s voting age population is 
significant and negative for the percentage of Democratic vote cast One Stop, indicating a 
higher proportional use of this option by Democratic voters who are in counties with 
larger percentages of minority populations. No other variables reached significance in 
either equation. The larger R-squared value indicates that more variation is explained by 
these variables in the percentage of Democratic vote cast One Stop than Republican, 
                                                            
94 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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which indicates that Democratic use of this practice may be more volatile while 
Republican One Stop voting is less susceptible to variation according to political or (with 
the exception of education) socioeconomic conditions. 
 The next section of the analysis considers partisan use of voting by mail in 2012. 
TABLE 6.22: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Democratic vote 
cast by mail in 2012 as the dependent variable. (n=100)95 
 
             B            Robust SE       t   Sig.           Beta  
(Constant)    -.0099138       .0516745      -0.19      0.848           . 
Democratic commission -.0032545       .0046539      -0.70      0.486          -.0899244 
White percentage of VAP  .0002279       .0002556       0.89       0.375           .2206091 
High school graduation rate   -.000096         .0005229      -0.18       0.855          -.0278552 
Poverty rate              -.0000994      .0004518      -0.22       0.826          -.0259385 
Voters per One Stop site  -2.41e-07       1.24e-07      -1.95       0.054          -.136223  
Turnout percentage of VAP    .0670608        .0398951      1.68       0.096           .2315815 
R-squared .1344. 
Adj. R-squared .0785. 
Root MSE .01745. 
 
TABLE 6.23: Multivariate regression equation using the percentage of Republican vote 
cast by mail in 2012 as the dependent variable. (n=100)96 
            
        B           Robust SE        t   Sig.      Beta  
(Constant)       0168292       .0498276      0.34      0.736             . 
Democratic commission -.0074492        .0053742    -1.39      0.169            -.1874858 
White percentage of VAP -.0000443        .0002301    -0.19      0.848            -.0390456 
High school graduation rate     .0001352        .0005384     0.25      0.802             .0357194 
Poverty rate              -.000706          .0004851    -1.46      0.149            -.1678121 
Voters per One Stop site           1.76e-07        1.66e-07      1.06       0.293             .0902905 
Turnout percentage of VAP     .0657403       .0375545      1.75       0.083             .2067888 
R-squared .1491 
Adj. R-squared .0942 
Root MSE .019. 
  
                                                            
95 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
96 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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 No variables were significant in either of these equations, indicating that the use 
of mail voting by either party’s supporters is not greatly affected by any of the variables 
of interest. As has been previously stated herein, this may be an artifact of the declining 
use of mail voting, as opposed to Election Day or One Stop voting, in North Carolina. 
While the Republican mail voting equation for 2008 showed more significant variation 
than did the Democratic, the partisan difference appears to have vanished by 2012. 
 The next section of the analysis will examine possible differences in Democratic 
and Republican use of Same Day Registration in 2008 and 2012. The dependent variable 
is the difference between the percentages in change from the previous election in 
Democratic and Republican registration, respectively, produced by SDR. 
TABLE 6.24: Multivariate regression equations using differences in use of Same Day 
Registration between registered Democrats and registered Republicans, 2008 and 2012, 
as the dependent variable.97 
 
Year 2008 (n=68)   B            Robust SE   t            Sig.          Beta 
(Constant)               -.0039766       .0242412           -0.16      0.870                  .    
Democratic commission        -.0078187       .0031792           -2.46      0.017*     -.316146 
White percentage of VAP      -.0005102       .0001309           -3.90      0.000**  -.6826215 
High school graduation rate    .0003063       .0002886            1.06       0.293       .1414245 
Poverty rate                             .0004455       .0003892           -1.14       0.257     -.1795327 
Registered percentage VAP    .0402242       .0164902            2.44       0.018*     .2439035 
Voters per site               2.82e-07         1.75e-07           1.62       0.111       .1859776 
One Stop percentage of vote  -.0007468       .0182346           -0.04      0.967     -.0054401 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .3499. 
Adjusted R-squared .2741. 
Root MSE .01061. 
 
Year 2012 (n=100)                 B          Robust SE t Sig.              Beta       
(Constant)        .0039362     .0157552         0.25       0.803                         
Democratic commission          -.0023073     .0014099        -1.64      0.105         -.171636 
White percentage of VAP       -.0001996     .0000526        -3.80      0.000**      -.5202106 
High school graduation rate     .0000116     .0001943          0.06      0.953           .0090369 
                                                            
97 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
County Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE 6.24 CONTINUED      B           Robust SE t  Sig.          Beta  
Poverty rate                              .0001239     .000243            0.51      0.611           .0870532 
Registered percentage of VAP .0132744     .0126159          1.05      0.295           .1488636 
Voters per site                           9.44e-08     6.29e-08           1.50      0.137           .1434203 
One Stop percentage of vote    -.0037222     .008403          -0.44      0.659          -.0554379 
* Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared .2459. 
Adjusted R-squared .1885. 
Root MSE .00608. 
 
Both years (n=168)           B                Robust SE        t              Sig.          Beta 
(Constant)                                 .0245677     .013086          1.88       0.062  
Democratic commission    -.004191       .0017704       -2.37      0.019*          -.205852 
White percentage of VAP       -.0003545     .0000663       -5.35       0.000**       -.5964979 
High school graduation rate    -.000079      .0001765        -0.45      0.655            -.0423417 
Poverty rate                -.0005153    .0002164       -2.38       0.018*          -.2491432 
Registered percentage of VAP .0255092    .0112355         2.27       0.025*           .1889581 
Voters per site                          1.54e-07      8.79e-08         1.76       0.081             .1430412 
One Stop percentage of vote    .0001761     .00923            0.02       0.985             .0016645 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01.       
R-squared .2140. 
Adjusted R-squared .1796. 
Root MSE .00925. 
 
 The most significant and influential variables observed here are socioeconomic 
rather than those related to election reform. The Democratic advantage in SDR is lowest 
in counties with higher percentages of white voting age population. In 2008 and for the 
overall model, but not for 2012, Democratic commission control is significant with a 
negative coefficient, indicating an even lower Democratic advantage in counties with 
Democratic commissions. In 2008 and for the overall model, but not for 2012, the 
registered percentage of voting age population is significant with a positive coefficient. 
However, it does not appear that Democrats use SDR significantly differently than do 
Republicans. Hypothesis Five is therefore not supported.                  
Nonprecinct voting, in particular One Stop, has substantially increased for all 
groups of voters in North Carolina in the past five presidential elections. Hypothesis Six 
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predicted that Democratic voters would take substantially greater advantage of these 
opportunities than their Republican counterparts. It appears that Democrats have 
increased their use of One Stop voting to a greater extent than Republicans. While the 
raw numbers appear to indicate that mail voting has grown more among Republican 
voters than among Democrats, a statistically significant difference between partisans’ use 
of it cannot be established. Hypothesis Six is therefore supported with respect to One 
Stop voting, but not with respect to mail voting. 
 Thus far, the present research has examined the effects of the availability of easier 
registration and voting on overall levels of registration and turnout; the extent to which 
these reforms may be differentially implemented according to partisan control of the 
county commission; and the extent to which adherents of the different parties choose to 
utilize these reforms differently. The next chapter, the final chapter of findings, will 
examine the final effect of these reforms: To what extent have they affected the actual 
outcome of presidential elections in North Carolina? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: PARTISAN EFFECTS OF ELECTION REFORM 
 
 
The preceding chapters have examined the effects of election reform on 
participation, including registration and turnout, and differences in the use of these 
reforms by partisan groups and in different partisan contexts. This chapter will explore 
the political effects of election reform, with particular attention to how the use of same 
day registration and One Stop voting affected the results in 2008 and 2012. As has been 
stated previously, Barack Obama very narrowly won North Carolina in 2008, becoming 
the first Democratic presidential candidate to carry the state in 32 years. Although he 
failed to carry North Carolina in his 2012 re-election bid, Obama’s showing still 
improved upon those of the Democratic candidates in the earlier period examined by this 
study. This chapter will examine the extent to which election reform contributed to 
Obama’s victory, and has made the state more politically competitive in presidential 
elections in general. 
The partisan effects of election reform will be examined using the Democratic 
presidential candidate’s vote share as a dependent variable. The analysis begins with a 
series of bivariate correlations between Democratic vote share and various factors related 
to registration, turnout and voting. The first bivariate analyses present the correlations 
with individual election years, and with the county’s socioeconomic and election reform 
characteristics. 
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TABLE 7.1: Bivariate correlations of Democratic vote share with election year and with 
election reform and socioeconomic characteristics, 1992-2012. 98 
            Sig. N 
Year 1992         .019 .649 100 
Year 1996         .037 .360 100 
Year 2000                             -.032    .433 100 
Year 2004                   -.083    .041*   100 
Year 2008         .067 .102 100 
Year 2012                             -.008  .855 100 
Democratic commission       .670 .000** 335 
White percentage of voting age population     -.375    .000** 600 
Registered percentage of voting age population     .105 .010** 600 
Turnout percentage of registered voters               -.143  .000** 600 
Turnout percentage of voting age population                  -.008 .840 600 
High school graduation rate                                                               -.036 .544 281 
Poverty rate         .491 .000** 281 
Voters per One Stop site              -.126 .012* 401 
Percentage of vote cast nonprecinct      .128 .008** 425 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
 
 The year variables are not significant except for 2004, but the direction of the 
signs over time simply indicates the Democratic candidate’s relative fortunes in each 
successive election: positive (but unsuccessful) in 1996, reflecting the closeness of 
Clinton’s loss in the state that year; positive in 2008, reflecting Obama’s win; and 
negative in the other years, reflecting the respective losses of Gore, Kerry, and Obama’s 
re-election bid. The strongest correlation, not surprisingly, is that between Democratic 
vote share and Democratic control of the county commission, given that voters who 
choose a Democrat for one office are more likely to choose a Democrat for another. The 
poverty rate is also moderate, positive and significant, indicating a higher Democratic 
vote share in poorer counties. The white percentage of the county’s voting age population 
is moderately, negatively and significantly correlated with Democratic vote share, 
indicating that counties with higher proportions of nonwhite voters are more likely to 
                                                            
98 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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support Democrats. The percentage of vote cast nonprecinct and the ratio of potential 
voters to One Stop sites are both significant and in the expected direction; it has been 
observed herein that Democrats take greater advantage of nonprecinct voting, that the 
greater relative availability of One Stop voting makes nonprecinct voting more likely, 
and that Democratic counties are more likely to make these resources available. 
Education level is not a significant correlate with Democratic vote share. 
 The correlations with registration and turnout statistics provide an interesting 
contrast. The registered percentage of voting age population is significantly and 
positively correlated with Democratic vote share, while the turnout of registered voters is 
significantly and negatively correlated with it, and there is no significant correlation with 
turnout of VAP. It would appear that counties with higher Democratic vote shares have 
larger proportions of registered voters, but lower turnout rates among those who are 
registered. Registration, not turnout, would seem to be the primary obstacle for 
Democratic voters in these counties.  
 The next section of the analysis presents correlations between Democratic vote 
share and percentage of registration change: 
TABLE 7.2: Bivariate correlations between Democratic vote share and registration 
change since previous presidential election, 1996-2012. 99 
Sig. N 
Democratic         .253 .000** 500 
Republican                                                     .074 .097 500 
Unaffiliated/Other        .175 .000** 500 
White                   -.149 .001** 500 
Black                                                 -.056 .215 497100 
Total                                                                -.050    .265     500 
  
                                                            
99 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
100 Graham County is excluded during the elections when there was a single black registered voter there. 
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TABLE 7.3: Bivariate correlations between Democratic vote share and registration 
change produced by Same Day Registration, 2008-2012. 101 
          Sig.    N 
Democratic            .459   .000**    200  
Republican         .319   .000**    200 
Unaffiliated/Other                                                    .125   .077   200 
White                                                      .268   .000**   200 
Black                                                                -.013   .856   200  
Total                                                      .371   .000**   200 
** Sig. p < .01. 
 
  With respect to the percentage change over four years, it is not surprising to find a 
significant, positive correlation between change in Democratic registration and the 
Democratic candidate’s vote share, although the absence of a countervailing negative 
correlation with Republican registration is notable. There are also significant correlations 
between Democratic vote share and four-year registration change among unaffiliated 
voters (positive) and white voters (negative). The total four-year registration change 
produces no significant correlation with Democratic vote share.  
The percentage change produced by Same Day Registration produces different 
results. The correlation with Democratic registration is again positive (and stronger), 
while the correlation with white voters changes its sign from negative to positive. The 
correlation with Republican registration goes from insignificant to significant (and 
positive), while the correlations with unaffiliated and total voters do the opposite. There 
is no significant correlation with black registration change in either case. It is noteworthy 
that the Democratic vote share is positively correlated with both Democratic and 
Republican registration change produced by SDR, indicating that the existence of SDR 
                                                            
101 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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may benefit Democrats regardless of the partisanship of the voters who choose this 
option. 
The next section of the analysis explores the correlations between Democratic 
vote share and voting method. The percentage of vote cast on Election Day covers the 
entire five-election period examined; the percentage of vote cast nonprecinct in those 
cases produces correlations of exactly identical strength and significance, and opposite 
direction. The 2008 and 2012 elections are categorized by separate categories for One 
Stop and absentee by mail. 
TABLE 7.4: Bivariate correlations with Democratic vote share and voting method, 1996-
2012. 102 
                     Sig. N 
Percentage of Democratic vote cast on Election Day                          -.137 .005** 425  
Percentage of Republican vote cast on Election Day                          -.075 .122 425   
Percentage of Democratic vote cast One Stop (2008-2012)                .438  .000** 196  
Percentage of Republican vote cast One Stop (2008-2012)                 .095 .186 196  
Percentage of Democratic vote cast by mail (2008-12)                      -.051 .476 196   
Percentage of Republican vote cast by mail (2008-12)                       -.052 .472 196   
Voters per One Stop site                                                                     -.126 .012* 401 
 
 Of greatest interest here are the moderate, positive, significant correlation 
between the Democratic vote share and the percentage of those votes which were cast 
One Stop in 2008 and 2012, and the weak, negative, significant correlation between 
Democratic vote share and the percentage of those votes cast on Election Day over the 
course of the five elections from 1996 to 2012. There are no countervailing correlations 
in the opposite direction for Republican voting method. This demonstrates the relative 
volatility of Democratic vote share, compared to Republican, as a result of the increased 
availability of nonprecinct voting, in particular One Stop voting in 2008 and 2012. While 
                                                            
102 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
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the presence of other candidates on the ballot, and the ability to write in a candidate who 
did not qualify for the ballot, do not make the voter’s choice entirely binary, the 
Republican vote share can effectively be interpreted as the inverse of the Democratic vote 
share. It does not appear that the Republican percentage of the vote is affected by the 
method in which it is case, since the variables related to Republican vote by method do 
not produce significant results.  
The relative availability of One Stop voting is also significantly correlated with 
Democratic vote share, with the expected negative correlation with the ratio of potential 
voters per site indicating that an easier opportunity to vote One Stop increases the 
percentage of the Democratic vote which is cast by that method. Reflecting the 
decreasing use of the mail voting option in North Carolina during the period examined, 
there is no significant correlation between Democratic vote share and either party’s 
percentage of vote cast by mail. As has been previously observed in this work, few North 
Carolinians now choose to vote by mail, even in the absence of an excuse requirement; 
the overwhelming majority of votes are cast in person, whether at a One Stop site or at a 
polling place on Election Day. 
The next section of the analysis will apply multivariate regression using the 
Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote as the dependent variable, using election 
years as dummy variables and then using election reform and socioeconomic variables. 
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TABLE 7.5: Multivariate regression analysis using Democratic percentage of vote as the 
dependent variable, and year dummies as independent variables. (n=600, with 1992 as the 
omitted category)103 
 
B  Robust SE     t   Sig.         Beta 
(Constant)                           .4447              .009435 47.13 0.000         .    
Year 1996                          .0047              .0139662   0.34 0.737         .0162245 
Year 2000   -.0124   .01422  -0.87 0.384        -.0428049 
Year 2004   -.0243              .0140895  -1.72 0.085        -.0838839 
Year 2008                          .0113              .0146979   0.77 0.442         .0390077 
Year 2012                         -.0063              .0155707    -0.40 0.686        -.0217477 
R-squared .0116 
Adjusted R-squared .004. 
Root MSE .10779. 
 
 In this equation, no individual year variable reaches significance. This is likely 
due to the relatively small variation in Democratic vote share over the elections 
examined, as illustrated in particular by the extremely small adjusted R-squared. 
TABLE 7.6: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic vote share as the 
dependent variable with socioeconomic and election reform factors as independent 
variables (2000, 2008, 2012). (n=280)104 
                   
  B  Robust SE             t     Sig.   Beta 
(Constant)                .6114541 .0665975     9.18   0.000        . 
White percentage of VAP   -.0058095 .0002899  -20.04   0.000**   -.8605587 
Poverty rate               -.0000288 .0010134    -0.03   0.977       -.0012204 
High school graduation rate   .0018829 .0007245     2.60   0.010**    .1079222   
Voters per One Stop site           -8.29e-08  1.36e-07    -0.61   0.542       -.0155264 
Turnout percentage of VAP   .2391873 .0615641      3.89  0.000**    .1721015 
R-squared .7166. 
Adjusted R-squared .710. 
Standard error of the estimate .06161. 
 
                                                            
103 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
104 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
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 The county’s white percentage of voting age population is by far the strongest 
(negative) influence on Democratic vote share, substantially exceeding any other 
socioeconomic factors or election-related variables. Turnout of voting age population is 
also significant with a positive coefficient, indicating a Democratic benefit from 
increased turnout, but the ratio of potential voters to One Stop sites is not significant, 
which indicates that the relative availability of One Stop voting is not necessarily a 
factor; increased turnout benefits Democrats by whatever method the vote is cast. The 
high school graduation rate is also significant and positive, indicating a higher 
Democratic vote share in counties with higher average levels of education. The county’s 
poverty rate is not a significant variable in this equation. 
The next model introduces additional variables representing various aspects of 
partisanship and election reform, including nonprecinct voting, party control of the 
county commission, and the effects of Same Day Registration. 
TABLE 7.7: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic vote share as the 
dependent variable with additional socioeconomic and election reform factors as 
independent variables (2000, 2008, 2012). (n=280)105 
 
B             Robust SE   t Sig.             Beta 
(Constant)             -.0355006 .1100254        -0.32    0.747 .   
Democratic commission        .0656773 .0103581 6.34 0.000**       .2743977 
White percentage of VAP     -.0036509 .0004108        -8.89 0.000**      -.524682 
Poverty rate              .0042176 .0011942 3.53 0.001**       .1731245 
High school graduation rate   .0041593 .0008431 4.93 0.000**       .1947194 
Voters per One Stop site 1.10e-06 3.80e-07 2.90 0.004**       .0868019 
Nonprecinct percent of vote .1070762 .0430674 2.49 0.014*         .0802157 
Net change from SDR             1.445178 .3569094 4.05 0.000**       .1559705 
Turnout percentage of VAP .3581093 .0607584 5.89 0.000**       .1894241 
* Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
                                                            
105 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Election. 
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TABLE 7-7 CONTINUED 
R-squared. 8383. 
Adjusted R-squared .8304. 
Root MSE .0494. 
 
 All of the variables included in this equation achieve significance. While the 
white percentage of the county’s voting age population remains the strongest (negative) 
influence on Democratic vote share, its effect is substantially diminished from that seen 
in the previous equation. Democratic control of the county commission has, 
unsurprisingly, the strongest positive influence, while each of the other variables also 
affects Democratic vote share. Positive effects are observed from the additional 
socioeconomic variables, related to education and poverty, which once again produce the 
seemingly paradoxical finding that Democratic vote share is highest in both counties with 
the highest levels of education and those with the highest levels of poverty. The election 
variables related to registration, turnout, and the use of nonprecinct voting are also 
significant with positive coefficients. The relative availability of One Stop voting, as seen 
in the ratio of potential voters to sites, is unexpectedly positive; this may be an artifact of 
a greater Democratic vote share in larger counties, with larger populations served by 
proportionately fewer One Stop sites. The extremely high R-squared and adjusted R-
squared values indicate that this equation explains a substantial majority of the variance 
in Democratic vote share over the course of the elections examined; on the whole, both 
socioeconomic and election-related factors can be seen to play a substantial role in 
determining levels of support for the Democratic candidate. 
An analysis of turnout patterns reveals that One Stop voting now accounts for the 
overwhelming majority of non-precinct voting (and, in 2008 and 2012, a majority of the 
votes cast in the state overall), while it appears that removing the restrictions on absentee 
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voting by mail has produced little effect on its frequency of use. However, a longitudinal 
analysis of this is hampered by the lack of consistently separate data for One Stop and 
absentee voting in 2000 and 2004. It can be established that most nonprecinct voting in 
1996 was absentee by mail, and most in 2008 and 2012 was One Stop, but the lack of 
intermediate data makes it impossible to illustrate the trend of change with any reliability. 
The analysis will now turn to a series of multivariate regression equations 
examining the Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote in each individual election. 
As has been stated in previous chapters, it was not possible to construct a single equation 
incorporating the year, election and socioeconomic variables due to collinearity issues 
resulting from missing observations of some data.106 
TABLE 7.8: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic candidate’s percentage 
of vote in 1992 as the dependent variable. (n=100)107 
    
              B                  Robust SE      t       Sig.               Beta 
(Constant)                .6594033       .0332421    19.84   0.000**          .               
White percentage of VAP   -.537472         .0335007   -16.04   0.000**         -.9216615 
Turnout percentage of VAP .3964041       .0624348      6.35    0.000**          .3231255 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared  0.6539. 
Adjusted R-squared  0.6468. 
Root MSE .05607. 
 
 Both variables used in this equation achieve significance. The white percentage of 
voting age population is the most influential (and negative), while the turnout percentage 
of voting age population has a positive coefficient, indicating that a higher proportion of 
turnout in these counties benefits Democratic candidates. 
                                                            
106 Democratic control of the county commission was not used as a variable in these equations due to high 
collinearity with the dependent variable. 
107 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
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TABLE 7.9: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic candidate’s percentage 
of vote in 1996 as the dependent variable. (n=100)108 
 
             B                 Robust SE       t      Sig.     Beta  
 (Constant)                .7468179     .0375918     19.87    0.000              .               
White percentage of VAP   -.0056653     .0003405    -16.64    0.000**         -.9050587 
Turnout percentage of VAP .3161146      .0844433      3.74     0.000**          .2018507 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared 0.6996. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6934. 
Root MSE .05701. 
  
 As is the case with the previous equation, both of the variables used achieve 
significance, and in the same direction. The Democratic percentage of the vote is again 
substantially lower in counties with higher percentages of white voting age population, 
while higher turnout benefits the Democrat, although to a lesser extent than in 1992, 
which likely reflects the lower overall turnout in the 1996 election than in its predecessor. 
 The next equation introduces the election reform and socioeconomic data 
variables which were not available for the previous elections. 
TABLE 7.10: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic candidate’s percentage 
of vote in 2000 as the dependent variable. (n=100)109 
B  Robust SE  t           Sig.        Beta 
 (Constant)        .3917724         .1351157       2.90     0.005                         
White percentage of VAP -.0053449         .0004787   -11.16     0.000**       -.8363989 
Turnout percentage of VAP  .3577485         .090138         3.97     0.000**        .1998734 
Poverty rate        .006278           .0020636      3.04      0.003**        .2537916 
High school graduation rate    .0024031          .001252        1.92     0.058             .1419717 
Nonprecinct percent of vote    .1015954          .0853793     1.19      0.237             .059689 
                                                            
108 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. 
109 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. The variable representing the ratio of potential 
voters to the number of One Stop sites was omitted from this equation, because it resulted in a missing 
observation for Columbus County, for which the number of sites used in this election could not be 
determined from the available data. When included in the equation (n=99), the VPS variable was 
insignificant.  
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TABLE 7.10 CONTINUED 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared     =  0.7706. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7584.  
Root MSE      =  .05229. 
 
 A similar pattern to the previous election is observed with respect to race and 
turnout. The county’s poverty rate also works to the Democratic candidate’s benefit, as 
seen by its positive coefficient. The education variable is not significant here. The 
percentage of vote cast nonprecinct is also not significant, indicating that in the first 
election where One Stop voting was universally available, its use did not substantially 
affect the Democratic candidate’s fortunes. This can also be interpreted to mean that, in 
this election, there is not yet a divergence between Democratic and Republican voters’ 
choices of voting method. 
TABLE 7.11: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic candidate’s percentage 
of vote in 2004 as the dependent variable. (n=99)110 
 
B  Robust SE   t  Sig.          Beta 
(Constant)        .5480242     .0562352        9.75     0.000            .                   
White percentage of VAP      -.0056486         .0004032     -14.01     0.000**      -.9167803 
Turnout percentage of VAP     .5705672        .1338189         4.26     0.000**       .3435562 
Nonprecinct percent of vote    .0121982        .0754036         0.16      0.872           .0138189 
** Sig. p < .01. 
R-squared 0.6607. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6500.  
Root MSE .06219. 
 
 The racial and turnout variables produce the same results in this election as have 
been previously observed, with higher Democratic percentages observed in counties with 
                                                            
110 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections 
and county Boards of Elections. Education and poverty data were not available for this election year, and 
Lee County did not separately report Election Day and nonprecinct votes. The Voters per Site variable was 
included in the original model, but was insignificant and was subsequently removed. 
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lower proportions of white population and higher proportions of voter turnout. Here 
again, the percentage of vote cast nonprecinct does not significantly affect the 
Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote. While this was the first election in which 
absentee voting by mail was available without restriction (and, as previously noted, in 
which it was used most frequently among the elections examined), it does not appear that 
nonprecinct voting (whether One Stop or by mail) influenced the partisan outcome.  
TABLE 7.12: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic candidate’s percentage 
of vote in 2008 as the dependent variable. (n=80)111 
 
                                 B                  Robust SE        t          Sig.  Beta 
 (Constant)                -.0589045         .1783634      -0.33        0.742                         
White percentage of VAP     -.0043872          .0006929      -6.33       0.000**      -.656554 
High school graduation rate   .0050947          .0013546        3.76       0.000**      .2641218 
Poverty rate      .005412            .0020742        2.61      0.011*         .2348507 
Voters per One Stop site         7.41e-07           7.90e-07        0.94       0.351          .054137 
Nonprecinct percent of vote   .0903768          .0776678        1.16       0.248          .0774778 
Turnout percentage of VAP   .453643            .1118172        4.06       0.000**      .2440212 
SDR registration change    .7919449         .7438547        1.06        0.291          .0835828 
Sig. p < .05; ** sig. p < .01. 
R-squared     =  0.7637. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7407. 
Root MSE      =  .05717. 
 
In this election, the white percentage of voting age population continues to 
negatively affect the Democratic vote percentage, but to a lesser extent than was observed 
in previous elections. Turnout percentage continues to work to the Democratic 
candidate’s favor, as do the education and poverty variables, all significant with positive 
coefficients. The election reform variables do not, however, have a significant effect 
                                                            
111 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. Lee County did not separately report Election Day 
and nonprecinct votes in this election, and education and poverty data were unavailable for 19 counties. 
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here; neither the net change in registration caused by SDR, nor the ratio of potential 
voters to One Stop sites, appears to have partisan implications.  
TABLE 7.13: Multivariate regression equation using Democratic candidate’s percentage 
of vote in 2012 as the dependent variable. (n=100)112 
          
B      Robust SE         t          Sig.                    Beta 
(Constant)        .0568214   .1633598          0.35      0.729                         
White percentage of VAP -.0054542   .0004253       -12.82      0.000**         -.7749934 
High school graduation rate    .0055441    .001503          3.69        0.000**          .2361164 
Poverty rate     .0046342    .0016722         2.77        0.007**          .1775297 
Turnout percentage of VAP     .3233032   .0874182         3.70       0.000**           .1638929 
One Stop percentage of vote   .1421295    .0505244         2.81       0.006**           .1154246 
R-squared     =  0.8036. 
Adjusted R-squared =  0.7931. 
Root MSE      =  .05634. 
 
 All variables are significant in this equation, and explain a substantial majority of 
variation in the Democratic vote share. The white percentage of the county’s voting age 
population continues to negatively affect the Democratic candidate’s percentage, while 
turnout, percentage of vote cast One Stop, education and poverty are all significant with 
positive coefficients, indicating that each of these factors adds to that percentage. This is 
the only election among those examined for which complete data were available for all of 
the variables used in the equation, and thus this equation arguably provides the most 
accurate model available for examining the effect of each of these factors on the subject 
in question. 
 Hypothesis Seven posited that Same Day Registration, increased availability of 
One Stop voting, and the unrestricted availability of absentee voting would benefit the 
Democratic candidate to a greater extent than the Republican candidate. The 2008 model 
                                                            
112 Analysis conducted by the author using data provided by the North Carolina State Board of Elections, 
county Boards of Elections, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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indicates that, contrary to expectations, SDR did not have a significant effect on Obama’s 
vote share in the state; nonprecinct voting in general and the relative availability of One 
Stop voting had no effect on Democratic vote share throughout the elections examined, 
although the percentage of vote cast One Stop did significantly and positively affect 
Democratic vote share in 2012. Therefore, Hypothesis Seven is not supported except with 
respect to the use of One Stop voting in 2012. 
 The final chapter of the work will tie together the various aspects of election 
reform which have been individually examined here, and will examine the effects of 
different factors (socioeconomic, political and structural) on the process of registration 
and voting as a whole. Chapter Eight will also consider the implications of the legislation 
enacted in August 2013 which repeals or significantly curtails the availability of many of 
the reforms considered here.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 This dissertation intended to answer the following research question: What effects 
have election reforms, specifically no-excuse One Stop early voting, no-excuse absentee 
voting by mail, and same day voter registration, had on participation in, and the results 
of, presidential elections in North Carolina? Legal-institutional theory, the theoretical 
basis of the present work, argues that nonparticipation by potential voters is due primarily 
to structural factors such as barriers to registration and to voting itself. The reforms 
enacted in North Carolina since 1999 have reduced many of those barriers. A potential 
voter no longer needs to visit his or her assigned polling place during a thirteen-hour time 
period on a particular weekday in November in order to participate; no longer needs an 
excuse to vote absentee by mail; and, until same day registration was repealed in 2013, 
no longer needed to register 25 days in advance of the election, but was able to do so in a 
single step – “One Stop” – while voting early. If the legal-institutional theory is correct, 
significant increases in participation should have resulted from the implementation of 
these reforms. The present work has found this to be generally true in North Carolina. 
Participation in presidential elections has increased as these reforms have been 
implemented, even controlling for the substantial growth in the state’s population during 
the time period examined. 
 The dissertation examines the presidential elections of 1996 (pre-reform), 2000 
(the first with widely available One Stop voting), 2004 (the first when an excuse was not 
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necessary to vote absentee by mail), 2008 (the first when it was possible to register and 
vote in a single step during the early voting period), and 2012 (the second election with 
all three reforms in place). It operationalizes an examination of the theory through a 
series of Ordinary Least Squares regression equations whose dependent variables were 
the percentage of vote cast nonprecinct (and specifically cast One Stop and by mail in 
2008 and 2012); registration of voting age population; turnout of registered voters; 
turnout of voting age population; Democratic and Republican percentages of vote cast 
nonprecinct; and the Democratic presidential candidate’s share of the vote in each 
election. The primary independent variables represent population characteristics (white 
percentage of voting age population, percentage of the county’s population under the 
poverty line, and percentage of those 25 and older who are high school graduates), as 
well as variables designed to operationalize the various aspects of election reform: the net 
effect of same day registration as a percentage of the county’s total number of registrants, 
and the number of potential voters per One Stop site as a measure of the convenience and 
relative availability of One Stop voting in a particular county, with a smaller number of 
voters per site indicating relatively greater convenience and accessibility. Robust 
standard errors were utilized to correct for heteroskedasticity, and the Durbin-Watson test 
for autocorrelation was used with the time series models. Each of these equations and 
findings will be discussed in turn. 
 Also of concern to the present work is the issue of resources devoted to the 
implementation of reform. While the laws regarding registration and voting are uniform 
throughout the state, elections are administered at the county level and funded by partisan 
county commissions. At the time of its enactment, One Stop voting, in particular, was 
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perceived by both Democratic and Republican partisans as benefiting the Democratic 
Party and its candidates and voters. Therefore, it might be expected that Democratic-
controlled county commissions would devote a greater share of resources to the 
implementation of One Stop voting in order to maximize their party’s advantage, while 
their Republican counterparts would devote less resources in order to make One Stop 
voting relatively less convenient and minimize the perceived Democratic advantage 
resulting from it. The effects of partisan commission control on the implementation of 
early voting were operationalized in the form of a variable denoting Democratic party 
control of the county commission (where such information could be obtained).  
This, the concluding chapter of the work, will begin with a review of the 
hypotheses previously stated in Chapter Three, and a report of the findings with respect 
to each. It will then discuss the importance of these findings to public policy, and make 
policy recommendations. 
Hypothesis One: Counties with Democratic control of the commission will devote 
greater resources to facilitate nonprecinct voting than other counties, in the form of more 
early voting sites than those with Republican-controlled commissions (during the years in 
which early voting is considered). Hypothesis 1A: This will produce greater use of 
nonprecinct voting in these counties. This was tested with a multivariate analysis using 
the percentage of vote cast nonprecinct as the dependent variable, and Democratic 
commission control as an independent variable. The bivariate analysis indicated a 
significant negative correlation between Democratic control of the county commission 
and the numbers of potential voters per One Stop site, indicating a greater commitment to 
One Stop voting in Democratic counties, but commission control did not consistently 
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emerge as a significant predictor of the percentage of vote cast nonprecinct, and was not a 
significant predictor of the use of same day registration or of turnout of either registered 
voters or voting age population. Although differences in partisan use of alternative voting 
methods were detected, party control of the commission was not a significant influence in 
that case. Democratic commission control did emerge as a significant predictor of 
registered percentage of voting age population, with a positive coefficient indicating a 
greater percentage registered in those counties, but this did not translate into significantly 
greater turnout. Socioeconomic factors, most predominantly education level, were more 
consistently significant than party control in predicting the use of nonprecinct voting. 
(Absentee voting by mail was not considered as a separate category here. The assumption 
is that any county will make an absentee ballot available to any voter who requests it, 
regardless of party control of the commission. The production and mailing out of 
absentee ballots does not require a funding commitment on the level of opening and 
maintaining One Stop voting sites throughout the early voting period.) Hypothesis One is 
therefore supported, but Hypothesis 1A is not supported.  
Hypothesis Two: The availability of same day registration will significantly 
increase voter registration. This was tested with a multivariate regression using registered 
percentage of voting age population as the dependent variable and the percentage of 
registrants who used SDR as an independent variable. The bivariate analysis found no 
significant correlation between same day registration and the percentage of voting age 
population who are registered. There was a significant negative correlation observed 
between same day registration as a percentage of the county’s total registration, and the 
percentage of those who are registered. This would seem to be a preliminary indication 
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that SDR has had a greater effect in counties with lower existing registration levels, but 
that it has not served to close the gap in registration between these counties and those 
with higher existing percentages of eligible voters who are actually registered.   
The bivariate analysis found weak, significant, positive correlations between 
turnout percentage of registered voters and percentages of various groups (Democrats, 
unaffiliated and white) who are same day registrants (and thus automatically One Stop 
voters), indicating that SDR has served to slightly increase turnout among these groups. 
However, in the multivariate analysis, SDR (as a percentage of total registrants) did not 
emerge as a significant variable in predicting registered percentage of VAP.  The 
education variable was the most consistently significant and influential, indicating that 
socioeconomic factors are again more important in predicting voter participation than the 
effect of this particular reform which is designed to make registration and voting easier. 
The relative availability of One Stop voting was also not a significant factor in predicting 
registered percentage of VAP. Hypothesis Two is therefore not supported. (The potential 
effects of the 2013 repeal of SDR will be discussed below.) 
Hypothesis Three: The availability of same day registration, One Stop voting and 
no-excuse absentee voting by mail will significantly increase turnout of registered voters. 
This hypothesis is not supported. While registration and turnout have increased in North 
Carolina, this trend is observable throughout the time period examined, including the pre-
reform era. Election reform may have added to this trend, but there is no evidence that 
Same Day Registration, One Stop voting, or absentee voting by mail were significantly 
responsible for it. 
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Hypothesis Four: The availability of same day registration, One Stop voting, and 
no-excuse absentee voting by mail will significantly increase turnout of voting age 
population. This hypothesis is not supported, for the same reasons discussed in the 
previous paragraph with respect to Hypothesis Three. 
Hypothesis Five: The availability of same day registration will increase 
Democratic registration to a significantly greater degree than Republican registration, 
Although Democratic registration increased to a markedly greater degree than did 
Republican due to SDR in 2008, Democratic SDR also declined by a much sharper 
degree in 2012. The bivariate analysis indicated no overall significant difference between 
Democratic and Republican patterns or percentages of registration using SDR (although 
the effects on turnout by the two groups are different, as will be discussed below). The 
Democratic pattern of use of SDR appears to be more volatile than the Republican, but 
the net effect appears to be essentially the same for the two groups. Partisan control of the 
commission is significantly correlated with the percentage of registrants who are 
affiliated with each party, but the effect is not greater for one party than the other. The 
multivariate analysis indicated that year 2008 (positive coefficient) and white percentage 
of voting age population (negative coefficient) were the most significant variables in 
determining the percentage of voters who are same day registrants. Election reform 
factors, such as the relative availability of One Stop voting (which is necessary for SDR) 
were not significant. Hypothesis Five is therefore not supported.  
Hypothesis Six: Different partisan groups will differentially use the opportunities 
provided by election reform. In particular, Democratic voters will take significantly 
greater advantage of nonprecinct voting (both One Stop and absentee by mail) than 
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Republican voters, and the difference will be greater in Democratic-controlled counties. 
There are observable differences in the way in which supporters of the Democratic and 
Republican candidates, respectively, have chosen to take advantage of the opportunities 
for alternative voting methods provided by election reform. One Stop voting for the 
Democratic candidate was significantly and positively correlated with the percentages of 
several different groups of voters who were same day registrants, while the bivariate 
correlation with One Stop voting for the Republican candidate was significantly 
correlated only with the percentage of Republicans who used SDR. This indicates that 
SDR does play a greater role in the Democratic candidate’s vote total than it does in the 
Republican’s. The multivariate regression, however, indicated that the education variable 
was the most significant and influential predictor of the Democratic candidate’s vote 
percentage, followed by SDR as a percentage of total registration, both with positive 
coefficients. White percentage of VAP, with a negative coefficient, was also significant 
and influential. It appears that both population characteristics (race and education) and 
election reform factors (use of same day registration) affect the use of One Stop voting 
for Democratic candidates.  Partisan control of the commission, percentage under the 
poverty line, and the relative availability of One Stop voting were not significant factors 
in this equation. Only the education variable was significant in predicting the percentage 
of the Republican candidate’s vote which was cast One Stop, indicating (as has been 
discussed previously within this work) that education is the most significant predictor of 
voting regardless of the voter’s preference, while use of One Stop voting for the 
Democratic candidate is affected by factors which are not relevant for One Stop voting 
for the Republican.  
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 With respect to voting by mail in 2008 and 2012, the education (negative 
coefficient) and same day registration (positive coefficient) variables are significant as 
predicting the percentage of Democratic vote cast this way, but no variables are 
significant in predicting the percentage of Republican vote which is cast by mail. As 
previously observed, SDR and mail voting are mutually exclusive, which indicates that 
the greater use of SDR actually decreases the Democratic use of mail voting.  
 Hypothesis Six is supported with respect to greater overall Democratic use of One 
Stop voting, but not absentee voting by mail. Absentee voting by mail appears to be more 
frequently used by Republican voters than by Democrats, and therefore this section of the 
hypothesis is not supported.  
Hypothesis Seven: Same day registration, One Stop voting, and no-excuse 
absentee voting by mail will benefit the Democratic candidate for president to a greater 
degree than the Republican candidate, and this effect will be greater in counties with 
Democratic control of the commission. This was measured in a multivariate regression 
equation using the Democratic candidate’s percentage of the vote as the dependent 
variable. Hypothesis Seven posited that Same Day Registration, increased availability of 
One Stop voting, and the unrestricted availability of absentee voting would benefit the 
Democratic candidate to a greater extent than the Republican candidate. The 2008 model 
indicates that, contrary to expectations, SDR did not have a significant effect on Obama’s 
vote share in the state; nonprecinct voting in general and the relative availability of One 
Stop voting had no effect on Democratic vote share throughout the elections examined, 
although the percentage of vote cast One Stop did significantly and positively affect 
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Democratic vote share in 2012. Therefore, Hypothesis Seven is not supported except with 
respect to the use of One Stop voting in 2012 (when Obama actually lost the state). 
To summarize the findings of this study, election reform does not appear to have 
been implemented differently in counties where Democrats, as opposed to Republicans, 
control the commission which determines the funding available to the Board of Elections. 
This indicates that all prospective voters, regardless of their party affiliation or the 
predominant affiliation in their community, have had a relatively equal opportunity to 
take advantage of these reforms. Same day registration has increased registration for 
certain populations in certain circumstances, predominantly minority communities in the 
election year of 2008, but has not significantly increased registration overall. There was a 
Democratic advantage in SDR in 2008 which largely disappeared by 2012, so no long-
term partisan effect can be determined to result from it. Once a voter is registered, 
however, the availability of One Stop and no-excuse absentee voting have had a 
significant effect on turnout. Democrats have chosen to take greater advantage of One 
Stop voting (though the gap is shrinking), and Republicans have chosen to take greater 
advantage of no-excuse voting by mail, though the overall number of mail ballots is 
declining, as more Republicans who do not wish to vote on Election Day choose One 
Stop rather than mail voting. Republicans maintain an advantage in traditional Election 
Day polling place voting.  
Voter turnout has consistently increased in presidential elections in North 
Carolina since One Stop voting was introduced, and One Stop voting has now exceeded 
Election Day voting as a method of choice in the state. This would seem to indicate that 
there is some validity to the legal-institutionalist argument that nonvoting is caused by 
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structural barriers such as difficulties in registering and actually being able to cast a 
ballot. Removal of these barriers is, for some potential voters, both necessary and 
sufficient for their participation. However, this work has found that, in the elections 
studied, education has been the most consistently significant predictor of both voting in 
general and nonprecinct voting in particular. This is consistent with the findings of 
Gronke and various co-authors (Gronke and Galanes-Rosenbaum 2005; Gronke, Bishin, 
Stevens and Galanes-Rosenbaum 2005; Gronke, Hicks and Toffey 2009). It would thus 
appear that the increased availability of opportunities to vote has not increased the 
probability of less-well-educated citizens actually doing so. At the very least, this does 
not disprove the behavioralist argument made by Berinsky (2005) and Fitzgerald (2005), 
among others, that early voting has increased the socioeconomic stratification of the 
electorate.  
The recurring significance of the county’s white percentage of voting age 
population and its education level in the equations presented herein indicate that 
socioeconomic factors may remain more important than election reform in determining 
one’s likelihood of registering and voting, and for whom. The county’s level of poverty is 
inconsistent in its significance with respect to various types of election reform. It is 
significant (with a positive coefficient) with respect to the percentage of the vote cast 
nonprecinct over the five elections examined, but not when the equation is modified to 
control for heteroskedasticity, and not in the models specifically examining One Stop 
voting in 2008 and 2012. Poverty is significant (with a surprisingly positive coefficient) 
as a predictor of registered percentage of voting age population, but not significant with 
respect to the use of same day registration. It is significant, with a negative coefficient, 
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and the most influential factor in the equations predicting turnout of registered voters, but 
not with respect to turnout of voting age population. It thus appears that those below the 
poverty line may be more likely than others to register but not subsequently vote. Poverty 
does not appear to significantly affect a voter’s choice of voting method, whether the vote 
is cast for the Democratic or the Republican candidate. The poverty level is significant, 
with a positive coefficient, as a predictor of the Democratic candidate’s vote share, but 
not when the equation is adjusted to account for heteroskedasticity.  
Does the increased availability of the opportunity to register and vote reduce the 
Downsian “costs” of participation for significant numbers of potential voters? Most 
studies of early voting have found that its effect on voter turnout is, at best, marginally 
positive, and in some cases, actually negative. North Carolina appeared to have been an 
exception, but the variables employed herein do not attribute a significant effect 
specifically to election reform. The two Obama campaigns’ mobilization efforts in North 
Carolina were beyond the scope of the present study; however, their effects cannot be 
ignored. One cannot dismiss the arguments by Jackson (1996) and Southwell (2006) that 
voting for some citizens requires both mobilization and a choice which they perceive to 
be a meaningful one. Obama (very) narrowly won the state in his first race and narrowly 
lost it in his second one. Perhaps Gronke, Hicks and Toffey’s (2009) argument applies to 
North Carolina: the historic nature of Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign produced effects 
in the state which could not subsequently be duplicated by him or anyone else.  The 
present study’s findings would seem to indicate that eliminating the registration barrier, 
rather than the voting barrier, has a greater partisan effect. Same Day Registration was 
considerably more widely used in 2008 than in 2012, while One Stop voting has 
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consistently grown with each successive presidential election (despite a slight reduction 
in the number of One Stop sites from 2008 to 2012).  Nonetheless, the small variation in 
voting patterns observed by the present study may have a long-term effect in making 
North Carolina more politically competitive in national elections. 
By operationalizing a variable representing the number of potential voters per 
One Stop site, the present study was able to investigate partisan differences in the 
implementation of One Stop voting in counties whose commissions were controlled by 
Democrats and by Republicans. While Democratic counties implemented One Stop 
voting in a way which produced a significantly smaller number of potential “voters per 
site,” which would thus appear to indicate greater convenience, availability, and ease of 
access to the process in these counties, the study found that this did not translate into an 
automatic partisan advantage. 
This work has set out to explore a variety of factors related to election reform and 
its implementation in North Carolina. Of interest have been, first, the effect which 
partisan considerations, as represented by control of the county commission, might play 
in the implementation (or lack thereof) of reforms such as same day registration and One 
Stop voting. It does not appear that partisan factors have directly affected this 
implementation, although the effects have been observed in other ways, as described 
above. Also of interest was the effect of election reform on political participation, in the 
form of voter registration and ultimately the act of voting itself. The work has concluded 
that One Stop voting, the ability to vote at a location other than one’s assigned precinct 
polling place, has significantly increased participation and has had a long-term effect for 
supporters of both Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. Same day 
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registration has had a significant effect only in one election with a unique set of political 
circumstances. It cannot (yet?) be shown to have had a lasting effect on political behavior 
or participation.  
The conclusion to be drawn is that, in comparing the effects of the two dependent 
variables examined herein, the availability of nonprecinct voting has had a greater (and 
long-term) impact on turnout, while the availability of same day registration has 
produced greater (short-term) partisan benefit for the Democratic candidate. Both of these 
reforms benefited Obama in both of his campaigns; however, the decrease in Democratic 
same day registration from 2008 to 2012, accompanied by the increased use of One Stop 
voting by Romney supporters, appears to have erased his victory margin in 2012. The 
extent to which these two reforms may moderate each other’s effects, and the fact that 
these findings are not consistent with those of most other authors who have investigated 
these practices, are important subjects for future research. 
The enactment of election reform has produced partisan differences in the way 
groups of voters choose to express their preferences. Since the introduction of One Stop 
voting in North Carolina, Democrats have been more likely to use it than Republicans. 
This did not make a difference in the partisan outcome of a presidential election until 
2008, and the difference disappeared in 2012. The use of One Stop voting has also grown 
among Republicans as well as Democrats, while the use of Election Day voting has 
declined less among Republicans than among Democrats. While One Stop voting and 
same day registration contributed significantly to Barack Obama’s victory in North 
Carolina in 2008, election reform cannot be said to have produced a long-term advantage 
for the Democratic Party. Reform has made North Carolina an even more politically 
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competitive state than it was previously. The partisan advantage goes not automatically to 
one side or the other, but to whichever side is better able to mobilize its supporters and 
take advantage of the increased availability of political participation. 
It would appear, from the results of this work, that both institutional and 
behavioral theories of political participation bear some validity. Structural barriers to 
registration and voting have been reduced or removed altogether. Some previous 
nonvoters have chosen, or have been able, to take advantage of these structural reforms 
and join the participating electorate. Others have chosen to continue to abstain from 
political participation. The institutional theory would appear to apply to the former group, 
and the behavioral theory to the latter. Universal political participation in the United 
States will not occur without large-scale change in the orientation of many Americans to 
their government and their sense of political efficacy. This is beyond the scope of simply 
changing the manner in which elections are implemented and administered. Nonetheless, 
structural reform has indeed had a significant impact in a state with a history of low voter 
participation and a history of intentional, legally sanctioned disenfranchisement based on 
race. This impact should not be ignored or minimized simply because it has failed to be 
felt universally. 
A democratic system of politics and government requires citizen participation. A 
government cannot be truly representative of the people it serves if access to that 
participation is limited. Reforms to widen electoral participation and to improve voting 
technology have had the common goal of making the voting electorate more 
representative of the population as a whole, and thereby making elections a more accurate 
expression of the views of the community. The American democracy should be stronger 
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if these reforms have accomplished their goals. In addition, to the extent that increased 
participation affects the results of elections and the popular choice of leaders, these 
reforms will have large implications for public policy, because elections ultimately 
determine the policies which the system of government pursues and adopts. These issues 
therefore pose significant questions to be explored within the fields of politics and public 
policy, and the research undertaken herein has sought to make an intellectual and policy 
contribution to these fields of inquiry by exploring and assessing the effectiveness and 
impact of these policies.  
Policy Prescriptions and Epilogue 
There are a variety of potential outcomes for this research which could lead to 
substantive recommendations to policymakers. In the long term, each voting reform may, 
or may not, be shown to achieve its desired effect of increasing both overall voter 
participation and the representativeness of the voting population as it relates to the 
population as a whole. In this case, the reforms should continue in place. The reforms 
may complement or conflict with each other, i.e., one reform could be found to increase 
participation while another tends to decrease it. These findings would lead to policy 
recommendations to continue, discontinue, or amend the availability of each new practice 
individually. If the reforms are found to be largely ineffective, then whatever small-scale 
benefits might be observed likely cannot justify the substantial added time and expense to 
the election authorities of administering an election that takes place over weeks rather 
than on a single day. In this case, if the polity wishes to increase political participation, it 
must look elsewhere for an effective method of doing so. Findings as to the effectiveness 
of campaign mobilization in conjunction with these new opportunities for participation 
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would lead to strategy recommendations to future campaigns, candidates and strategists 
as to how to tailor one’s message and outreach in order to maximize the political gain to 
be obtained from the availability of these new forms of participation to one’s particular 
supporters. 
There are, of course, potential partisan effects as well. Given the perception that 
election reform in North Carolina has consistently benefited Democratic candidates, 
when the Republican Party took control of the General Assembly following the 2010 
elections, and the governorship in 2012, a move was made to undo those reforms or 
curtail their availability. On Aug. 13, 2013, Gov. Pat McCrory signed Session Law 2013-
581, which makes sweeping and significant changes to North Carolina election laws and 
procedures, effective beginning in 2014. Much of the content of the legislation is beyond 
the scope of the present study; among other provisions, it implements a photo 
identification requirement for voting, effective in 2016 (General Statutes 163-166.13); 
effective in 2014, it increases the opportunity for political party representatives or others 
to challenge a voter’s eligibility at the polling place (General Statutes 163-87); eliminates 
a preregistration program for 16- and 17-year-olds (repealing parts of General Statutes 
163-82, sections 1, 3 and 4); eliminates straight party ticket voting (General Statutes 163-
165[e]); eliminates public funding of certain elections (repealing parts of General Statutes 
163-22); and limits the circumstances under which a provisional ballot will be counted 
(General Statutes 163-55).  
Of particular interest to this study are the potential effects of this legislation on the 
three election reforms examined herein. The only changes which the law makes to 
absentee voting by mail are a new requirement that the ballot be witnessed by two people 
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when it is executed (General Statutes 163-229[b]) and slight changes to the procedure for 
applying for an absentee ballot (General Statutes 163-230.1). Same day registration is 
entirely eliminated (repealing much of General Statutes 163-82.6A). The first week of the 
One Stop voting period is eliminated; however, counties which operated multiple One 
Stop sites (in addition to the Board of Elections office or other single location) are 
required to offer One Stop voting in the primary and general election for the same 
number of total hours during which it was available during the corresponding primary 
and general election period in 2012 (the “total” being the cumulative number of hours at 
each site in the county). This may be achieved by any combination of extending the 
number of hours each site is open, or increasing the number of sites (General Statutes 
163.227.2, subsection g2). The legislation was enacted shortly after the U.S. Supreme 
Court removed the Voting Rights Act’s formula for requiring U.S. Justice Department 
approval of changes to voting procedures in jurisdictions where race-based electoral 
discrimination had historically occurred (Shelby County v. Holder, 2013). This made it 
possible for the law to be put into place without the state having to first rebut claims that 
it discriminated against African-American voters. Early voting and same day registration 
have reportedly been used disproportionately by black citizens, and thus they would be 
particularly disadvantaged by the reduction of one and the elimination of the other (a 
claim which was beyond the scope of the present study to evaluate). (Gordon 2013). 
The primary stated purpose of the legislation is to eliminate voter fraud, a 
problem the law’s supporters describe as “rampant and undetected.” (Gordon 2013; 
Christensen 2013) The potential policy consequences of these changes have been the 
subject of intense debate. While Same Day Registration peaked after its introduction in 
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2008 and tapered off significantly in 2012, its repeal would still potentially depress voter 
participation by returning the process of registration and voting to two steps, taken at 
least 25 days apart, rather than in “One Stop” at an early voting location. Public interest 
groups have described the law as “motivated to stop people from voting.” (Hair, as 
quoted in Morrill 2013) North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper argues that “this 
law makes registering and voting more difficult for many people.” (Cooper, as quoted in 
Morrill 2013) It is impossible to predict the effect of the changes to the early voting law 
without knowing how counties will choose to meet their obligations under it to match the 
number of total hours in which early voting was previously offered. If counties offer 
more early voting sites during a shorter period of time, turnout may not be significantly 
affected. If counties offer longer hours on a shorter number of days at the same number 
of sites, it is possible that turnout might increase among those who find their county’s 
existing hours of One Stop voting inconvenient (which would not, however, prevent them 
from casting an absentee ballot by mail). The elimination of same day registration cannot 
possibly contribute to an increase in political participation, but only a decrease. The 
minor alterations to the laws concerning absentee voting by mail will likely affect only a 
small proportion of the voting population, given the limited use of mail voting in recent 
elections in the state.  
It would be extremely unfortunate, and anti-“small-d” democratic if those whose 
ability to participate was made possible by election reform had that ability taken away by 
policymakers who simply did not agree with the outcome of the newly-empowered 
voter’s decisions. 
 
192 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
R. Michael Alvarez, Stephen Ansolabehere and Catherine H. Wilson, “Election Day 
Voter Registration in the United States [/] How One-Step Voting Can Change the 
Composition of the American Electorate,” Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, VTP 
Working Paper #5, June 2002. 
 
R. Michael Alvarez and Thad E. Hall, “Controlling Democracy: The Principal-Agent 
Problems in Election Administration,” The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2006 
 
-- “Resolving Voter Registration Problems: Making Registration Easier, Less Costly and 
More Accurate,” Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, VTP Working Paper #87, 
August 2009. 
 
R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall and Morgan Llewellyn, “Who Should Run Our 
Elections? Public Opinion About Election Governance in the United States,” 
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Working Paper #47, Feb. 2006. 
 
-- “Symposium Article: Law of Democracy: How Hard Can It Be: Do Citizens Think It Is 
Difficult to Register to Vote?”, Stanford Law & Policy Review, 18 Stan. L. &. Pol’y Rev. 
382, 2007. 
 
-- “Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are Counted?” The Journal of Politics, 
Volume 70, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 754-766. 
 
Austin Baird, “Early voters swarm election sites – Triangle election officials say wait 
times have eased after first-day rush,” The (Raleigh) News & Observer, Oct. 25, 2012. 
 
Michael Barone, Richard E. Cohen and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 
2008, Washington, DC: National Journal, 2007. 
 
Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, eds., The Almanac of American Politics 1994, 
Washington, DC: National Journal, 1993. 
 
Matt A. Barreto, Matthew J. Streb, Mara Marks and Fernando Guerra, “Do Absentee 
Voters Differ from Polling Place Voters?” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 2, 
Summer 2006, pp. 224-234.  
 
193 
 
Gary O. Bartlett and Veronica W. Degraffenreid, “North Carolina State Board of 
Elections: Report on Same Day Registration,” March 31, 2009. 
 
Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics, second ed., 
Athens, GA: Brown Thrasher Books, 1995. 
 
Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, “What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series 
Cross-Section Data,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 
634-647. 
 
Stephen Earl Bennett, “The Uses and Abuses of Registration and Turnout Data: An 
Analysis of Piven and Cloward’s Studies of Nonvoting in America,” PS: Political 
Science and Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 166-171. 
 
Adam J. Berinsky, “The Perverse Consequences of Election Reform in the United 
States,” American Politics Research, 2005 33:471. 
 
Adam J. Berinsky, Nancy Burns and Michael W. Traugott, “Who Votes by Mail? A 
Dynamic Model of the Individual-Level Consequences of Voting-by-Mail Systems,” 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 178-197.  
 
J. Michael Bitzer, “In North Carolina, It’s Not Election Day – It’s Election Month: An 
Analysis of the 2008 Election,” The American Review of Politics, Vol. 31, Fall, 2010: 
223-244. 
 
Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
Lynn Bonner, Valerie Bauerlein and David Raynor, “GOP clinched victories with Nov. 2 
voting,” The (Raleigh) News & Observer, Dec. 9, 2004. 
 
Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman, “Beyond SES: A ‘Resource 
Model’ of Political Participation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 
(June 1995), pp. 271-294. 
 
Craig Leonard Brians and Bernard Grofman, “When registration barriers fall, who votes? 
An empirical test of a rational choice model,” Public Choice 99: 161-176, 1999. 
 
-- “Election Day Registration’s Effect on U.S. Voter Turnout,” Social Science Quarterly, 
Volume 82, Number 1, March 2001. 
 
194 
 
Sommer Brokaw, “GOP sweep alters landscape,” The Charlotte Post, Nov. 11, 2010. 
 
Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer and Donald P. Moynihan, “The 
Effects and Costs of Early Voting, Election Day Registration, and Same Day Registration 
in the 2008 Elections,” Report presented to the Pew Charitable Trusts, December 21, 
2009. 
 
-- “Early Voting and Election Day Registration in the Trenches: Local Officials’ 
Perception of Election Reform,” Election Law Journal, Volume 10, Number 2, 2011, pp. 
89-102. 
 
Jerry W. Calvert and Jack Gilchrist, “Suppose They Held an Election and Almost 
Everybody Came!”, PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), pp. 
695-700. 
 
Steven Carbo, “Did Same Day Registration Tip The Election in North Carolina?”, Dēmos 
Ideas & Action Blog, November 25, 2008, retrieved from demos.org on August 29, 2011. 
 
Rob Christensen, “Chance to vote stretches wider – New rules may boost turnout, but 
effect on results unknown,” The (Raleigh) News & Observer, Sept. 16, 2000. 
 
-- “Obama turns tide in N.C., “ The (Raleigh) News & Observer, Nov. 6, 2008. 
 
-- “Lawmakers not targeting true vote fraud,” The Charlotte Observer, Apr. 17, 2013. 
 
Rob Christensen and Jack D. Fleer, “North Carolina: Between Helms and Hunt No 
Majority Emerges,” Ch. 3 in Alexander P. Lamis, ed., Southern Politics in the 1990s, 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999. 
 
Stuart Comstock-Gay, “Update on Election Day Registration,” National Civic Review, 
Winter 2007, pp. 56-58. 
 
Congressional Quarterly, Politics in America, various editions: 
 The 100th Congress, Alan Ehrenhalt, ed., Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1987. 
1996 edition, Philip D. Duncan and Christine C. Lawrence, eds., Washington, 
DC: CQ Press, 1995. 
2002 edition, Brian Nutting and H. Amy Stern, eds., Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2001. 
2006 edition, Jackie Koszczuk and H. Amy Stern, eds., Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2005. 
195 
 
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, State of North Carolina, as quoted in Jim Morrill, “Voter 
law could draw lawsuits – N.C. attorney general concerned about major election law 
changes,” The (Raleigh) News & Observer, Aug. 4, 2013. 
 
Pedro De Oliviera, “Same Day Voter Registration: Post-Crawford Reform to Address the 
Growing Burdens on Lower-Income Voters,” Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & 
Policy, 16 Geo. J. Poverty Law & Pol’y 345, Spring 2009. 
 
Dēmos, “Election Day Registration,” National Civic Review, Summer 2007, pp. 49-51. 
 
-- “What is Same Day Registration? Where Is It Available?” 
http://www.demos.org/publication/what-same-day-registration-where-it-available, 
retrieved on June 11, 2013. 
 
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row, 1957. 
 
Joshua J. Dyck, Brian J. Gaines and Daron R. Shaw, “The Effect of Local Political 
Context on How Americans Vote,” American Politics Research 2009 37:1088. 
 
Joshua J. Dyck and James G. Gimpel, “Distance, Turnout, and the Convenience of 
Voting,” Social Science Quarterly, Volume 86, Number 3, September 2005. 
 
Mark J. Fenster, “The Impact of Allowing Day of Registration Voting on Turnout in U.S. 
Elections from 1960 to 1992: A Research Note,” American Politics Research 1994 22:74 
 
Mary Fitzgerald, “Greater Convenience But Not Greater Turnout: The Impact of 
Alternative Voting Methods on Electoral Participation in the United States,” American 
Politics Research 2005 33:842. 
 
John Fortier, Absentee and Early Voting [/] Trends, Promises and Perils,  The AEI Press, 
2006. 
 
John Frank, “Election officials urge fund release,” The (Raleigh) News & Observer, Feb. 
7, 2012. 
 
Curtis Gans, “A Rejoinder to Piven and Cloward,” PS: Political Science and Politics, 
Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1990). 
 
196 
 
-- “Making It Easier Doesn’t Work: No Excuse Absentee and Early Voting Hurt Voter 
Turnout; Create Other Problems,” Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, 
news release, September 13, 2004. 
 
Joseph D. Giammo and Brian J. Brox, “Reducing the Costs of Participation: Are States 
Getting a Return on Early Voting?” Political Research Quarterly 2010 63:295. 
 
James G. Gimpel, Joshua J. Dyck and Daron R. Shaw, “Location, knowledge and time 
pressures in the spatial structure of convenience voting,” Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 35-
58. 
 
Michael Gordon, “Voting fight: race or politics? Challengers to state’s restrictive laws 
must prove ‘intentional discrimination’,” The Charlotte Observer, Oct. 20, 2013. 
 
Stan Greenberg and James Carville, “The 2008 Early Vote [/] Obama dominates among 
new electorate,” press release, Democracy Corps/Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, 
Jan. 13, 2009. 
 
Paul Gronke, “Early Voting Reforms and American Elections,” paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 2004. 
 
Paul Gronke, Benjamin Bishin, Daniel Stevens and Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, “Early 
Voting in Florida, 2004,” paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1, 2005. 
 
Paul Gronke and Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, “Getting out the Early Vote: Lessons for 
Progressives,” A Report Prepared for the Progressive Targeting Conference, The Center 
for American Progress, August 31, 2005. 
 
-- , “The Growth of Early and Non-Precinct Place Balloting: When, Why, and Prospects 
for the Future,” Reed College and the Early Voting Information Center, manuscript, c. 
2007. 
 
Paul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum and Peter A. Miller, “Early Voting and Turnout,” 
PS, October 2007, pp. 639-645. 
 
Paul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Peter A. Miller and Daniel Toffey, “Convenience 
Voting,” Annual Review of Political Science 2008.11.437-55. 
 
197 
 
Paul Gronke, James Hicks and Daniel Krantz Toffey, “N=1? The Anomalous 2008 
Election and Lessons for Reform,” Early Voting Information Center at Reed College, 
manuscript, 2009. 
 
Paul Gronke and Peter A.M. Miller, “Voting by Mail and Turnout: A Replication and 
Extension,” paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association. 
 
Paul Gronke and Daniel Krantz Toffey, “The Psychological and Institutional 
Determinants for Early Voting,” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2008, pp. 503-
524. 
 
Stefan Haag, CPPPS Report #5, “Early Voting in Texas: What Are the Effects?” Austin 
Community College, Center for Public Policy and Political Studies, 2010. 
 
Penda Hair, Advancement Project, as quoted in Jim Morrill, “Voter law could draw 
lawsuits – N.C. attorney general concerned about major election law changes,” The 
(Raleigh) News & Observer, Aug. 4, 2013. 
 
John Mark Hansen, “Early Voting, Unrestricted Absentee Voting, and Voting by mail,” 
Task Force on the Federal Election System, 2001. 
 
Richard L. Hasen, “Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown,” 62 Wash. &. Lee L. Rev. 937 (2005). 
 
Benjamin Highton, “Easy Registration and Voter Turnout,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 
59, No. 2 (May, 1997), pp. 565-575. 
 
-- “Voter Registration and Turnout in the United States,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, 
No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 507-515. 
 
Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger, “Estimating the Effects of the National 
Voter Registration Act of 1993,” Political Behavior, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1998, pp. 79-104. 
 
Robert A. Jackson, “A Reassessment of Voter Mobilization,” Political Research 
Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2 (June 1996), pp. 341-349. 
 
Morgen S. Johansen, “Getting the Worm by Encouraging the Early Bird: Early Voting, 
Party Mobilization, and Their Influence on Voter Turnout,” Texas A&M University, 
manuscript, 2006. 
198 
 
Mark Johnson, “Early voting favors no party – process helps those who plan better, have 
more money, researchers say,” The Charlotte Observer, Dec. 15, 2004. 
 
Mark Johnson and Jim Morrill, “Court asked to quash early voting,” The Charlotte 
Observer, October 20, 2000. 
 
Alison Jones, “Some voters can get to polls very early,” The [Raleigh] News & Observer, 
Oct. 6, 1992. 
 
Jeffrey A. Karp and Susan Banducci, “Going Postal: How All-Mail Elections Influence 
Turnout,” Political Behavior, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 2000) pp. 223-239. 
 
--“Absentee Voting, Mobilization, and Participation,” American Politics Research 2001 
29:183. 
 
Kate Kenski, “No Excuse Absentee and Early Voting During the 2000 and 2004 
Elections: Results from the National Annenberg Election Survey,” manuscript, 2005. 
 
David C. Kimball and Martha Kropf, “The Street-Level Bureaucrats of Elections: 
Selection Methods for Local Election Officials,” Review of Policy Research 23: 1257-68 
(2006). 
 
David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf and Lindsay Battles, “Helping America Vote? Election 
Administration, Partisanship, and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Election,” Election Law 
Journal Volume 5, Number 4, 2006. 
 
V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 
1949. 
 
James D. King and Rodney A. Wambeam, “Impact of Election Day Registration on Voter 
Turnout: A Quasi-experimental Analysis,” Policy Studies Review, Autumn/Winter 
1995/1996, 14:3/4, pp. 263-278. 
 
Stephen Knack, “Does ‘Motor Voter’ Work? Evidence from State-Level Data,”  The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 3, August 1995, pp. 796-811. 
 
-- “Drivers Wanted: Motor Voter and the Election of 1996,” PS: Political Science and 
Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 237-243. 
 
199 
 
-- “Election-day Registration: The Second Wave,” American Politics Research 2001 
29:65. 
 
Stephen Knack and James White, “Election-Day Registration and Turnout Inequality,” 
Political Behavior, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000. 
 
Thad Kousser and Megan Mullin, “Does Voting by Mail Increase Participation? Using 
Matching to Analyze a Natural Experiment,” Political Analysis, Advance Access 
published July 13, 2007. 
 
Martha E. Kropf, “Does Early Voting Change the Socio-Economic Composition of the 
Electorate?” Poverty & Public Policy, Vol. 4: Issue 1, Article 3, 2012. 
 
Martha Kropf, Timothy Vercellotti and David C. Kimball, “Representative Bureaucracy 
and Partisanship: The Implementation of Election Law,” Public Administration Review, 
March-April 2013, pp. 242-252. 
 
Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-Party South, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
Roger Larocca and John S. Klemanski, “U.S. State Election Reform and Turnout in 
Presidential Elections,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 2011 11:76. 
 
Jan E. Leighley, “Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political 
Participation,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Mar. 1995), pp. 181-209. 
 
Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler, “Electoral Laws and Turnout, 1972-2008,” paper 
prepared for the Fourth Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of 
Southern California, November 2009. 
 
Brooke Lierman, “Short Essay and Book Review [/] Election Day Registration: Giving 
All Americans a Fair Chance to Vote,” Harvard Law & Policy Review, 2 Harv. L & 
Pol’y Rev. 173, Winter, 2008. 
 
Randall D. Lloyd, “Voter Registration Reconsidered: Putting First Things First is Not 
Enough,” American Politics Research 2001 29:549. 
 
Paul Luebke, Tar Heel Politics 2000, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1998. 
 
200 
 
Seth E. Masket, “Did Obama’s Ground Game Matter? The Influence of Local Field 
Offices During the 2008 Presidential Election,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 
5, 2009, pp. 1023-1039. 
 
Michael P. McDonald, “Portable Voter Registration,” Political Behavior (2008), 30:491-
501, cited as 2008a. 
 
-- “The Return of the Voter: Voter Turnout in the 2008 Presidential Election,” The 
Forum, Volume 6, Issue 4, 2008, cited as 2008b. 
 
Jim Morrill, “Early Voting Was a Hit But May Not Increase Turnout,” The Charlotte 
Observer, Nov. 4, 2000. 
 
Jim Morrill and Ted Mellnik, “Record N.C. voter rolls might help Democrats,” The 
(Raleigh) News & Observer, Oct. 1, 2008. 
 
The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, “To Assure Pride and Confidence 
in the Electoral Process,” August 2001. 
 
National Conference of State Legislatures, “Absentee and Early Voting,” 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx#, 
updated May 28, 2013, retrieved on June 11, 2013. 
 
-- “Same Day Registration,” http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/same-
day-registration.aspx, updated May 15, 2013, retrieved on June 11, 2013, cited as 2013a. 
 
Grant Neeley and Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., “Who is early voting? An individual level 
examination,” The Social Science Journal 38, 2001, 381-392. 
 
Benjamin Niolet and Samiha Khanna, “Long lines linger as early voting ends,” The 
(Raleigh) News & Observer, Oct. 31, 2004. 
 
David Niven, "The Mobilization Calendar: The Time-Dependent Effects of Personal 
Contact on Turnout," American Politics Research, May 2002, Vol. 30, Issue 3, p. 307. 
 
-- "The Mobilization Solution? Face-to-Face Contact and Voter Turnout in a Municipal 
Election," The Journal of Politics, Aug., 2004, Vol. 66, Issue 3, pp. 868-884. 
 
201 
 
North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State, Publications Division, Directory of 
State and County Officials in North Carolina, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2007 
editions. 
 
North Carolina General Assembly, Session Law 2013-381. 
 
North Carolina General Statutes 163, 226, and 254. 
 
North Carolina State Board of Elections, “One-stop Absentee Voting,” 
http://www.ncsbe.gov/content.aspx?id=135, retrieved on June 11, 2013. 
 
-- “Registering to Vote in North Carolina,” 
http://www.ncsbe.gov/content.aspx?id=1&s=1, retrieved on July 1, 2013. 
 
-- “Voter Registration Frequently Asked Questions,” 
http://www.ncsbe.gov/content.aspx?id=25, retrieved on July 1, 2013. 
 
J. Eric Oliver, “The Effects of Eligibility Restrictions and Party Activity on Absentee 
Voting and Overall Turnout,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 2 
(May, 1996), pp. 498-513. 
 
Timothy G. O’Rourke, “Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come,” Ch. 3 in Anthony 
A. Peacock, ed., Affirmative Action and Representation [/] Shaw v. Reno and the Future 
of Voting Rights, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1997. 
 
Pamlico County, North Carolina, Board of Elections, 
http://www.pamlicocounty.org/board-of-elections.aspx, retrieved on June 14, 2013. 
 
Jen Pilla, “In N.C., Election Begins Today,” The Charlotte Observer, Oct. 16, 2000. 
 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Why Americans Still Don’t Vote And Why 
Politicians Want It That Way, Boston: Beacon Press, 2000. 
 
Wade Rawlins, “Future election days could last for weeks,” The (Raleigh) News & 
Observer, November 2, 1993. 
 
Wade Rawlins and Lynn Bonner, “Police called to restore order in House,” The (Raleigh) 
News & Observer, July 14, 2000. 
 
202 
 
David Rice and Dana Damico, “House Gridlock Yields 2 Speakers – Black and Morgan 
Will Share Control of Evenly Split Chamber,” Winston-Salem Journal, Feb. 6, 2003. 
 
Staci L. Rhine, “Registration Reform and Turnout Change in the American States,” 
American Politics Research 1995 23:409. 
 
Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr., and Grant W. Neeley, “The Impact of Early Voting on 
Turnout: the 1994 Elections in Tennessee,” State & Local Government Review, Vol. 28, 
No. 3 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 173-179. 
 
Sean Richey, “Voting by Mail: Turnout and Institutional Reform in Oregon,” Social 
Science Quarterly, Volume 89, Number 4, December 2008. 
 
Elizabeth Rigby and Melanie J. Springer, “Does Electoral Reform Increase (or Decrease) 
Political Equality?” Political Research Quarterly, published online August 4, 2010. 
 
Rocky Mount Telegram, uncredited article, “Election officials urge legislature to release 
federal funds,” Feb. 10, 2012. 
Margaret Rosenfield, “Innovations in Election Administration 9 / Early Voting,” National 
Clearinghouse on Election Administration, Federal Election Commission, April 1994. 
  
Steven J. Rosenstone and Raymond E. Wolfinger, “The Effect of Registration Laws on 
Voter Turnout,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 1 (Mar., 1978), pp. 22-
45. 
 
Jason Sandford, “Voting Gets Much Easier,” (Asheville) Citizen-Times, Jul. 30, 2000. 
 
Russell K. Schutt, Investigating the Social World [/] The Process and Practice of 
Research, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2006. 
 
Shelby County, Alabama, vs. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et. al., 570 U.S. ___ 
(2013). 
 
Priscilla L. Southwell, “Research Note [/] Alienation and Nonvoting in the United States: 
Crucial Interactive Effects Among Independent Variables,” Journal of Political and 
Military Sociology 1986, Vol. 14 (Fall) 249-261. 
 
-- “Five Years Later: A Re-Assessment of Oregon’s Vote by Mail Electoral Process,” PS: 
Political Science and Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 89-93. 
 
203 
 
Peverill Squire, Raymond E. Wolfinger, and David P. Glass, “Residential Mobility and 
Voter Turnout,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 1, March 1987, pp. 45-
66. 
 
Robert M. Stein, “Early Voting,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 62:57-69, 1998. 
 
Robert M. Stein and Patricia A. Garcia-Monet, “Voting Early but Not Often,” Social 
Science Quarterly, Volume 78, Number 3, September 1997. 
 
Robert M. Stein, Jan Leighley and Christopher Owens, “Voting, Early Voting and the 
Determinants of Vote Choice: Is Timing Everything?” Paper prepared for presentation at 
the 2004 Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 15-19. 
 
Robert M. Stein, Chris Owens and Jan Leighley, “Electoral Reform, Party Mobilization 
and Voter Turnout,” unpublished and undated manuscript (cited as 2003 in same authors’ 
2004 paper, above). 
 
James A. Stimson, “Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay,” American 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 914-947. 
 
Katherine Tate, “Black Political Participation in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential 
Elections,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4, December 1991. 
 
Dianne T. Thompson, Congressional Redistricting in North Carolina [/] Reconsidering 
Traditional Criteria, New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2002. 
 
“Under the Dome,” uncredited column, “N.C. voter participation swelled in 2008,” The 
(Raleigh) News & Observer, Dec. 30, 2008. 
 
Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America [/] Political Democracy and 
Social Equality, New York: Harper and Row, 1972.  
 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Public Law 97-205. 
 
Alex Wayne, “Early Vote Spawning Conflict,” (Greensboro) News & Record, Oct. 15, 
2000. 
 
Alex Wayne and Denise Becker, “Early Birds Flocked to Polls [/] In Some Counties, 
Nearly 11 Percent of Registered Voters Cast Their Votes by the End of the Early Election 
Period,” Greensboro News & Record, Nov. 4, 2000. 
204 
 
Herbert L. White, “Dems see early vote as Nov. 4 barometer,” The Charlotte Post, Oct. 
16, 2008. 
 
Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980. 
 
John Zebrowski, “Absentee ballots trickier to get,” The (Raleigh) News & Observer, Aug. 
30, 2003. 
  
205 
 
VITA 
 
 
John Thomas Roddey Holder 
Born: Rock Hill, South Carolina, May 11, 1962. 
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania, 1985. 
Master of Arts in Political Science, The George Washington University, Washington, 
D.C., 1990. 
Master of Philosophy in Political Science, The George Washington University, 1993. 
 
Co-author (with Angela Roddey Holder), The Meaning of the Constitution, Barrons 
Educational Series, 1997. 
 
Adjunct faculty member (Lecturer/Instructor) in Political Science, Winthrop University, 
Rock Hill, South Carolina, 1995-2005, 2007-2008, 2012-present. 
 
Graduate Teaching Fellow in Political Science, The George Washington University, 
1991-1994. 
 
Professional Associations: 
American Political Science Association 
Southern Political Science Association 
North Carolina Political Science Association (Executive Board member, 2013-present) 
South Carolina Political Science Association 
 
 
 
 
